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1. During this period two calendars were in use* Until 31st
December 1751, the Julian or Old style was the legal calendar in
Great Britain* This was eleven days behind the Gregorian, or
New style calendar used in all other European countries except
Russia and Turkey# The legal beginning of the year in England,
moreover, was Lady Day, 25th March, not 1st January as in the
rest of l&arope# It was common practice in England to date
letters until 1752 using both styles# In Scotland, however,
January 1st had been adopted as New Year's Day since 1600. This,
the contemporary Scottish practice is adopted here, by which dates
of the month accord with the Julian or Old style calendar (unless
otherwise stated) but the year is held to begin on January 1st#
Ix.
INTRODUCTION .
Any military body which is essentially an irregularly raised
volunteer force presents certain peculiar problems of recruitment,
discipline and organisation# The resources available to a regular
army to secure enlistment, discipline and supplies, were, because of
its very nature, denied to the Jacobite army of 1745/6. The methods,
however, by which the problems of recruitment, discipline and finance
were solved by the rebel army were often to play a decisive part in
the fate of the rebellion as a whole# Problems of local recruitment,
and the availability of small parties of men to enforce recruiting or
levy money, were often to affect the fortunes of the rebel army
operating at a distance of several counties.
In one sense such local activities remained isolated from the
main strategy, for local recruitment was apparently much less affected
by the varying fortunes of the main force than might have been expected.
It is difficult to trace a discernible pattern between important
military successes or reverses and local recruitment#
Local recruitment, for instance, was affected primarily by the
presence locally of the main force rather than by the news of
military actions elsewhere#
The major actions of the campaign do not appear to have had a
decisive effect on recruitment, even in their own immediate neighbour¬
hood# From, for instance, the St# Andrews district, out of a total
of forty-four rebel recruits in the official "List of Persons
(1)
concerned in the Rebellion," only five joined after the Jacobite
(1) "A List of Persons concerned in the Rebellion," transmitted to
the Commissioners of Excise# Preface by the Earl of Rosebery,
Scottish History Society Vol# VIII#1890# pages 62 et seq.
victory of Prestonpans. Again, from Haddington, an area whioh
one would also expect to reflect the action at Prestonpans, oui
(1)
of fifty-nine recruits, only ten joined after that battle.
These statistics alone, of course, are not conclusive. The lists
of named adherents are not exhaustive and precise details of time
of adherence are not given in all cases. The figures do, however,
serve to suggest that the factors which explain local recruitment
(2)
are complex rather than simple. Such factors are examined
separately in relation to each geographical area.
It should also be noted, however, that the adherence of
recruits did not necessarily mean that the men would be available
(3)
for anything more than local activity. Because of the large
number of local adherents who, for various reasons, never joined
the main Jacobite force, statistics of numbers recruited often
differ sharply from the size of the aotual fighting body at any
given time.
The total operational force of the Jacobite army never ex¬
ceeded the figure of nine thousand men. Sight thousand men were
in aotion at the battle of Falkirk^ and a further one thousand!^
under the Duke of Perth, were engaged in the siege of Stirling
Castle and in the transporting of the Jacobite artillery. This
period saw the largest number of men in arms simultaneously.
(1) Hosebery. op. cit. p.132 et seq.
(2) Below Chapters 1,2,3, and 4.
(3) See below Chapters 3 and 4 particularly.
(4) ELcho. p.372. This number is also accepted by Blalkie (p.96)
"Itinerary of Prince Charles Edward Stuart." Walter Biggar
Blaikie. Edinburgh University Press, Scot. Hist. Society 1897.
(5) Lord John Drummond's Regiment, the Farquharsons, under Monaltrie,
and some of Glenbuckets. See below, Chapter 3.
xl.
(1)
Blaikie estimates that only five thousand served at Culloden,
while at Prestonpans the rebel force consisted of a maximum of
two thousand five hundred.
On the march into England the rebel force numbered at the
most five thousand five hundred, although during that march Lord
John Drummond commanded a supplementary force at Perth of at least
three thousand, giving an operational total available of something
over eight thousand five hundred,^
We are presented, from these figures, with a maximum Jacobite
operational force of no more than nine thousand men. A detailed
reference, however, to all contemporary accounts available^4)
would suggest that the actual number of men recruited for the
Jacobite army between August 19th, 1745 and April 16th, 1746
would total between 13,140 and 11,470 men. This figure does
not include the French reinforcements which arrived during the
campaign.^ With such reinforcements included, the total would
be between 14,140 and 12,470.
This force was made up in the following way.
Recruited from the counties of Aberdeen, Banff, Moray and Nairn,
(1) "Itinerary," p.97»
(2) Gentleman's Magazine. October, 1745.
(3) Eleho. p.322. Lord Elcho's figures are here, again, the largest
contemporary estimate and are cited for that reason.
(4) These sources consist chiefly of the following materials.
(A) The contemporary accounts of Lord Hcho, the Chevalier
Johnstone, Sir John Macdonald, Colonel John 0'Sullivan,
John Murray of Broughton, Lord George Murray, Maxwell
of Klrkconnell, and Donald Macdonald of Lochgarry.
(B) The contemporary correspondence of Lord Tullibardine,
Lord Pitsligo, Lord Cromartie and his son, Ludovick Grant,
Forbes of Culloden and others.
(C) Miscellaneous Mss. especially in the West Highland Museum,
Fort William, the Charter Room at Blair Castle and the
National Library of Scotland. Further details of all these
sources will be given below, in the text, and also In the
Bibliography,
(5) RAA flhflnf.o* 7
xli.
and serving in the Gordon, Farquharson or Pitsligo regiments
between £,000 and 3,230 men^)
Recruited from Perthshire and serving in the Atholl Brigade
at least 2,990 men^
Recruited from Dundee and Angus and serving under Lord Ogilvy - 900
men * '
Recruited by the Duke of Perth - 300 men^(Included in the Perth¬
shire totals)
From the Western Highlands,
1, Clanranalds, including Macdonalds of Kinlochmoidart and
Morar - 400 or 450 men ^3)
2. Garaerons - 1,000 or 1,200 men^
3. Keppocha, including some Mackizmons and Macdonalds of Glencoe
- 600 men^
4, Glengarry*s (including Macdonalds of Morar, Barrisdale and
Scotus, Macleods of Raasay, Grants of Glenmoriston and
Glenurquhart and some Mackenzies) - 860 men^
(1) See below Chapter 3 for further details of this force.
(2) See below Chapter 2,
(3) See below Chapter 4.
(4) See below Chapter 2, p.37
(5) Made up of about 200 (according to O'Sullivan - "1745 and After."
A. & H. Tayler. p.60) or of 300 (aocording to Maxwell of
Kirkconnell - "Narrative of Charles, Prince of Wales*
Expedition to Scotland in the Year 1745" James Maxwell of
Kirkconnell, Edin, Maitland Club 1841. p.27) who were already
in arms by August 19th, 1745 plus a further 150 who joined
Lord Strathallan at Perth in November, 1745 (ELcho p.322).
(6) Made up of 700 or 900 at Glenfinnan on August 19th, 1745.
0*Sullivan put the figure at 700 (1745 and After" p.60) and
Blaikie (p.8) accepts this figure, but Sir John Macdonald
("1745 and After" p.60) puts the figure at 900. A further
300 joined Strathallan at Perth in November, 1745 (ELcho p.322).
(7) Heho p.372,
(8) Made up of 500 recruited by the beginning of November (ELcho
plan Jntfet p*324) 100 brought to Perth by Young Glengarry
(Elcho p.322) and a further 260 raised by Barrisdale (ibid.p.322)
O'Sullivan (p.63) confirms these figures.
xiii.
5, Macdonalds of Glencoe - 180 mail ^
(2)
0. Appln Stuarts - 310 men
Gromartie Regiment - 420 or 460^
Macphersons under Cluny - 400^
(5 \
Frasers - 600
Mackintoshes - 200 ^6 ^
Maclachlans and Madeane - 350^
(8)
Chisholms - between 100 and 200
(1) Made up of 120 recruited about August 26th (Patullo the Muster
Master's figures, Blaikie p.9) and a further 60 who reached
Edinburgh on September 11th, 1745 fLyon in Mourning," Soot.
Hist. Society VcQ.XX - XXII Journal of Duncan Cameron Vol.2
p.201 et seq.)• A further 100 joined at Ferth in November,
1745 (ELcho p.322) but served under Keppoch and are
included there.
(2) Made up of 260 who joined on Aug.26th (Patullo's figure,
Blaikie p.9) and 150 under Stewart of Invernahyle who
joined at Perth in November (ELcho p.322) •
(3) Made up of between 260 and 300 raised during November in
Wester Ross by Lord Macleod (Sir Bruce Seton, "Prisoners
of the Forty-Five," Vol.1. Soot. Hist. Society, lain,
Univ. Press 1928 p.310) mid a further 160 raised by Barrisdale
during March, 1746 in Wester Ross ("Culloden Papers," Edit.
Warrand. p.57). See also Chapter 1 for further details of
Barrisdale and his activities.
(4) 300 Maophersons fought at Falkirk in January, 1746. (Elcho p.
372) but Cluny had a force of up to 400 in Badenoch by
March, 1746. See below Chapter £p.fcb).
(5) Made up of 300 at the Battle of Falkirk (Elcho p.372) and a
further 300 reorulted by the Master of Lovat by April, 1746
(TSIistory of the Rebellion in the Year 1745." John Home,
London T. Cadell end Davies, 1802 p.218).
(6) Brought by MacGillivray of Drumnaglass to Perth in November,
1745 (ELcho p.322), The rest of the unit, which was also
known as Lady Mackintosh's Regiment seems to have been
recruited from Farquharsons and others counted elsewhere.
(7) Made up of about 150 brought by Lachlan Maclachlan on Sept¬
ember 18th to Edinburgh with Lord Nairn (Atholl Correspon¬
dence p.15) and about 200 Macleans under Maclean of Drimmin
raised after Falkirk (Lochgarry's Narrative. Blaikie.
Postscript p«112 et seq.)
(8) sir Bruce Seton Op. cit. p.309, Vol. 1.
xiV.
Miscellaneous troops - Roy Stuarts • about 450^
Jacobite Horse - about 410^not including
150 of Pitsligo*s Horse, already Included in the numbers from
the North Eastern counties*
The total of between ten and twelve thousand recruits, shown
above to have been enrolled between July, 1745 and April, 1746,
compares with an operational total of approximately nine thousand
men* The difference of possibly one, and at the most three
thousand between these two totals must largely be accounted for
by desertions.
This gap between the two totals is not, however, as large
as the frequent contemporary complaints of desertion would lead
us to expect.x ' Two conclusions are, therefore, suggested by
the smallness of this gap. The first is that almost certainly
the rate of desertion throughout the army was not as large as
has hitherto been believed. Desertion was undoubtedly high
among the Atholl Brigade, but there is little to show that it
ever reached a comparable figure in other regiments. Contempo¬
rary accounts, however, tend to presume that desertion on an equal
scale was common to all the Highland Regiments.^
The actual numbers enlisted in many Jacobite regiments were
often disappointingly smaller than the numbers expected by those
(1) Made up of those recruited by him in the area of Edinburgh
during September and October, 1745, and 250 Stewarts cf
Grandtully.
(2) Made up of Elcho's Horse (150 men) The Perthshire Horse
(150 men). The Hussars (70 men) and Balmerino*s Horse
(40 man) Elcho p.324.
(3) See below, Chapter 3.
(4) Below, in Chapter 3, this point is further examined.
XV.
In command. This is the second conclusion suggested by the
figures. The expectations of those in command were based on
the optimistic reports of early numbers to be enlisted, or
already enlisted, by local agents, but in many cases such
numbers never reaohed the main Jacobite body at all. On
September 19th, 1745, for instance, Lord Tullibardine wrote
from Dunkeld to Lord Ogilvy, who was recruiting in the Cortoohy
area to tell him that the Jacobite High Command in Edinburgh
(1)
believed "you and the Mar men were 800 strong" , When,
however, these Mar recruits, under Farquharson of Monaltrie,
reached Dunkeld on September 29th they numbered only seventy
or eighty men,^ while the Ogilvy recruits vho reached Edinburgh
on October 3rd, under Lord Ogilvy, were estimated by Lord Hcho
to consist of as few as 500 men.
While in charge of Atholl recruiting during September and
October, 1745, Lord Tullibardine was frequently misled as to the
actual numbers his agents had raised* He was led to believe,
for instance, that Robertson of Struan had raised a further 100*
between early September, 1745 and October 12th when in fact it
is very doubtful whether Struan had raised any such numbers at
this point. Later, in January and February of 1748, there is
an even mora marked disparity between the numbers apparently
enlisted by local agents and the real figures, Spalding of
(1) "Jacobite Correspondence of the Atholl Family, during the
Rebellion of 1745/6," Edln, Abbotsford Club, 1840 p.20,
(2) Atholl correspondence p.36. Letter from Robert Mercer of
Aldie, of September 29th,
XVi.
Glenkllrie had reported to Tullibardine that h© had enlisted
200 men, and pay and arms for these men were sent to him by
Tullibardine, but as late as February 8th, 1746 no such men had
actually appeared In arms, and there is no record of their ever
doing so.^
Such examples of inaccurate and exaggerated enlistment
figures are frequent from both the Perthshire and North Eastern
areas, and are dlsoussed in more details in Chapters 2 and 3*
They serve here as a reminder that, while contemporaries tended
to blame desertion for disappointingly small Jacobite levies, in
actual fact the totals seemed only small beoause of misleading
preliminary information.
The totals recruited, moreover, suggest an interesting geo*
graphical pattern of recruitment. The Jacobite force of 1745/6
has generally been considered to be a predominately Highland or
even West Highland levy, and it is true that the counties of
Ross, Cromarty, Inverness and Argyll and ths Islands produced
(2)
between 43$ end 46# of the total force raised • It should,
however, be noted that two considerable smaller geographical areas
produced equally important contributions to the Jacobite Levy.
These areas were the North Eastern counties of Moray, Aberdeen and
(3)
Banff which between them produced between 17# and 24# of the force
and the county of Perthshire, whose recruits numbered at least
(1) See Chapter 2 p.4-q-
{2} That is between 5,400 and 5,790 men, see above p.»i et seo.
(3) See above p.^?u and also Chapt. 3.
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2,290^ op between 17# and 20# of the Jacobite army.
The proportion of the amy enlisted from Perthshire may in fact
have been considerably more than 20#, There is a manuscript list
of Perthshire gentry serving in the Jaoobite army as officers, among
the miscellaneous papers at Blair Castle*^ It names sixty-nine
Perthshire gentlemen who served in regiments other than the Atholl
(3)
Brigade*, These regiments being primarily recruited outside
Perthshire, are not included in the Perthshire totals above*
This known presence of Perthshire officers in non-Perthshire
regiments suggests that there may be a similar over-lapping In
other territorial areas, and serves as a reminder that such figures
can only be at best approximations* Even however with these
reservations, it is no longer possible to treat the Jaoobite army
of 1745/6 as "essentially a clan gathering"^, and nothing more*
Lord Rosebery in his Introduction to the "List of Persons Concerned
in the Rebellion," describes the rebel army as dominated by the
(5)clans** In the light of these statistics, this view must be
substantially modified#
Equally Important modifications must be made to any general¬
isations about motives for Jaoobite adherence. It has been
(1) See above p*x« and also Chapter 2*
(2) Charter Room Blair Castle - MIscell* Mss,
(3) The Regiments were Roy Stuarts (7 Officers), Lord John Drummond,s
(5),Appin's (3), Strathallan's Horse (16), Ogllvy's (8),
Keppoch*s (1), The Life Guards (2) and the Duke of Perth*s
(27)* ,
(4) "List of Persons concerned in the Rebrllion" (Preface by Lord
Rosebery) Scot, Hist* Sco* Vol#VIII, 1890 Edinburgh Univ*
Press Introd#p.X#
(3) Ibid# Introd,p,xv et seq* "all eye witnesses of the rebel army
speak: of Highlanders and nothing else"*
xviii*
(1)
argued that Highland Jacobitism was caused by these three
factors* First, the knowledge that the best interests of the
Highlands had been served by the Stuarts, who had tried to curb
the powers of feudal superiors; secondly, the fact that the
Revolution government had shown little sympathy for Highlanders,
whether Jaoobite or Whig, and, lastly,,the fact that "clansmen
supported their chief because they knew from experience that
their hereditary and natural leader had their interests nearer
(2)
at heart than had any stranger"; These three factors do indeed
go some way to provide an explanation for Jacobite sentiment in
the Highlands, though not necessarily elsewhere, but it should
also be remembered that Jacobite sentiments and Jacobite actions
were not always identical, and that the two were not always the
products of the seme faotors*
k certain continuity of Jacobite sentiment did exist in the
Highlands, but even such continuity tends to be broken after 1715*
Atholl men, MaoGregors, Appin Stuarts, Robertsons, Macdonalds of
Glengarry, Clanranald, Glencoo and Keppoch, Macleans, Farquharsons,
Gordons, Macnabs and MacKenzies had all served under Montrose,
Dundee end Mar* However, Seaforth, Sir Alexander Macdonald of
(3)
Sleat, Farquharson of Invercauld and Macnab did not stir in 1745,
and Macdougalls who had fought under Mar in 1715 did not stir in
1745.*4*
(1) In, for instance "The Loyal Clans" - A. Cunningham, Cambridge
Univ. Press 1952 p.5 et seq.
(2) Cunningham* op*clt* p«9*
(3) See below Chapters 1 and 3 for details of their attitudes*
(4) James Alan Rennie, "Steps of the Clansmen." Rich and Cowan,
London, 1951* p.141.
xix.
Deference to the actions or views of chief or superior does
not necessarily exnlain Jacobite adherence. Maonabs, Mackintoshes
(1)
and Grants fought in opposition to the wishes of their chiefs,
and Farquharsons were led, not by Invercauld, their natural chief,
(2)
but by the two Farquharsons of Monaltrie and Balmoral. Grants
from Glenmoriston, in opposition to the wishes and even threats of
Ludoviek Grant, served under Glengarry, as did Mackenzies re¬
ts)
crulted by Barrisdale, Furthermore, descendants of Maclvors
who had joined Argyll in rebellion in 1685 now renounced their
(4)
Campbell loyalty to serve under Keppoch in 1745.
Gratitude for favours received from, or expected, from the
administration may explain actions in some cases. On the
Hanoverian side, for instance, the gratitude of Kenneth Mackenzie,
titular Lord Fortrose and Seaforth to an administration which
had pardoned the 5th Sari of Seaforth in 1726 may account for his
Hanoverian sentiments in 1745, but this explanation does not fit
(5)
the obvious cases of Lord George Murray, or of Robertson of
Struan, who was pardoned in 1703, out in rebellion in 1715,
pardoned in 1731 and out again in 1745,
The ambitions of Lord Lovat, and the heavy debts of other rebels,
undoubtedly influenced adherence. The Duke of Perth, Lord
Cromartie, Lord Kilmarnock, Lord Balmerino, Stuart of Ardsheal,
Macpherson of Cluny, Macdonald of Kinlochmoidart and Macdonald of
Barrisdale were all amongst those Jacobites who were heavily
(1) See below Chapter 3.
(2) See below Chapter 3.
(3) See below Chapters 1 and 3.
(4) Rennie. op.cit. p.213.
(5) See below Chapter 2,
XX*
in debt in 1745^. The estates of Maodonald of Lochgarry and
Farquharson of Monaltrie, moreover, were bankrupt. To suggest,
however, that Jacobitism was merely a desperate expedient to
avoid bankruptcy would be a gross over simplification* It would
also go no further towards providing an explanation of the motives
of many like lord George Murray, Lord Elcho or indeed most of the
prominent lowland Jacobites*
The availability of a small Jacobite force to act as a re-
(2)
cruiting party or rudimentary Press Gang, the local activities
of Gordon of Glenbuoket or Lord Lewis Gordon, the sending north
of part of Lord John Drummond's French Regiment in late November,
1745, all these played their part in determining local recruitment,
as did the decisive views of figures of local eminence* Those
areas where there was the least difficulty in raising men were
those where the personal prestige of chiefs or superior was the
(3)
highest, and where his actions were the least equivocal*
Economic factors, especially in the Western Highlands, were
also of importance* In these areas an agricultural economy, based
(1) See Scottish Forfeited Estates Papers, 1715 and 1745* Scot* Hist*
Society, Vol.LVII 1909* p*308 et seq. for further details of
these debts* Their debts at forfeiture were as follows:
Perth £56,526«15*3d* Cromarty, £19,010.10,7d, Kinlochmoidart,
£l,lll*15*5d. Cluny £5,l38.17*lld. Ardsheal, £699*17s.9d*
Barrisdale, £l,667*13s.5d. For details of Balmerino's debts
see J. Hill Burton"Hlstory of Scotland," Blackwood. Sdin. and
London 1897. Vol.VIII p.360.
(2) The Importance attached to the presence of a "party" to aid
recruitment is amply illustrated from events in the Atholl
area. See Chapter 2 for such details*
(3) See below Chapter 1 for significance of this point in the
Western Highlands,
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on the minimum necessary for subsistence, left no margin for
emergencies, and the frequent bad harvests produced recurrent
problems of scarcity and famine. There is ample local testimony
(1)
to the bad harvests of 1744 and 1745. Such scarcity provided
a certain incentive to unrest to those whc had therefore little to
lose. To these, also, a descent on the fertile south would appear
the more attractive, and for this adherence to the Jacobite cause
Y/ould provide an excuse. Equally important, however, scarcity of
food hampered military organisation, slowed up movement and, as
(2)
will be demonstrated, from January, 1746 onwards was a vital factor
dictating the direction of marches and the dispersal of men.
In all these various ways, local or individual factors played
their part. Jacobite adherence remained in fact, ultimately a
matter for personal decision and was decided by personal and local
factors. Its motives can only be studied individual by individual
and district by district. For these reasons, therefore, the
recruitment of the rebel army is studied in four separate chapters
below, corresponding geographically to the four major areas of
recruitment.
One other preliminary point should be noted. This is
essentially a study of the recruitment and organisation of the
Scottish Jacobite array. It is concerned with Jacobite activities
in Scotland, in so far as these activities created, or affected,
(1)See below Chapters 1 and 3 especially. Such scarcity, moreover,
was not confined to the more remote areas. There were meal
riots in Perth in 1750 and in 1760 for instance. See George
Penney."Traditions of Perth," Dewar, Sidey, Morrison, Peat
and Drummond, Perth 1836 p.47.
(2)Below Chapters 7 and 8 especially.
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the Jacobite military body. It is not, however, a military
history of Jacobitism in the field at either Prestonpans, Falkirk
or Culloden, and it treats of these encounters only in so far as
they exemplify, or affect, factors of organisation or recruitment.
For the same reasons no attempt is made to deal in any detail with
the military history of the Jacobite march into England, except in
so far as that march affected military organisation and the problems
of recruitment*
CHAPTER I.
The Western Highlands. Rosa and Cromarty.
The counties of Inverness, Ross, Cromarty and the northern
part of Argyll produced, approximately, 46# of the Jacobite force.^
This north western area had certain special features which, in their
turn, produced certain special characteristics in the regiments
recruited there. In no other area was recruitment so affected by
personal factors. In the North East recruitment was largely
achieved by the use of a quota system, or pressure of some kind,
imposed by the zeal of a few men like Gordon of Glenbucket, Lord
Lewis Gordon and Lord Pitsligo. In Perthshire, also, the majority
of recruits were forced out, while in the Lowland area of Scotland,
recruitment was the result of a much greater diversity of motives.
In the Western Highlands forced recruiting by military parties,
or a quota system enforced by such parties, does not seem to have
existed to any considerable extent, nor, as in Perthshire, was
recruiting left to the activities of only a few men. Almost every
Jaoobite chief or chieftain was, to some extent, a recruiting agent,
but this recruiting was almost always done voluntarily. That
some forced recruiting occurred in the 'Western Highlands cannot be
denied, but those who used force, or the threat of it, were not, as
in the oase of Perthshire, the victims of similar force themselves.
Regiments raised in the Western Highlands were represented by six
members in the Jacobite Council of war. The full council oon-
(2)
sisted of seventeen men' , but included Sir Thomas Sheridan, Lord
Elcho, Colonel 0#Sullivan and Secretary Murray, who did not re¬
present specifio regiments. It also contained two representatives,
(1) See Introduction above for details of this figure.
(2) See Elcho p.288.
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in Lord Nairn and Lord George Murray, of the Atholl Brigade.
The Jacob ite army consisted of 16 Regiments^, 12 of whom were
represented by their commanding officers in the Council of War.
The Western Highlands produced ten of these sixteen regiments and
the Lochiel, Keppoeh, Clanranald, Glencoe, Glengarry and Ardshiel
Regiments were represented in the Council of War by their command
ing officers.
The ten West Highland regiments were commanded as follows:
The Cameron Regiment -
Colonel: Donald Cameron (Young Lochiel), son of John Cameron
of Lochiel.
Keppoch*s Regiment •
Colonelt Alexander Maedonell of Keppoch.
The Clanranald Regiment •
Colonel: Ronald Maodonald, Younger of Clanranald.
The Glengarry Regiment -
Colonel: Angus Macdonald, 2nd son of Macdonald,
13th of Glengarry.
Lieut.Cols: Donald Maedonell of Lochgarry.
Maodonell of Barrisdale.
The Glencoe Regiment -
Colonel: Alexander Macdonald of Glencoe.
Ardshiel,s Regiment (Appin Stewart) •
Colonel: Charles Stewart of Ardshiel.
The Cromartle Regiment -
Colonel: George Mackenzie, 3rd Earl of Cromartie.
(1) For these purposes the Jacobite Horse and the Manchester
Regiment, neither of which were territorially raised in
Scotland, are excluded.
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Lady Macintosh's Regiment -
Colonel: Alexander McGillvray of Drumnaglass.
The Fraser Regiment -
Colonel: Simon Fraser, Master of Lovat.
Lieut*Colj Charles Fraser, Younger of Inveralachie (in
command at Culloden,)
The Maclachlan Regiment - with which the Macleans
recruited largely by Maclean of .Brlmmin, served.
Colonel: Lachlan Maclachlan of Castle Lachlan.
Lieut,Col: Maclean of Drimmin.
Cluny*s Regiment -
Colonel; Ewen Macpherson of Cluny.
Even a superficial study of the command of these regiments
reveals the close knit and inter-related society of which West
Highland Jacob it ism was composed. Ronald Maodonald, Younger of
Clan Ranald and Donald Macdonald of Lochgarry were brothers in
law^, while Lochgarry was a first cousin of Old Glengarry, and
also of Donald Macdonald of Scotus and of Coll Macdonald of
Barrisdale, who both served in the Glengarry Regiment. Alexander
Macdonald of Glencoe had married the daughter of John Stewart of
Ardshiel, Ewen Macpherson of Cluny was the first cousin of Donald
Cameron, the young Lochiel of the Forty-Five, and he was married
(2)
to a daughter of Lord Lovat . Alexander Maodonell of Keppoch
was married to a daughter of Stewart of Appln, while Donald
Macdonell of Tiendrish, like Alexander Macdonell of Keppoch, was a
grandson of Archibald Macdonald of Keppoch. It was Tiendrish who
(1) Both had married daughters of Gordon of Glenbucket.
(2) Sea Cluny Papers. West Highland Museum, Fort William.
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as Major commanded the company of Keppoch's Regiment in the suc¬
cessful skirmish at Highbridge in August, 1745,
Glengarry's second son Angus, who commanded the Glengarry
Regiment until his death in 1746, was married to a niece of Robertson
of Struan, thus allying two families who both had long Jacobite
traditions, Alexander Macdonald of GLenaladale, Major of Clan-
ranalds, and Donald Macdonald of Kinlochmoidart, A.D.C. to the
Prince, were both descended from younger branches of the Clanranald
family,^as was Macdonald of Morar, another Major in the Clanranald
regimentf Lochgarry had married a daughter of Cameron of Lochiel,
while Old Glengarry's father had married, as his first wife, a
daughter of Lord Lovat* Glengarry himself had married a daughter
of John Gordon of Glenbucket - this marriage, like that of his son,
Angus, formed a link with a family conspicuous for its Jacobitism,
Lastly, of course, the two great families of Glengarry and Clan¬
ranald were themselves of oommon descent, being desoended from
Reginald, 6th Lord of the Isles, and because of this both claimed
Chiefship of the whole of Clan Donald,
This relatively dosed society, characterised by frequent
intermarriage amongst the families of chiefs, preserved a tradition
of Jacobite sentiment more continuous than In any other region,
except possibly Perthshire, Every West Highland clan and sept who
joined the Jacobite force in 1745 had served in the same cause in
both 1715 and 1689, and had traditions of loyalty to the Stuarts
which went back to the time of Montrose, All branches of the Clan
Donald served under Montrose, including those of Keppoch, Scotus,
(1 ) Both were descended from John, 7th of Clanranald, see
Father Charles Maodonald;
"Among the Clanranalds," Oban, Duncan Cameron 1899, p.165.
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Glencoe, and of course Glengarry and Clanranald, as did the
Camerons under Loohiel. All these, and the Stewarts of Appin,*15
with Maophersons under Cluny, and Macleans of Duart, were again in
arms under Dundee in 1689, while in 1715 the same clans were out
again. The force under Loohiel in 1715 numbered about 800, under
Cluny a little over a thousand, while Glengarry and Clanranald be¬
tween them brought out about 2,800 in that year# This probably
included all branches of the Clan Donald* These figures remained
constant or even increased in 1745. Young Lochiel had already
brought out 800 Camerons by August 19th, 1745, less than a month
after the arrival of the Prince, and by the end of November a total
(2)
of at least 1,000 had been raised. The Glengarry and Clanranald
regiments, with other Clan Donald offshoots such as those of
Keppoch and Glencoe, in 1715 had a total of at least 2,320 recruits,
in spite of the fact that the powerful influence of Sir Alexander
Macdonald and Macleod of Macleod was now exerted on the government
side. This continuity, however, which characterised the North
West, was not maintained in other Jacobite areas. The numbers
brought out in 1745 show, almost everywhere else, a marked decrease
over those brought out in 1715 or earlier. Robertson of Strowan
brought out a force, according to Skene, of 800 in 1715. He was
able to raise far fewer in 1745. Probably at the most he raised
300 men.*35
The fundamental reason for this constancy of sentiment in the
Western Highlands lies in the special characteristics of that
region. These same characteristics account for the differences
(1) See Alexander MacKenzie,"The Macdonalds of Clanranald" p.58.
Inverness, A. and W. MacKenzie 1881. p.45 et seq.
2) See Introduction for the source of these figures.
3) See below Chapter 2.
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between recruiting in these areas and recruiting elsewhere# The
Western Highlands were an area where ties of sentiment were at
their strongest, and where material considerations played least
part. Such sentimental ties, unlike more material considerations,
were little affected by the vicissitudes of fortune, and the failure
of the 1715 rising did not, therefore, have in this area the
discouraging effects on recruitment in 1745 that it had elsewhere.
Lord George Murray frequently compared the poor Showing by Atholl
men in 1745 with the Jacobite zeal of their fathers in 1715^^but
young Lochiei was able to bring out a larger force in 1745 than
his father had raised in 1715. In both Perthshire and the North
Eastern Counties ardent Jacobites, like Tullibardine or Lord Lewis
Gordon, were forced to spend the largest amount of their time in
enforcing recruitment, although both were representatives of
families with wide territorial and local influence. There is no
evidence, however, in the Western Highlands of similar difficulties
being encountered by personalities of similar standing. Lochiel's
hesitation before joining Charles in August, 1745 was not because
of any difficulty of raising support among his clan, but beoause he
doubted his right to embroil them in prospective disaster. He,
however, took it for granted, and with justification, that where he
led, they would follow. It is no coincidence that, with the
exception of Barrisdale and young Glengarry (who returned North
from Edinburgh to recruit in the more remote areas where there was
^ See below Chapter 2.
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no ona else to act) all the chiefs from the Western Highlands were
present with the main Jacobite body throughout the campaign,^1 ^
None were forced, as were Tulllbardine and Lord LewiB Gordon, to
return home during the campaign to beat up further recruits.
Throughout A strongest motivating force In the North West was
the desire to follow the ohief. A second and also very strong foroe
was provided by sentimental attachment to the House of Stuart.
Where these two factors worked in the same direction we have the
unshakaable Jacobitism of Camerons under Lochiel. Where they worked
in conflict with each other we have the comparatively weaker and
hesitant activities of Sir Alexander Macdonald, Macleod of Macleod,
or Macdonald of Qoisdale.
Kacdonald of Sleat had been an ardent supporter of the House
of Stuart in 1689, and had been one of those who, like Lochiel,
opposed any surrender to the government after Dundee*s death at
Killlecrankie, but these sentiments were not upheld by his
descendant, Sir Alexander Macdonald in 1745. Two official requests
for help were sent to Sir Alexander by the Jacobite High Command.
from Glenflnnan a formal request was sent to Sir Alexander and
(2)
Macleod of Macleod, and later, after the retreat from Stirling, a
similar request was brought to him on the orders of Cluny Macphersoii.
This second request was signed by all the Highland Chiefs serving
(3)
with the Jacobite axmy.
(1) Except for the absence of Cluny Macpherson from Culloden. This
absence was caused by the fact that Cluny had left the main
Jacobite army earlier on April 16th, the day of the battle, in
order to meet and prepare food for the rest of his regiment
which had been allowed to disperse for quarters. Cluny,with
his regiment, was within 3 or 4 miles of Culloden when the
battle began.
(2) John Murray of Broughton • "Memorials," Scot. Hist. Society
Publications Vol.XXVII. Edinburgh 1898. p.155.
(3) See Robert Forbes, "Lyon in Mourning" Vol.2 p.34. Account of
Conversation with Capt. Donald Roy Macdonald.
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sir Alexander was, however, much under the influence of
Macleod of Maoleod and Forbes of Culloden, both prominent supporters
of Hanover, and throughout the rising he remained committed to the
Hanoverian interest. He had as great personal and territorial
influence in the North West as any other chief, and he had the
support of both Macleod of Maoleod and Forbes of Culloden, yet the
number of men he was able to raise for the government during the
rising was far smaller than that provided on the Jacobite side by
much lesser men. Two independent companies were raised by him,
probably of 100 men eaoh^while Keppoch was able to raise at
least 600 men for the Jacobite force, and at least 220 were raised
12)
by Macdonald of Glencoe from only a small sept of Clan Donald* ,
Jacobites, however, had estimated that Sir Alexander could have
raised between 1,200 and 1,500 men and he himself had told Maoleod
(3)
of Raasay that he could raise 900 for Charles,
Apart from the smallness of the numbers raised by Sir Alexander
there was little strength of purpose in the men, compared with
those brought out by Jacobite Chiefs, Hugh Macdonald of Armadale,
sent by Sir Alexander to search, with a body of militia, for
Charles in the Outer Hebrides after Culloden, was Jacobite at
heart and was the step-father of Flora Macdonald, Alexander
Macdonald of Kingsburgh, Sir Alexander's own factor, was equally
Jacobite in sentiment, and was of course committed to prison in
August, 1746 for his part in the concealment of Charles on Skye,
(1) This was the optimum size of each Independent Company under
Loudoun at Inverness,
(2) See Introduction for further details of these figures,
(3) "Lyon in Mourning," Journal of Capt. Malcolm Macleod, Vol,I
p,146,
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Kingsburgh* s sentiments, however, were probably known by Sir
Alexander, for earlier Macleod of Macleod had written an undated
letter to Kingsburgh warning him of "the danger of protecting or
aiding him (the Pretender) by any of our friends".
During the time that Charles was in hiding Sir Alexander had
tried to raise further men for the government from Portree, without
success^ while earlier, in September, 1745, he had found diffi¬
culty in distributing commissions in the Independent Companies
because of the reluctance of many of his following to accept them,
(2)
and thereby fight their neighbours or relations* 'There was wide¬
spread Jacobite sympathy on Skye, and, because of this, Duncan
Forbes had stressed the necessity that either Sir Alexander or
Macleod of Macleod should accompany the Skye militia to prevent
(3)
them from turning Jacobite, When Donald Roy Macdonald, of the
Clanranald Regiment, returned to Skye after Falkirk to recruit he
was well received and entertained by the officers of the pro
(4)
Hanoverian Skye Militia, and earlier in the campaign Sir
Alexander had not put any obstacles in his way when he determined
(5)
to join Charles,
Sir Alexander*s own attitude was by no means simple. According
to Donald Roy Macdonald he was, for the first month after the news
of Charles* arrival, undeolded as to whether to raise his men for
(1) Undated letter to Kingsburgh, West Highland Museum, Fort
William, Miscall, Mss,
(2) "More Culloden Papers", p.115 Vol.IV. ed. D. Warrand, Inverness,
Robert Carruthers & Sons, 1929,
(3) See I, F. Grant. "The Macleods". Faber & Faber London, 1959.
(4) "Lyon in Mourning." Vol.2 p.5, Account of Donald Roy Macdonald.
The Journal of Capt, Malcolm Macleod of Raasay suggests
similar indecision.
(5) "Sir Alexander not pretending in the least to hinder", ibid p.5,
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the Prince, and, even after the battle of Falkirk, he wrote to
Keppoch that "I assure you I will as little rise against you. If
any misfortune shall happen to yourself, I desire you may leave
(1)
your son Ronald to my care".' '
In spite, however, of such mental reservations Sir Alexander's
own actions were clear. He refused all Jacobite requests for help,
he raised his own following for the government, and he identified
himself with the pro-Hanoverian policy and actions of Forbes of
Culloden. His local influence and following were considerable and,
in deference to his views, although the sentiments of his people
were strongly Jacobite, only two of his immediate following joined
(2)Charles. 'When, as here, the political views of the chief were in
conflict with the sentiments of his following, the views of the
chief prevailed in general. But, because such a conflict had first
to be resolved, the resulting military actions of such clans were
far weaker and less decisive than those of clans where chief and
following were united in political aims. The sentiment of rever¬
ence for Qiief or Chieftain was, in fact, stronger than the senti¬
ment of traditional attachment to the Stuarts; the attitude of Sir
Alexander's following proved this, but when the two sentiments were
in union instead of in conflict, Jacob it ism was Immeasurably strong.
The pro-Hanoverian activities and inclinations of both Macleod
of Maoleod and Macdonald of Bolsedale prove the same point. The
prestige and personal influence of Norman Maoleod of Macleod was
(-*-) ibid p.5 et seq.
(2) They were Donald Roy Macdonald (see above) and John Maodonald
of Hlshir, IJist.
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considerable, and he had represented the county of Inverness in
Parliament since 1741* His attitude to a possible rising was also
(1)
well known, whatever vague promises of sympathy he might have made
in 1743 or 1744 as a member of the Buck Club. Duncan Forbes had no
doubt of his loyalty, and even Murray of Broughton admitted that
Macleod held, in August 1744, that a Jacobite rising would be in-
(2)
advisable, and by the summer of 1745 his hostile attitude to a
Rising was well-known. In June, 1745 he had written to Duncan
Forbes to point cut the lack of arms amongst clans loyal to the
government, and in July he reported to Forbes that he had placed
people in Ardnamuehan, Glenelg, and the islands, to send him
(3)
intelligence of Charles* arrival.* ' Macdonald of Boisedale who
visited Charles on his arrival in the Du Teillay warned him that
Macleod would not join, a proof therefore that Macleod*s attitude
was well known, end on 3rd August Macleod wrote from Dunvegan to
report Charles* arrival to the government, in a letter to Forbes of
Culloden.(4)
Moreover, there was not, in the case of Macleod, any recent
history of Jacobitism to obscure the issue. Although John Macleod
of Contulllch, Macleod*s first cousin twice removed, who managed the
(5)
estates during his infancy, had Jacobite connections, he did not
(1) Both Duncan wsrrand,("More Culloden Papers") and I.F. Grant,
("The Macleods") point out that there is no evidence that
Macleod was ever seriously committed to Jacobitism. The only
promises of sympathy he made were oral, and were made after
drinking. Further assertions of unconditional support depend
only on the unsubstantiated word of Murray of Broughton, in
his memorials written at least 12 years after 1745.
(2) See Murray - "Memorials" p.109.
(3) Warrand. "More Culloden Papers," Vol.IV letters of 25th June 174S
and 16th July, 1745. pp.10 and 13.
(4) ibid, letter of 3rd August p.14.
(5) His son brought fifty men from Glenelg to join the abortive Jaco¬
bite rising of 1719.
is*
involve the clan in the Fifteen Rising, Macleod himself was a close
personal friend of Forbes of Culloden, to whom he had turned for help
in freeing himself of suspicion of being implicated in the Bernera
kidnapping case of 1739. The support Forbes gave him on that
occasion was sufficient to ensure unequivocal Hanoverian sentiments
from Maeleod in return.
The only result, however, of such sentiments and inclinations
was a total force of only four hundred pro-Hanoverian recruits.
These numbers of pro-Hanoverian levies actually raised by
Macleod and Sir Alexander Macdonald are, however, far smaller than
the real military potential of their following. Duncan Forbes of
Culloden was probably responsible for compiling an undated report on
the State of the Highlands, one copy of which is amongst the mis-
(1)
cellaneous papers of the Episcopal Church of Scotland. This
report lists the military potential of all personages of importance
in the Highlands as calculated by the author, and the figures, where
they can be Checked by the actual adherents raised, seem in general
to be fairly accurate. This Report assesses the strength of the
Maodonalds of Sleat, under Sir Alexander, at 700 and the Macleods at
the same figure. In fact, though, as has been shown earlier, the
total force raised by Sir Alexander did not exceed 200, while
Macleod's Independent Companies probably consisted of not muCh more
than 450 men.
It is somewhat difficult to assess the size of the force Macleod
(1) Papers of Scottish Episcopal Church. Episcopal Training College,
of the Dloscese. Edinburgh# (Episcopal Chest). The Report is
also printed by the Spalding Club, Allardyoe papers, p.166
et seq.
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was able to recruit. Dr. I.F. Grant quotes Memorial drawn up
by Macleod in 1763 in which he asserted that he had enlisted 1,400
men and spent £2,500 of his own money, in government service during
the rebellion, but he does not state what proportion of these men
were recruited from his own following. Certainly the backbone of
Loudoun*s force of Independent companies at Inverness was provided
by the 5 Macleod companies, and in some contemporary accounts the
words "Macleods" and "Independent Companies" are used synonymously.
(2)
Maxwell of Kirkconnell, for instance, refers to the Hanoverian
force which attempted to surprise Charles at Moy, on February 16th,
1745, as "a force of 1,200 Macleods."
Macleod had certainly already raised one Independent Company
before the Rising began, and apparently raised four subsequent
companies, by December, 1745. In the skirmish at Inverness Macleod
had 450 men under him, and in a letter of December 24th, 1745,
(3)
Ludovick Grant puts the number of Macleod Companies at five.
Possibly Macleod was able to raise some further men later, although
(4)
both he and Sir Alexander Maodonald found recruiting difficult.
The final figure raised for the government by Norman Macleod would
probably not stand at much over 450 men, therefore.
In morale, however, these men were far below the quality of
the Jacobite recruits from the same area. Their undisciplined
flight after the skirmish at Inverurie, in December 1745, and the
(1) The Macleods, I.F. Grant, p.484.
(2) "Narrative of Charles, Prince of Wales*Expedition to Scotland
in the year 1745," James Maxwell of Kirkconnell. Maitland
Club. Edinburgh 1841. p.117.
(3) "Chiefs of Grant." Sir William Fraser, Edin. 1883. Vol.2, p.203,
Letter of Ludoviok Grant to Lord Loudoun.
(4) See "The Macleods" p.450.
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complete collapse of their morale after their dispersal, on March
20th* by a Jacobite force under the Duke of Perth, testify to this.
Their morale was undoubtedly further lowered by a division of
loyalties. Many were certainly torn between loyalty to their
chieftain and loyalty to the House of Stuart. The persistent legend
that many Highlanders who served on the government side in the
Rising actually believed they were being raised to fight on the
rebel side, has certainly some basis in the attitude of many Maoleods.
There are several references in the "Lyon in Mourning" to Macleods
joining the Independent Companies wearing white Cockades, believing
they were going to fight for the Prince. A memorandum by James
Mackenzie of Orkney^^points out that, after the skirmish at
Inverurie, when Macleod tried to rally his men at Elgin they re¬
minded him "that he had made them believe they were to follow
Charles when he first brought them out of the Island, and afterwards
to hold them together at Inverness he had dissembled with them as
if he had always meant to let them follow their own inclinations".
One reason for Loudoun's hasty evacuation of Inverness on February
18th, 1746 was his unwillingness to trust the Independent Companies
In any action against a Highland Jacobite force. There was no
similar lack of trust on the Jacobite side.
The government force which Maeleod of Macleod raised from his
own following was, therefore, inferior in numbers and morale to
vrhat might have been raised on the Jacobite side.
The same picture is presented by the actions of Alexander
Maodonald of Boisedale. Bolsedale was the brother of Old Clanranald,
and had considerable influence over him. Because of his increasing
infirmity Clanranald left the management of his affairs to Boisedale.
(1) "Lyon in Mourning." Vol.11, p.85.
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Because of this It was to Bolsedale that Ch&lres addressed his
official request for help on his arrival. Clanranalds had a long
tradition of loyalty to the Stuarts, They has served under Montrose,
and had been present at Kllliecrankie and Glenfinnan. The most
important offshoots of the main branch were the Maodonalds of
Kinlochmoidart, Glenaladale, Morar and Borrodale, and all of these
were strongly Jacobite In sentiment and in action, Ronald Macdonald
of Kinlochmoidart was the brother of the banker, Aeneas Macdonald,
who accompanied Charles on the Doutelle or Du Teillsy, He held the
rank of Colonel in the Jacobite army, and was made en aide de Camp,
Alexander Macdonald of Glenaladale served as a Major in the Clan-
ranald Regiment, and had arrived with Kinlochmoidart to meet Charles
on board the Du Teillay, Angus Macdonald of Borrodale was the uncle
of Glenaladale, and his son, like Macdonald of Morar, served in the
(1)
Clanranald regiment, Borrodale had given Charles hospitality at
Borrodale House in August 1745 and sheltered him again after
(2)
Culloden.
Clanranald*s influence was very considerable in the West, and
in recognition of this the undated "Report on the State of the
Highlands," referred to above, put the military force at Clanranald*
disposal at 700 men. The maximum who served in the Jacobite force,
(3)
however, did not exceed 400, Again, the explanation of this
disparity lies In the attitude of one man.
Alexander Macdonald of Boisedale had no faith in Charles*
chances In 1745, and was determined to give the enterprise no
I1) See Father Charles Macdonald, "Moidart." p.194 and unpublished
aiBjk, Roll of Jacobite Army, Miscell. M&s, Fort William Museum,
(2) Father Charles MacdonalcU op, cit, p,195.
(3) See Introduction,
16.
support. He warned Charles that he could expect no help from
and passed on to him the views of Sir Alexander Macdonald as well.
After the setting up of the standard of Glenfinnan he "kept back all
Clanranald,s men that lived in South Hist and the other isles to the
(2)
number of 4 or 5 hundred good men". The fact that this could be
done, amongst a clan with as strong Jacobite traditions as the
Clanranalds, proves yet again the immense importance of personal
(3)
influence in the Western Highlands.
In one other sphere in the Western Highlands the personal,
rather than the political factor, played an important part. A cer¬
tain amount of destruction of property, pillage and plunder was the
work of Jacobite Highlanders, a much greater amount, after Culloden,
was the work of those on the Hanoverian side. However, it is almost
certain that the motive on both sides for much of this was personal
and local, rather than political. Camerons daring the Fort William
campaign of March 1746 fought Campbells, and Campbells plundered
(4)
Cameron property, not merely because of the political clash be¬
tween Jacobite and Hanoverian, but because of the personal and
traditional clash between Cameron and Campbell. Moreover, at least
in the case of the Duke of Argyll, on the government side, and
Lochiel, on the Jacobite side, such plunder and violence was in
opposition to the desires of the ohief. The Duke of Argyll, in a
(1) "Lyon in Mourning." Journal of Capt. Malcolm Macleod. p.45 etsefl.
(2) ibid. p.148.
(3) In spite of his own views, Boisedale was never actively hostile
to Charles, however, and he provided shelter for Aeneas
Macdonald while he was in charge of the Spanish money landed
at Barra in April, 1746. He was also of considerable help
to Charles during his wanderings after Culloden.
(4) The Governor of Fort William reported on Maroh 13 three sorties
for Instance, by the garrison, in which 2 of Lochlel^ farms
were burnt and cattle siezed. Two days earlier, on March
10th, had occurred the plundering of Morvemby a party which
included twenty Campbell militia.
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letter of March 17th, 1746, condemned the policy of burning and
destruction, and was only prepared to countenance such actions If
they were done as the result of military necessity by regular
(1)
troops, not as private action by Individuals. Lochiel*s Manifesto,
(£)
drawn up at Clennevls on March 20th, 1746 ends "we shall show that
we are not to males war against women and brute creatures, but against
men,,,..,., notwithstanding the malicious aspersions Industriously
contrived by our enemies they could never, since the commencement of
the war, Impeach us with any acts of hostility that had the least
tendenoy to such cruelty as they exercise against us".
Earlier, In July, 1745, both Lochiel and his brother Dr.
Archibald Cameron had thwarted a proposal to distress the homes of
Campbell of Inveraray and of his tenants on the grounds "that such
(:
proceeding could be no way useful to his (the Prince*s) undertaking"
The known views of both Lochiel and the Duke of Argyll were not
strong enough, however, to prevail always over the instinctive and
ancient enmity which both Camerons and Macdonalds felt for
Campbells. Respect for a chiefs views was strong, as has been
shown above, but ancient enmity was even stronger.
This feeling of enmity was shared even by Lochiel himself. In
a letter to Cluny Macpherson,written from Glennevis, on March 20th,
1746, describing the plundering by Campbells of Morvern, Lochiel
continues by congratulating the authors of the "well conceived and
well executed scheme" of surprising 70 Campbell militia and some of
(1) See Fergusson. "Argyll in the Forty-Five." London, Faber and
Faber 1951 p.120.
"• * ■* - i- ■ - *
(2) See Alexander Mackenzie,"History of the Camerons," Inverness.
A. & W. Mackenzie 1884. p.229/30,
(3) ibid. p.274 transcript of documents written by Dr. Cameron while
in prison, June, 1753.
(4) Miscell. documents. West Highland Museum. Fort William.
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Kingston's light house at Keith oil March 19th - "but what gives me
joy in a particular manner is the fate of the Campbells, the
plunderers of our countries"# Lochiel*s manifesto from Glemievls,
written on the same day and referred to earlier contained the threat
"We hope to prevail with his Royal Highness to hang a^ Campbell for
every house that shall hereinafter be burnt by them". This same
feeling of deep personal hatred was shared by Campbells. Lochiel,
(2)
describing the plundering of Morvem to duny Macpherson stated
"a party of the Campbells took the opportunity, while the county of
Morvlne was destitute of men to burn all the farms upon the coast of
it that were inhabited by either Camerons or Macleans, first plunder¬
ing the houses, str ipt the poor women and children, killed all the
horses that came in their way and even set fire to their blres
without allowing them to turn out their cattle, such barbarity as
was never heard of". Continually, Lochiel's letters refer to the
garrison at Fort William not as the enemy, but merely as Campbells,
another instance of the same personal rather than political hostility .
The entire siege of Fort William was itself largely necessitated
by this traditional enmity. There were twelve further garrisons or
out-posts still in government hands on the fall of Fort Augustus
(3)
on March 5th but the siege of Fort William was undertaken partly
as a result of pressure from local men in the Jacobite force whose
(1) Alexander Mackenzie op.cit. p.229/30.
(2) Letter of Lochiel, Glennevis March 20th 1746. Miscell. Documents,
West Highland Museum. Fort William.
(3) They were Fort William, Kilchurn, Dunstaffnage, Mingarry,
Glenfalloch, the head of Loch Fyne, Portlncapel, St. Catherine^
ferry, Dumbarton, Inversnaid, Castle Lochlan, Inveraray and Dusrt.
See "Argyll in the Forty-Five." Fergusson p.52.
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homes end livestock were in continuous danger from the sallies of
(1)
the garrison. The Jacobite force besieging Fort William consisted,
apart from Irish piquets and some piquets of the French Royal Scots,
of Csmerons and Macdonalds of Keppoch and Glencoe, all of whom were
especially interested in the success of the siege because their
homes had suffered from the frequent sallies of the garrison, while
the main Jacobite force was in Ittagland. The original garrison at
Inverlochy had been established by General Monk in the previous
century to paralyse Cameron activity by forcing Sir Ewen Cameron*s
men to return to defend their own homes from attack by the garrison.
Nearly a oentury later, the garrison still fulfilled the same purpose
Sallies by the garrison continued in spite of the siege. On March
(2)
20th, 1746, Lochiel wrote to Cluny Macpherson "There are three
hundred and fifty of the Campbells at Fort William, two men of war,
they are dayly attempting by their partys to land at Corpaeh and
other farms in Lochiel to burn end carry off cattell but prevented
by our guards......we hope soon to be masters of it (the fort) coast
What it will".
The two factors which played a very large part in colouring
West Highland sentiment in 1745 were, as has been demonstrated above,
reverential obedience to the views of one*s chief and traditional
enmity towards Campbells and their offshoots. However, a third
factor also existed. This was a traditional and sentimental loyalty
to the House of Stuart, This, though of much importance, was,
never-the-less, secondary and subservient to the need to obey the
(1) See Maxwell of Kirkconnel. op.oit. p.£0,
(2) Miscell. Documents, West Highland Museum, Fort William.
20.
(1)
wishes and political view of each chief. This has been demon¬
strated in the cases of those who followed Sir Alexander Macdonald
or even Macdonald of Boisdale.
However, with these reservations, traditional loyalty to the
House of Stuart was a very powerful factor. With very few excep¬
tions, each clan had a continuous history of loyalty to the Stuarts
extending from service under Montrose in the mid seventeenth century
to service under Prince Charles Edward a hundred years later, and
including in between service under Dundee and Mar. This was true of
Macdonalds of Keppoch, Glenooe, Clanranald and Glengarry, and the
smaller septs, and of Lochiel's Camerons. In no other area was there
such continuity of sentiment. This continuous tradition, in the
Western Highlands, of loyalty to the Stuarts has many causes. In
many cases, as Miss Cunningham has pointed out "the clansmen sup¬
ported their chief because they knew from experience that their
hereditary and natural leader had their Interests nearer at heart
(2)
than any stranger". These chiefs who, like Cameron of Loohiel,
felt their responsibility for the interest of their people, were not
men to plunge their followers needlessly into warfare, and in many
cases, as Forbes of Culloden pointed out to them, their own
Immediate personal Interests would often have been better furthered
by support of the government. Many of the chiefs who joined the
(1) This tie between clansman and chief, was a tie of tradition and
sentiment, not of respect for legal rights of succession. This
is demonstrated in the case of Simon Fraser of Beaufort's claim
to succeed Lord Lovat, in opposition to the rights of Lovat's
daughter with her powerful Atholl connections. By clan tradi¬
tion Simon Fraser might be the customary heir, but parties of
law were against him. The majority of the clan however stood
behind Simon Fraser's claim, choosing to support clan tradition
rather than legal rights. See Audrey Cunningham, "The Loyal
Clans". Cambridge University Press 1932. p.432 et seq,
(2) ibid. p.9.
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Jacobite cause were enlightened and Intelligent administrators and
must have been aware of this. Lochiel and his brother, Dr. Archibald
Cameron, had a long record of enlightened administration, with a ma¬
ll)
rked sense of reponsibility towards their clan, Young Clanranald
and Boisedale were well known as agricultural improvers and were
responsible for introducing potatoes to Uist. Cluny Macpherson*s
Watch, which he organised during the early 1740*3, testified to
his administrative ability, and Macleod of Bernera and Macdonald
of Balshar, or Baleshare, were responsible for the introduction of
(2 )
kelp to Harris and Uist and were reckoned as agricultural improvers.
The motives which drew such men to support the Jacobite rising must
therefore be of considerable strength.
Chief amongst these motives were the twin facts; first that the
concept of the patriarchal power of the Crown, as symbolised by the
Stuarts, had considerable appeal for a Highlander used to the rather
similar authority of his chief. Second, that many Highlanders felt,
in Miss Cunningham*s words, that "the Revolution Settlement had left
the Highlands to face the Parliamentary despotism of a hostile and
(3)
prejudiced majority". The Highlander, moreover, had in general
gained from the administration of at least the later Stuarts. Both
(1) See, for instance, an early letter of Lochlel's, written from
Carendale, November 1720, to a Major Cunningham, complaining of
a raid on some of his tenants on Loch Arkaig - Miscall, letters.
West Highland Museum. Fort William,
Balshar, though serving himself in the government militia, was
Jacobite in sympathy and was of considerable help to Charles
while he was in hiding on Uist.
A.Cunningham op.cit. p.436.
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Charles II and James VII and II, in increasing tha powers of the
Crown in the Highlands, had done much to safeguard the liberties of
the smaller clans. They had, moreover, done nothing to interfere
with Highland tradition or the wearing of Highland dress, or the use
of the Gaelic language.
On the other hand, the administration since 1689 had apparently
done nothing for the Highlanders, who remembered instead Glencoe, and
official temporising over the dangerous question of superiorities
and fresh legislation against the MacGregors. These feelings were
increased by the religious grievances which were the result of the
Presbyterian domination begun in 1689. In contrast, the clans
remembered the attempt by James VII and II to free them from some
of the irksome feudal superiorities vested in the House of Argyll,
and this memory was kept alive by promises from the exiled court of
the Old Pretender. In 1729 Allan Cameron wrote from the exiled
court at Albano to Donald Cameron, the Young Lochlel of the Forty-
Five telling him "you are to assure yourself and others that the
King has determined to make Scotland happy and the Clans in parti¬
cular, when it pleases God to restore him, this is consistent with
(1)
my certain knowledge". The various proclamations issued by the
Old Pretender, during and before the Rising of 1715, also contained,
or implied, promises to deal with the powerful superiorities ofthe
(2)
House of Argyll.
The Highland Clans had, that is, tangible and material reasons
for expecting much from the Stuarts, but little from the administra¬
tion since 1689. Their Jacobitism was more than the sentimental
(1) A.Mackenzie "History of the Camexons." p.215/216.
(2) See George Hilton Jones - "The Main Stream of Jacobitism".
Harvard University Press 1954. p.80 et seq.
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attachment to an exiled dynasty which led English High Tories to
toast the King over the water. It was the result of much more
tangible and material factors, and for that reason was the more
enduring. Young Lochiel*s father, John Cameron, on going into ex¬
ile after the Fifteen Rising, warned his clan to keep alive and
foster their loyalty to the Stuarts and urged them "not to doubt
that all will end to your satisfaction and mine in the happy re¬
storation of your rightful and lawful sovereign for whom, under God,
(1)
we all suffer".
After the crushing defeat of Culloden, it was only amongst the
Western Highlanders that hope of a cummer campaign remained alive.
A conference to discuss this had been held at Muirlaggan on May 6th
and a rendezvous at Aohnacarry on May 15th decided upon where Clan-
ranalds, Camerons, Glengarries and any others from that area could
assemble. Lochlel wrote a letter, dated May 1746, to Cluny
Maopherson to inform him of these plans. This letter is now among
the Miscellaneous Cluny papers in the West Highland Museum at Fort
William. It begins optimistically "I have nothing new to acquaint
you of. We are preparing for a summer campaign and hope soon to
join all our forces. Mr. Murray desires that if any of the picketts
or of Lord John Drummond's Regiment or any other pretty fellows are
straggling in your country that you conveen them and keep with your¬
self till we Join you". The summer campaign came, of course, to
nothing. As Lochlel wrote in a second, unaddressed letter among the
(2)
Miscellaneous Cluny Papers "our assembly was not so general nor
hearty as was expected". Without sufficient numbers to gain
(1) Cunningham, op.clt. p.451.
(2) Fort William. West Highland Museum. Miscall. Papers letter dated
May 25th, 1746.
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intelligence of enemy movements, those who did assemble at Achna-
n)
carry were nearly surprised. Even now, however, Loohiel was
directing all to "keep themselves as safe as possible, and keep
their arms as we have great expectations of the French doing some-
(2)
thing for us7 Such determined faith in the face of such ample
proofs of failure could only be the result of something much
stronger than mere sentimental attachment to an exiled House.
The great tenacity with which Jacobite sentiments were held is
true of almost all the clans of the far west. It is true of Keppochs,
Clanranalds, Glengarries, Camerons and of the smaller septs like
Macdonalds, Glencoe, Scotus, Tiendrish.
It is a little less true, however, of the slightly more
sophisticated clans like Frasers of Macphersons, who were affected
by the more political and materialist atmosphere of Inverness. Ewan
Macpherson of Cluny had held a Captain's Commission in Loudoun's
(3)
Regiment since June 8th 1745. He was on terms of friendship with
(4)
Norman Macleod of Macleod and had some acquaintance with the Duke
(5)
of Argyll, to whom he was "much obliged" for his commission. He
had organised an efficient policing body, known as Cluny*s Watch, to
protect the Inverness area, and, through this, had business connec¬
tions with prominent Hanoverians like Alexander Brodie of Lethen,
He had married a daughter of Lord Lovat.
(1) The same letter of May 25th.
(2) The same letter.
(3) See Commission and covering letter from Robert Graigie, Lord
Advocate, dated June 24th, 1745, among miscell. Cluny Papers.
West Highland Museum, Fort William.
(4) viz. for instance Macleod's letter of July 30th 1745 to Cluny,
congratulating him on his Captaincy under Loudoun, and
speaking of his "Sincere Friendship", Letter among miscell.
Cluny Papers. Fort William.
(5) See the same letter of July 30th.
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His adherence to the Jacobite cause in 1745 was partly the
result of bio accidental capture by a body of Camerons on August
28th, who brought him before the Prince at DalwhinnjfS* It was also
partly due to the fact that General Cope, with whom he had been
consulting at Ruthven, had treated him tactlessly and haughtily, and
this treatment contrasted badly with his courteous and flattering
reception by the Prince, These factors, however, did not produce
quite the same blind tenacity which marks the Jacobites of the
further West clans. Cluny himself never forswore his choice, and re¬
mained lurking in the hills after Culloden in charge of what Jacobite
money was left behind by the Prince, until he escaped to France and
(14
received a Commission in the (French ) Royal Scots Regiment in 1757.
However, those factors which explain the tenacity of Jacobitism in
(2)
the Western Highlands applied less in the Inverness area, and the
Macphersons appear to have been less steadfast than most of the Clans
of the West.
For instance, among the miscellaneous Cluny Papers at Fort
William is a letter, signed by the Prince, giving permission for
Cluny to use, against those who would not follow him," all manner of
military execution against their persons or cattle ••••••we empower
and require you to judge ••••all deserters from the regiment, whom
you are to punish by death or otherwise," An anonymous suggestion
of lack of steadfastness in the Maopherson Regiment is amongst the
Culloden Papers, "Many of the Macphersons came before Clunie, now in
Badenoch and many of them expressed Resolutions not to be further
(1) See various letters, mlscell, Cluny letters of 1757 at Fort
William,
(2) The area was comparatively distant, for instance, from both
Glencoe, and Campbell influence.
S3*
(1)
concerned, but how far they will be steady was yet uncertain."
This seems to suggest something more serious than the normal
temptation amongst a Highland levy to return home, often with the
booty, during the intervals of a campaign* Lastly, in the un¬
published Roll of the Highland Army the number of Macphersons who
surrendered themselves after Culloden is calculated at 266, a con-
(2)
siderably higher figure than any West Highland clan provided*
Lord Lovat*s tergiversations were also in contrast to the
steadfastness of the clans of the Sbr west. His private aim was
almost certainly to secure a Dukedom for himself from a victorious
Pretender, without endangering, until that victory, his own rela¬
tions with the Hanoverian government* To this end he sent his agent
William Fraser of Gortuleg to make evasive promises of support to
Charles at Invergarry, on August 26th, 1745# Re was enough of a
realist to defer any action until the outcome of the first pitched
battle was clear, and even after Prestonpans, he could still be
hindered from action by Macleod of Macleod's ruse of pretending to
be about to raise his own men In the Jacobite cause. Macleod, on
Forbes of Culloden's instructions, visited Lovat at Castle Dounie,
during October 1745, and persuaded him to delay despatching the
Frasers to join the Jacobite camp at Perth, on the pretext that
they could later march in one body with his own men. A less
(3)
materialistic man might not have fallen for this ruse. Even as
(1) Nat, Lib. Chill, Papers 2396* Anonymous intelligence regarding
the Highlanders*
(2) Ms* Roll of the Highland Army, The Property of the Forty-Five
Association. West Highland Museum, Fort William,
The other available figures of surrenders are Appin Stuarts,
0* Glencoes and Keppochs:98*
(3) See I.F, Grant. "The Macleods" p*446*
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late as November 10, when his son and three hundred Frasers were
about to march to Perth, (If they had not already left) Lovat was
still in correspondence with Forbes of Culloden, sending him intel¬
ligence of Jacobite movements. Lovat was experienced in political
manoeuvring. He was used to the political atmosphere of the
government administration at Inverness, and he had held a commission
in the Independent Companies. He was a frequent visitor to Duncan
Forbes at Culloden House, and a frequent correspondent of Lieut. Col.
(1)
Kennedy, the Deputy Governor of Fort George at Inverness. His
estate was also heavily in debt by 1745, for the annual rental of
the estate was a little over £1,000 sterling, the debts on it some-
(2)
thing over £35,000. Lovat*s political sophistication, plus his
heavy debts in 1745, provide an explanation for his actions which
is in striking contrast to the motives of such men as Lochlel,
Keppoch or other chiefs of the West.
The remarkable continuity with which loyalty to the Stuarts
was maintained in the West was one of the reasons why there was here
no need for devices such as a quota system of forcing out men. The
continuous loyalty with which Clanranalds and Glengarry*s had served
(3)
the Stuarts, since the time of Montrose, meant that the more
reoent offshoots of these two great clans also shared, with the
(1) See Mlscell. Letters of Col. Kennedy*s in the archives of the
Public Library at Inverness.
(2) The aotu/al figures are: rental £1,003.16s.0^d., debts dis¬
charged to creditors after the forfeiture £35,837.0s.0d.
see Forfeited Estates Papers, 1715/45. Scot. Hist. Society
Yol. 57 p.29/30,
(3) Though not necessarily before 1642. Both Donald, 9th of Clan-
ranald, and the Glengarry of the time had come into conflict
with James VI from 1611 onward for instance.
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older stock, the seme tradition* Of the older Clanranald offshoots,
the most Influential were the Maodonalds of Kinlochmoidart and
Glenaladal®, descended from John of Mortlach and Clanranald, and the
Macdonalds of Morar, descended from a branch of the Glenaladale
family. Of the newer Glengarry offshoots, the most influential
were the Macdonalds of Scotus, descended from Donsld, 1st of Scotus,
the grandson of the eighth Glengarry, and the Macdonalds of Loch-
garry and Barrisdale, descended from Ronald, 2nd of Scotus. In
1745, Donald Macdonald of Scotus had joined before the raising of
the Standard at Glenflnnan, and was killed at Culloden while
(1)
Barrisdale joined Charles on 26th or 27th August 1745. Further¬
more, both Kinlochmoidart and Glenaladale joined before the raising
of the standard.
Macdonald of Keppoch had an equally distinguished history of
Stuart Loyalty*! Coll, Macdonald or Macdonell received a Colonel's
(2)
Commission from James VII and II in 1690 or 1691, and in November
1689 James wrote from Dublin to "his trusty and well beloved,"
expressing gratitude for his valour. In 1743 Alexander Macdonell
of Keppoch was created a baronet by the Old Pretender, in recogni¬
tion of his family's services, and, commanding his own regiment,
was killed at Culloden. Sharing descent from Coll Macdonald of
(3)
Keppoch was Donald Macdonald of Tiendrish, Who held the rank of
Major in the Keppoch regiment in 1745.
(1) See Loohgarry's Narrative in Blaikies "Itinerary". p.X12.
(2) Commission undated, among letters, the property of Miss Alice
Macdonell of Keppooh, Misoell.Papers, Fort William.
(3) He was his nephew, the son of his brother Ronald Ivor Macdonald.
£9*
The result of these strong, and long, traditions of loyalty to
the Stuarts was the absence, in the Western Highlands, of the
forcing out of men, in the way that tills forcing out took plaos
elsewhere* There is no reference, either amongst the Culloden
Papers or amongst the miscellaneous Cameron papers at Fort William,
nor in any other source, to the use of either a quota system, or
the hiring out of recruits. Both these methods of raising men were,
however, common in the North Fast, the Dundee, Angus and Perthshire
areas. Amongst the "Lists of Persons Concerned in the Present
(1)
Rebellion", transmitted to the Commissioners of Excise, is a
reference to Alexander Steivart of Invernahyle, Captain in the Appln
Stuart#s who was "active in raising Appin's tenants" but with no
details of the means used.
In a list of prisoners, enclosed in a letter from the Earl of
(2)
Albermarle to the Duke of Newcastle, there is one reference to
the taking prisoner of a Charles McGachen in South Uist for buying
men for the Pretender,s son. It is, however, equally possible that
this is a reference to the recruiting for the French Service, wfcioh
was so common in the Western Highlands before 1745,
There are equally few references in this area to forcing out,
as distinct from hiring out. Miss Macdonell of Keppoch, in her
(1) "A List of Persons Concerned in the Rebellion". Preface by the
Earl of Rosebery, Publications of Scot. Hist, Society Vol.
VIII 1890. p.287.
(2) Letter of August 8th 1746, A.W.C, Mackenzie. History of the
Outer Hebrides. Paisley. Alexander Gardiner 1903. p.97/8,
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short account of her family "The Macdonells of Keppoch and
(1)
Gargavach" and Sir James Fergusson in his "Argyll in the
Forty-Five" both refer to 30 families called McGlasserick who
alleged that they had been forced out from their homes in Lochaber
into supporting the rising, though they were really Campbells.
(2)
They accordingly claimed Campbell protection. Barrisdale later
claimed that he also had been forced out by his chief, presumably
Glengarry's second son Angus, as Glengarry himself took no part in
the rising, although here Albermarle doubted the truth of the excuse.
The fact that they had been forced out by a threat of violence was
obviously a frequent, and tempting defence, for those who were
caught. There has always been a tendency to overestimate the ex¬
tent of forcing out in the West. John Merchant, in his "History of
the Rebellion", published in 1746 gives one of the early examples
of this tendency, saying "such as did join them (the rebels) were
compelled to it; one of their Chiefs used Means that savoured of
TS-)
Barbarity".
Where forcing out does seam to be proved, however, it appears
not to be used against West Highland clans, but to have been used
by men from such clans against neighbouring districts. This
occurred generally on the perimeter of the area, where other,
purely emotional factors, were not strong enough to command support.
It was used, that is, not against West Highlanders, but by them
against others. Barrisdale, and young Glengarry used it in their
(1) Josephine Macdonell of Keppoch - The Macdonells of Keppoch and
Gargavach. Archibald Sinclair - The Celtic Press. Glasgow,
See also Fergusson, Argyll in the Forty Five p.205,
(2) Albermarle Papers, ii 405 and i. 87.
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attempt to raise men from the Grants of Glenmoriston, and also
(1)
In Urquhart and Assynt. Glengarry's second son, Angus threatened
(2)
to plunder Urquhart unless a hundred Grants joined him, and
(3)
later, threatened to burn the corn of those who opposed hlrn.
Among the Atholl Papers Is at least one reference to a recruiting
raid, by Camerons, on Atholl tenants in the Rannoch area, Again,
on August 15th, a party of Camerons threatened to burn the houses
of any Camerons in Rannoch who would not rise. Two days later,
Keppoch made similar threats In the Bunrannoch area, and this was
(4)
also an Atholl barony, Keppoch later made a similar descent on
the Loch Broom area, "snatohing some of them out of their beds"
according to the petition of James Robertson, a presbyterian clergy-
(5)
man of Loch Broom, in favour of fifteen forced out from his parish.
All these references, however, are to the use of force outside the
home district of those using the violence, and the force was used
against those living outside, or on the perimeter only, of this
Western Highland area.
(1) See the Earl of Seaforth's letter of Oct, 19th 1745 to Forbes of
Culloden, telling of Barrisdale's attempt to force men in
Assynt, Cull.Pap, Nat, Lib, 2969, Also Forbes' letter to
Ludovick Grant of 0ct.S7th, Grant Letters p,180 Vol, 2,
"Chiefs of Grant"
(2) "Chiefs of Grant" Letter of Young Glengarry to Ludovick
Grant's factor in Urquhart, Sept, 30th 1745, Vol,2 p,165.
(3) ibid, letter of Angus Maodonald of Glengarry to John Grant,
factor in Urquhart, Oct. 8th 1745. Vol,2 p.167-8.
(4) See Sir Bruce Seton, "The Prisoners of the *45," Vol.1.
Edln. University Press, 1928,




The countryside of Perthshire proved a very fertile recruiting
ground during the rebellion, Between 18^ and 2CK> of the Jacobite
force came from here, and the county provided illustrations of
almost every facet of Jacobite recruitment. In the first place,
almost all those families possessing territorial influence in
Perthshire had long histories of Jacobite activity, often going back
to the days of Viscount Dundee, Next, the near feudal military
power of the chief is amply illustrated in this county by the MarquiP
of Tullibardine's method of raising recruits. Further, Perthshire
was a stronghold of %iscopacy, and this made for Jacobite senti¬
ments, Lastly, the county provides numerous illustrations of the
difficulties involved in forcing out men, and of the necessity of
(2)
providing large military parties in order to achieve any success
in this. The existence of forced recruiting, on a large scale,
meant that this county also produced by far the largest number of
deserters from the Jacobite army, and plentiful examples of the
problems of desertion can be found from these parts. The county of
Perth also produced, in Lord George Murray, probably the ablest
soldier, and certainly the most diligent staff officer, in the
Jacobite army.
Section I,
Recruitment Statistics from Perthshire,
The three men responsible, between them, for almost all the
recruiting within this county were Lord George Murray, his brother
(1) See Introduction for the source of these figures,
(?.) The. term prrty is here used in its Jacobite sense of a company
of men prepared, and Instructed, to use military force to
secure recruits.
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the Marquis of Tullibardine, and the Duke of Forth, Lord George
Murray joined the Prince at Dunkeld, on September 3rd, 1745, while
Tullibardine and the Duke of Perth had earlier arrived with Charles
from France on board the Du Teillay,
Lord George Murray was the fifth son of the first Duke of
Atholl, and was fifty at the time of the Forty-Five, With his elder
brother, Tullibardine, he had fought under the Sari of Mar in the
rising of 1715, and had escaped from Uist to France in May, 1716, In
1719 he had sailed from Bordeaux, and had the rank of Brigadier, in
the brief and disastrous rising which was routed at C-lenshiel, He
again escaped to the Continent, after lurking in hiding for ten
months, and remained in exile, largely in the company of his brother
the Marquis of Tullibardine, until he returned to Scotland in 1724,
and received a formal pardon in November 1725, Although he had
twice been engaged in treasonable activities, he, unlike his elder
brother, had not been attainted, and his pardon was therefore easier
to prooure. It was achieved as a result of negotiations begun by
his father, the first Duke, in 1722, After his return to Scotland,
and succession to the Dukedom of his brother Fames, Lord George
remained immersed in family and estate business, and lived largely
at the family property of Tullibardine until the September of 1745,
The years from 1725 to 1745 were spent largely in the circle
of his brother, the Duke, whose daughter Lord George's eldest son
(1)
was, by family arrangement, to marry. Twice in 1744 he ignored
Jacobite feelers put out by the Duke of Perth, and as late as the
20th August, 1745 was writing to the Lord Advocate, Robert Craigie,
(1) See an undated Ms, compiled late in 1747 by Lady George Murray
summarising her husbands financial relations with the Duke of
Atholl, now amongst miscellaneous papers in the Charter Room
at Blair Castle,
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Intelligence of the Prince* s doings to date, ending with the
orthodox and pious Hanoverian hope "that these troubles will soon
(1)
be over". With his brother, and the elder Glengarry, he met Sir
John Cope on August 21st to discuss action, and he was already in
(2)
receipt of a Government commission as Sheriff Depute of Perth.
On September 2nd 1745 a request from the Prince for support
was brought to Lord George by the younger Oliphant of Gask, and
on the following day Lord George wrote to his brother, the Duke,
to explain that his decision to engage "in the course I always
(3)
in my heart thought just and right" was already taken when they
parted after the August interview with Sir John Cope. He was given
by the Prince, on the arrival at Perth, a Major General*s Commission,
(4)
and a day or so later was made a Lieutenant General.
Lord George Murray was a valuable adherent to the Jacobite
Cause. Like his brother, Tullibardine, he represented the Atholl
territorial and personal Influence, which was of incalculable
importance in Perthshire, but while his brother had been an exile,
and remote from local politics for the last thirty years, Lord
George had been consolidating his personal influence in Perthshire
since 1725. He had also, alone of the Jacobite High Command in 1745,
personal experience of the army they were fighting, as he had served
as an offioer in the Royals (First Foot or Royal Scots), until the
rising of 1715. He had considerable military ability, his holding
(1) Winifred Duke, "Lord George Murray and the Forty-Five". Aberdeen.
Milne and Hutchison 1927. p.56.65.
(2) Granted to him, August 14th by his brother the Duke of Atholl.
(3) Winifred Duke, op.cit. p.72.
(4) According to Col. 0*Sullivan"a day or so later, finding the Duke
of Perth was Lieut. General he would be one too and so the
Prince made him one". "1745 and After" A. & H. Tayler,
p.69 Fdin. Nelson & Sons. 1938.
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of the Jacobite rear on the retreat from Derby, and his transport
of the artillery and heavy baggage over exceptionally difficult
terrain was a severe test of his powers, but both these tasks, and
his command of the coastal division on the retreat north from
Stirling, revealed his talent for organisation.
However, the Jacobite attitude of mind after the retreat from
Derby gave ample opportunity for mutual recriminations over
tactics, and the Prince had been encouraged by his earlier suc¬
cesses in the entry into Edinburgh, and the battle of Prestonpans,
to believe in the necessity for bold strokes, and therefore to
resent Lord George*s more cautious advice.
Lord George lacked the ability to get on with either Colonel
0,Sullivan or Sir John Maedonald, who had accompanied Charles from
France, Both of them were closely in the Prince's confidence.
Lord George quarrelled with Sir John Macdonald and 0,Sullivan over
the placing of the Atholl Brigade at Frestonpans, and with
O'Sullivan, both over the battle of Falkirk, and the retreat from
Stirling, Matters were made worse by what even Maxwell of Kirkconnell,
a supporter of Lord George, called "his manner haughty and over-
(1)
bearing" and by the attitude of John Murray of Broughton, Charles"
Secretary, who saw Lord George*s ability as a threat to his own
Influence over the Prince, Murray of Broughton, therefore,
(2)
(according to Maxwell of KirkconneH) "began by representing
Lord George as a traitor to the Prince; he assured him that he had
joined on purpose to have an opportunity of delivering him up to
(1) Maxwell, p.57.
(2) Who had, however, no love for Murray of Broughton, and who
may therefore over blacken the picture.
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the government".
Lord George was, In part at least, the victim of the suspi¬
cions and intrigue which are too often engendered in exiled courts,
and which had formed the atmosphere in which the Prince had grown
up.
The second major Jacobite personality in Perthshire was
William Murray, Marquis of Tullibardine. He was the eldest surviv¬
ing son of the first Duke of Atholl, and the brother of Lord George
Murray. With Lord George he had been out in the Fifteen, end was
attainted for his rebel activity. With his brother, he was in¬
volved in the Glenshiel landing in 1719, but, unlike Lord George
Murray, never received a pardon. Accordingly, on the death of his
father in 1724, the Dukedom passed to the next brother, James, who
was usually known in Jacobite circles as "Duke James". In such
oircles Tullibardine was held to be the rightful Duke, and is
frequently referred to as Duke of Atholl in Jacobite correspondence.
He is here referred to however, by his earlier title of Marquis of
Tullibardine, though even this was only a titular rank.
On the death of his father, in 1724, a messenger was sent
(with his^expenses paid by the new Duke), to give Tullibardine
the news. From then on, frequent sums of money were paid, by
(2)
order of the new Duke, to settle his brother's debts.
In July 1745 Tullibardine returned to Scotland with the Prince ,
(1) See Atholl Papers - in the Charter Room at Blair Castle. Box 42.
Package I. Factor's Accounts 1699/1742.
(2) Atholl Papers, Box 42. Package I. One payment was made in 1727
three in 1729 totalling £3,444 Scots, one in 1730, two in
1732, one in 1733, two in 1734, and three in 1739, for instance.
All these payments appear in the factor's accounts as pay¬
ments to "Mr. Kateson" the code name in family correspondence,
for Tullibardine".
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on board the Du Telllay, and on August 31st arrived at Blair Castle.
o
yrom there, with the foimal position of Commander-in-Chief North of
the Forth which was given him on September 22nd, 1745, his two
chief conoerns were the raising of Atholl men, and their despatch
to join the main body In Edinburgh. He was also responsible for
securing as much support as possible from all those with territorial
or personal influence north of the Forth, and sent out accordingly
(1)
formal requests for support to Lord Cromartle, Mackintosh of
(2) (3) (4)
Mackintosh, Lord Lovat and others. On October 30th he joined
(5)
the main body in Edinburgh with up to 1,000 Atholl recruits.
On January 13th he set out again for Blair, and used Blair Castle
as a centre to rally the Atholl men until about February 19th, when
(6)
he rejoined Charles at Culloden House.
James Drummond, titular Duke of Perth, was the third Perthshire
personality of importance. He was bom in 1713 and was the grand¬
son of the 4th Earl of Perth, who was created 1st Duke of Perth by
James VII and II at St. Germain. He was the most important re¬
presentative of Roman Catholicism in the Jacobite Council of War,
(7 )
and he joined Charles at Perth, bringing with him 200 recruits.
He had raised these from the area round Crieff, where he began re¬
cruiting operations about August 22nd. By November, this force had
(8)
grown to 300 men. The Duke served in the Jacobite army with the
(1) On September 28th 1745.
(2) On Ootober 7th.
(3) On Ootober 9th.
(4) See below for further details of these appeals.
(5) See infr. p.4-0.(6) See below p.4-2. et seq.
(7) ELcho p.248.
(8) ELcho p.234 inset.
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rank of Lieutenant General, until he became involved in Lord
George Murray's quarrel with the Prince over the terms of surrender
to be negotiated with Carlisle, on November 14th 1745. Thereupon
the Duke of Perth resigned his General's commission, and served
for the rest of the campaign as Colonel of his own regiment.
The Jacobite force recruited from Perthshire was raised
largely beoause of the activities of these three men. It appears
to have totalled at least 2,190 men, and was probably considerably
larger. It wan raised in the following manner.
On September 4th, 1745, Charles was joined at Perth by the Duke
(1)
of Perth, who brought with him about 200 men. The Duke had begun
recruiting about August 9th, when he had visited Lord Strathallan
at Maohany, Strathallan's home, to discuss action, in view of
(2) (3)
Charles' arrival. By August 22nd he was recruiting in Crieff,
and the force with which he arrived at Perth on September 4th
formed the nucleus of his own regiment.
On the same day, Charles was Joined by Robertson of Struan,
with a body whlehhe had already raised in WestemPerthshire of
U)
between 50 and 200. How many more men Stru&n later raised is
doubtful. He certainly was believed by Tullibardine to have raised
a further 100 by October 12, for on that date Tullibardine ordered
him to send a party of 100 to join Farquharson of Balmoral in
Braemar, but this party was never sent, and whether he had, in
(1) Elcho p.248.
(2) "Jacobite Lairds of Gask" p.104.
(3) Culloden Papers, letter of Aug. 28th from Forbes of Culloden
to Cope. Nat. Lib. Cull. Papers 2696.
(4) Elcho gives a figure of only 50, although Maxwell of Kirkconnell
puts it at 200. Eloho p.284 note 2.
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fact, raised as many is doubtful* Those whom he did raise served
in the Atholl brigade*
A further 240 men were raised by mid-October, largely through
the efforts of MacGregor of Glengyl© and MaoGregor of Glenoairnaig*
These were Drummonds, or MacGregors, who oame largely from the
Balquidder area, and they served in the Duke of Perth's Regiment*
3y the end of December MaoGregor of Glengyle had raised a further
force which, under Glengyle, was holding Doune Castle* These were
of the force which Lord Strathallan commanded at Perth* Lord Elcho
(1)
put the size of Glengyle force at 50, and it was probably com¬
posed of the same men who had gone with him in November in a
recruiting raid into CowO^*
The largest number of men recruited from Perthshire served,
however, in the Atholl Brigade. Here, because of the recurrent
problem of desertion, statistics of the standing force at any
given moment are more interesting, but much more oomplex*
One source of detailed figures for these and other reoruits
is Lord Elcho, but if we accept his figures without questioning
them, we are faced with a conclusion of desertion on an upreoe-
dented scale*
The Atholl Brigade was composed of three battalions, commanded
by Lord Nairn, Menzles of Shlan, and Lord George Murray respectively*
On Septrnober leth Lord Elcho writes that Lord Nairn reached
Edinburgh with a force of 1,000 men* On Septmeber 21st the battle
Elcho p*322*
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of Prestonpans was fought, and In this battle Elcho puts the
Nairn battalion at 350, Lord George's at the same figure, and
Menzies of Shian's at 300, giving a total of all Atholl recruits
of 1,000 men. If we accept these two statements we must believe
that no Atholl recruits had arrived before September 18th, and
none subsequently, and also that the force that Lord Nairn brought
on that date was divided into 3 battalions and composed the entire
Atholl force at Prestonpans. Against this argument, however, is
the fact that Lieut. Col. Spalding of Glenkllrie had sent off at
least a few men on September 10th, under Murray of Soilary or
(2)
Sollzarit, to join the main Jacobite force. We know also that
the force of between 50 and 200 Bobertsons, raised by Stman, had
by now joined the Atholl Brigade.
Elcho's figure of a battalion under Lord Nairn totalling 1,000
men, by September 18th, is also contradicted by a letter of Lord
George Murray, to his brother Tullibsrdine, written on October 4th,
in Which he says both his and the Nairn battalion contained less
than 500 men each. He asks for enough Atholl recruits to bring
(3)
their totals up to 500.
Lastly, we know that the main body of Atholl recruits were not
brought to Edinburgh by Tullibardine until October 30th 1745. The
force which he had been collecting at Blair since early September
(4)
numbered between 600 and 1,000 when it reached Edinburgh.
(1) "Atholl Correspondence", p.57.
(2) "Jacobite Correspondence of the Atholl Family during the
Rebellion of 1745-6". Edin.Abbotsford Club 1840.p.14. Letter
of Spalding to Tullibardine dated September 10th 1745,
(3) "Atholl Correspondence", p.57.
(4) Blaikie p.23, accepts the smaller figure, while Tullibardine's
correspondence suggests the larger one.
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However. ELcho, summing up the size of the Jacobite force when it
(1)
reached Carlisle nine days later, gives the Atholl Brigade as
still totalling only 1,000 men. The total of 1,000 still being
made up of 350 under Lord George, 350 men under Lord Nairn and 300
under Menzies of Shian. If Tullibardine had brought a force of
between 600 and 1,000 to swell an existing Atholl force of about
1,000, this figure of 1,000 men still serving en November 8th
implies desertions at the rate of 1,000 men in nine days. A more
likely hypothesis, therefore, is that Elcho's figures for the
Atholl force at Prestonpans refer, in fact, to the size of the
force some weeks later, when it had been strengthened by the
recruits Tullibardine brought on October 30th. Home, in his
(2)
History of the Rebellion puts the Atholl force at Prestonpans at
250 Atholl men, and 100 Robertsons - a total of 350, which is a
more likely figure than ELoho's. A force of this size, increased
by up to 1,000 recruits under Tullibardine could yiq11 have shrunk
(3)
again, after desertions, to 1,000 by November 8th.
More important than such details is, however, a major conclu¬
sion. Already it should be noted that there was either considerable
(1) On November 8th, Elcho,plan following p.324.
(2) John Home. "History of tne Rebellion", London. Cadell and Daviec
1802 p.117.
(3) The theory that Lord ELcho's figures are not always accurate,
end that he confuses a figure at one date with the figure at
some later or earlier date is borne out by his figures for
the Duke of Perth's Regiment. He tells us that on September
4th the Duke of Perth joined Charles at Perth bringing with
him 200 recruits, and refers to the Perth Regiment at
Prestonpans on Septmeber 21st, and at Carlisle on November
8th, as throughout totalling only 200 men, despite the fact
that in the interval between, 140 and 200 MacGregors had
joined the regiment.
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confusion and inaccuracy over Atholl recruitment figures, or else
considerable desertion. Tullibardine believed Lord Nairn to have
a force of 1,000 on September 15th, yet by the end of October, in
spite of the known and large reinforcements, the Atholl brigade
still totalled little more than this earlier figure. Both over
optimistic exaggeration of recruitment figures, and some early
desertion, would explain this important and apparent deficiency.
The last major phase of Atholl recruiting occurred from
January 1746 until early April. On January 13th Tullibardine left
the main Jacobite body at Stirling and returned to Blair Castle
to continue raising the Atholl men. He rejoined Charles at Inver-
ness Cn February 19th, but on March 15th Lord George Murray left
Inverness with one battalion of the Atholl brigade, and joined
Cluny Macpherson with 300 Macphersons in Badenoch to begin the
siege of Blair Castle. The presence of first Tullibardine and
later Lord George had a revitalising effect on Atholl recruitment.
No sizeable body of Atholl men had been recruited since Tullibar¬
dine marched South at the end of October. By January 19th,
Tullibardine's Secretary Colville reported to him that only 200
had been raised during the two and a half months of his absence,
(1)
although 700 or 800 had been expected*
Between January 19th and April 2nd, however, 40 or 50 recruits
(2)
from Strathardle were raised by Robertson of Bleaton and an
unknown number had been raised by Spalding of Glenkilrie, the
Lieutenant Colonel in Lord George*s battalion.
(1) "Atholl Correspondence", p.146-7.
(2)ibid, p.153.
43.
Some of these were sent off on January 31st to join those
already gathered at Blair, and Spalding promised, in his letter of
January 31st to Tullibardine, to send more as soon as possible.
A small party had also, before January 24th been gathered by
Robert Stuart of Ballechin, a Captain in Lord Nairn*a battalion.
With these he intended to raise recruits in the Tullimet district*
and by February 1st he had raised enough men from Tullimet to set
(r)
out with them for Blair, to join Tullibardine,
By January 28th, Spalding of Ashintullie had raised at least
some men, although his methods of so doing and especially his
willingness to receive bribes to excuse those he should have been
forcing out, were suspected by Robertson of Bleaton, Bleaton wrote
on January 28th to Colville, Tullibardlne's Secretary, that, unless
he was given the power to bring up Ashlntullieife men to Blair
quickly "he and his mother will spoil the business by taking bribes
(2)
to pass some of them".
Ferguson of Baleycuran and Robertson of Killiechangie and
Robertson of Fascally had also raised at least a few further re¬
cruits by the end of January. On January 31st Tullibardine wrote
(3)
to Ferguson of Baleycuran, and Robertson of Killiechangie
reproving them for their dilatoriness, aid instructing them to join
Fascally and Bleaton, who were on their way to Perth with the
recruits they had each raised,
k force of size unknown, had been raised by Killiechangie




by February 5th, but a striking instance of the importance of
morale is provided by the faot that the whole force could not be
prevented from dispersing home when they learnt of the Jacobite
(1)
retreat north from Stifling.
By February 6th, Tullibardlne had decided, on Kilmarnock's
advice, to use the fire cross as a further method of enoouraging
(2)
recruiting. On February 7th at least 40 men raised by Stewart
(3)
of Gourdie set out from Logierait to join Tulllbardine at Blair.
However, the morale of this party, like that of Killieehangie's
company, deteriorated rapidly, and by the following day at least
(4)
some of the men had already deserted.
Meanwhile, Spalding of Glenkilrie had reported that he had
now raised 200 men in Strathardle, and pay and arms had been sent
for them, but by February 8th no men had as yet been sent by
(5)
Glenkilrie to Blair. Stewart of Kynachan and Archibald Menzies
of Shian had been recruiting during this time towards Rannoch.
Stewart of Kynachan was a major In Lord Nairn's battalion and
Shian a Lieut. Col. in Tulllbardine's battalion. Under them
Stewart of Fincastle, Stewart of Ballechln, Stewart of Kinnaird,
Stewart of Garth and Robertson of Balnacree had each raised com-
(6)
panies which, by February 8th, were on the road to join Kynachan,
By February lC^h, Blair of Glasolune, who held the rank of
"
_____
(1) See"Atholl Correspondence", p.187. ^illlechangie's letter of
Feb.5th to Tullibardine reporting their dispersal.
(2) ibid. p.188. Letter of Tullibardine to Kilmarnock,
(3) ibid. p.200. Letter of Blair of Glasclune to Tullibardine,
from Logierait, February 8th.
4) ibid, the same letter.
5) ibid, p.194. Letter of Tullibardine to Glenkilrie.
(6) "Atholl Correspondence", p.197. Letter of Kynachan to
Robertson of Drumachine at Blair.
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(1)
Lieutenant Colonel In the Atholl Brigade, had recruited over 100
men. Some of these, and others already raised, must have marched
North with Tullibardine on February 10th, He joined Chaires and the
main Jacobite body in Inverness on February 19th, However,
Robertson of Drumachine, Stewart of Kynachan and other officers ef
the Atholl brigade remained behind in Perthshire to continue re¬
ts)
eruiting, and to try to hold the Tummal by destroying the bridge.
On February 10th Colville wrote to Tullibardine to complain that
the bridge was still standing, while Kynaohan had written the
previous day to Colville explaining the impossibility of the task
In the absence of masons. Confusion, in fact had already set in.
The last recruits came on February 20th when Colonel Robertson of
Drumachine sent on from Corrybroch four Atholl recruits with the
(4)
message that more were following. Large scale Atholl recruiting,
however, oarae to an end with the occupation of Perthshire by
Government troops and the dispatch of Sir Andrew Agnew, with 500
men, on February 11th to occupy Blair Castle. This occupation put
virtually Insurmountable obstacles in the way of further recruitment
because it made impossible the sending out of armed parties to
raise men and it was partly because of this fact that the Jacobite
force under Lord George Murray was sent to attempt the recapture of
Blair Castle on March 15th,
By April 2nd the attempted siege of Blair Castle had been
abandoned, and Lord George had returned to Inverness, bringing
(1) "Atholl Correspondence", p.200,
(2) ibid. p.20 Letter of Drumaohine from Lude to Colville, Feb,9th,
(3) "Atholl Correspondence", p.203 and 204, Letters of Kynachan and
Colville of February 9th and 10th,
(4) ibid, p.207 and 208,
one company each,
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with him those Atholl recruits who had not been ready to accompany
Tullibardine to the main body on February 19th. Lord George esti-
(1)
mates them at between 400 and 500. Their number would be made
up of the following and would possibly total over 500.
Under Robertson of Bleaton 50 men
Under Stewart of Gourdie under 40 men
Under Spaiding of Glenkllrie vQO men
and Robertson of Stralloch
Under Blair of Glasclune 110 men
Under Stewart of Fincastle
Under Stewart of Ballechin
Under Stewart of Kinnaird
Under Stewart of Garth
Under Robertson of Balnacree
A total of the Jacobite adherents from Perthshire, recruited
(2)
as outlined above, would give a figure of at least 2,290, This
figure does not include the large number of Atboll recruits known
to have been enlisted who deserted rapidly. It also puts at an
average of only 20 men each, the five companies enlisted by Fincastle,
Ballechin, Kinnaird, Garth and Balnacree. The figure here would
almost certainly be larger * the smallest party of recruits re-
*
ferred to elsewhere as a separate body numbered 40, and almost
certainly a company of any smaller number would have been merged
(1) In his "Marches of the Highland Army", Lord George implies that
the large part of this number were previous deserters, but
this seems unlikely. He writes "I got a reinforcement of from
four or five hundred men in the county. o£ those vuho had
been with us formerly." "Jacobite Memoirs of the Rebellion
of 1745". Ed, Robert Chambers. Edinburgh. W. & R, Chambers
1824 p.108.
(2) Made up as follows: Under the Duke of Perth:300, under MacGregor
of Glengyle and Glencalrnaig:240. Further party under
Glengyle:50, Atholl Recruits up to Nov 1: at least 1,000 Atteoll
recruits Nov 1st to Jan,19th:200, Atholl recruits Jan.l9th/
Aprf| 2nd r at" 1 east ~500. ^6til "2 f290.
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with another to make a larger unit.
The figure of 2,290 also Ignores the Perthshire Horse, and
certainly nucleus of this was raised in Perthshire by Lord Strath-
allan. According to Lord Hcho, the Perthshire Horse eventually
(1)
totalled 130, and were commanded by Strathallan, as Colonel,
(2)
with the elder Ollphant of Gask as Lieutenant Colonel.
Allowing for these additions, therefore, Perthshire adherents
would almost certainly number at least 2,400 and probably consider¬
ably more. At the least, this would provide us with a proportion
of 20$ or 21$ of the entire Jaoobite levy, if we assume the total
Jacobite levy, as explained in the introduction, to have been be¬
tween 11,470 and 13,140 men.
SECTION III.
Motives for Enlistment in Perthshire.
If we accept the calculation that Perthshire produced approx¬
imately 20$ or one fifth of the whole Jaoobite force, we are faced
with the problem of finding the reasons and motives behind such
large scale enlistment, for no other single county produced a com¬
parable proportion, or total, of recruits.
It has been fairly common to ascribe the strength of Perthshire
Jacobitism, at least in part, either to the personal attraction felt
(1) Elcho, plan following p.324. Ollphant of Gask put them at 75 by
Feb,7th 1746. See "Jacobite Lairds of Gask". T.L, Kingston
Oliphant Grampian Club. London. Griffin & Co. 1870 p.129 et
seq.
(2) This squadron were also known as the Horse Grenadiers or
Kilmarnock*s Horse, since on Strathallan*s appointment to
command at Perth during the invasion of England, cavalry
command was given to Lord Kilmarnock.
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for Lord George Murray and his brother or to the more general
idea of lairdship and the respect it could command. The explana¬
tion is, in fact, much more complex and more varied than this.
Apart from ties to the Atholl family two other motives inspired
the gentry, tacksmen and tenants who formed the bulk of the
Perthshire officers. The first was the religious motive of
Eplscopalianism, the second the financial motive arising from the
nature of their land holdings.
The motives for enlistment among the men, however, were quite
different from those of the officers. Those who formed the rank
and file of the Perthshire regiments served, not from choice, but
because they were forced out. The widespread nature of this
forcing out of men led to the equally widespread problem of deser¬
tion among these recruits. Because the difficulties of disciplin¬
ing an army of forced out men were not fully realised, no successful
steps could be taken to check this desertion. Lord George Murray
recognised the magnitude of the problem of desertion and wrote of it
(1)
to his brother Tullibardlne on numerous occasions but, through¬
out the campaign, neither he nor Tulllbardine seems to have
realised that measures which might hold together an army of volun¬
teers would not suffice to prevent desertion in what was virtually,
amongst the Perthshire rank and file, a conscript force.
Among those, chiefly officer^ who enlisted with some appearance
of free choice, or at least without the presence or threat of
military force to secure their adherence, three major motives can
be discerned. With a few, the deciding factor was a blood or
(1) See "Atholl Correspondence" esp. letters of January 11th p.107
and 16th January p.141.
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marriage relationship, or a personal tie with the Jacobite branch
of the House of Atholl. For others, almost certainly the political
implications of Ifciscopalianism were decisive. The third, and
probably in numbers at least, the most important factor was, for
many, the fact of their occupation, as tenants, of lands composing
part of the Atholl estates. Amongst the officers of the Atholl
brigade practically every man was a Ducal tenant. This, combined
with Tullibardine*s attitude to their position as tenants, suggests
that their willingness to follow his politioal cause was the result
of financial rather than sentimental ties.
Those Jacobite adherents who had either a blood or close
personal relationship with the House of Atholl are found, not
surprisingly, amongst the more senior officers of the Perthshire
regiment. They include Lord Nairn and his brother, Robert Meroer
of Aldle, both Colonels in the Atholl Brigade, Laurence Oliphant
of Gask, Lieutenant Colonel in the Perthshire Horse, Viscount
Strathallan, its Colonel, and Alexander Robertson of St rowan and
Duncan Robertson of Drummaohine, both Colonels in the Atholl
Brigade. In all these oases there were not only close personal
links with the Atholl family, and with each other, but also a long
family tradition of Jacobit ism as well.
Both Lord Nairn and his younger brother, Robert Mercer of
Aldie, were cousins of Lord George Murray and Lord Tullibardine.
(1)
They were the sons of Lord William Murray and Margaret, Baroness
Nairn. They came from a family noted for its Jacobite views, and
Lord Nairn had been taken prisoner at Preston in 1715 although
subsequently pardoned, Laurence Oliphant of Gask was married to a
(1) Son of the 1st Marquis of Atholl and brother of the 1st Duke
Lord George*s father.
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sister of Lord Nairn, and he was the brother-in-law of Lord
Strathallan, who had also married a daughter of Lady Nairn's;
(1)
Robertson of Strowan was one of the twelve trustees for the 1st
Duke of Atholl in 1714, as was Laurence Oliphant of Gask, and he
had served under Dundee in 168S, and under Mar in 1715, after which
he had remained abroad until his pardon in 1731. Robertson of
Strowan's daughter was married to Oliphant of Gask's son, who held
the rank of captain in the Perthshire Horse. Duncan Robertson of
Drummachine was yet another son-in-law of Lady Nairn, and had been
one of a short list to receive Jacobite Commissions from Lord Nairn
(2)
in 1719. Both Henry Stewart of Flncastle and Robert Stewart of
Ballechln, held the rank of Captain in Lord Nairn's battalion of
(3)
the Atholl brigade, and both raised companies of further recruits
between January and April 1746. They were almost certainly the
sons of the Stewart of Ballechin, and the Gilbert Stewart of
Fincastle, who were among the twelve trustees appointed for the 1st
(4)
Duke of Atholl in 1714. Stewart of Ballechin had also been in¬
cluded on Lord Nairn's list of those to receive Commissions in 1719.
A second major motive for Jacobitism in Perthshire was pro¬
vided by membership of the Scottish Episcopal Churoh. The reasons
for the political association between Episcopalianism and Jacobit-
ism have been examined elsewhere. Here it should be noted that
Perthshire was a stronghold of that Church. There were Episcopalian
(5)
parishes with strong congregations at Blair Atholl itself, at
(1) This,rather than Struan, is the more common contemporary spelling,
(2) "Jacobite Lairds of Gask". p.64.
(3) See Ms. List of Officers in the Atholl brigade - compiled by the
7th Duke of Atholl. Miscell.Atholl Papers, Charter Room, Blair
Castle.




Muthill, south of Crieff, at Logie Almond, and in Perth Itself
(1)
there were two separate Episcopal congregations. There were
possibly other congregations as well in the county. The Episco¬
pal Church has not preserved as detailed records of its parish
organisation as the Roman Catholic Church has done, and there are
few figures available amongst its reoords for the first half of
the eighteenth century. The most detailed report of its strength,
(2)
compiled in 1708 however stated that there were twelve episcopal
clergy stationed in the two counties of Perth and Stirling, and
more than half these would have been in Perthshire, by far the
larger county of the two.
Amongst Perthshire Jacobites there were many who are known
to have been members of Episcopal Congregations, They included
(3)
Lord George Murray, Lord Nairn, Robert Mercer of Aldie, George
Robertson of Fasoally who held the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in
the Atholl Brigade, Alexander Robertson of Strowan, Major David
Stewart of Kynachan,(also of the Atholl brigade) Graham of Balgowan
and Lord Rollo, both of whom were amongst the first names on a list
of "well affected" (to the Jacobite cause)"hnd firm gentry of
(4)
Perthshire" compiled for Lord Tullibardine on September 3rd 1745,
The list also includes the Robertsons of Lude, end the family of
Lord Stormont, both of whom gave hospitality to Charles at the
beginning of September 1745,
(1) See the papers of the Scottish Episcopal Church at the Episcopal
College, Rosebery St., Edinburgh, for letters of William
Erskine, Duncan Cameron, William Abernethie, Clergy at
Muthili, Perth and Logie Almond respectively,
(2) See below Chapter 6 p. 141
(3) For evidenoe of the Episcopalian ,c<7nnections of Lord George and
the rest of this list, see above /'chapter 6,
,X44 See "Atholl Correspondence", list of Perthshire gentry compile'
" -/v"
by William Davidson of Auchterarder for Tullibardine p,7.
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Many Episcopalians undoubtedly felt in 1745 that the best
(1)
interests of their Church could be served by active Jacobitism
and ever since 1689 the hierarchy of the Episcopal Church in
Scotland had maintained on behalf of their Church, far closer
links with the exiled Stuarts than did, for instanoe the hierarchy
of the Catholic Church in Scotland. The two Episcopal clergymen
from Perthshire who served in the Jacobite army, Robert Lyon of
Perth and Duncan Cameron of Fortlngall, wrote of the duty they
(2)
felt to follow their congregations. To many members of that
faith, quite apart from the political connection between their
Churoh and the exiled Stuarts, active support of the Jacobite
movement seemed the best means of ending the disabilities and
persecution their Churoh had suffered since 1689.
The more highly ranking officers of the Perthshire regiments
formed, as has been demonstrated, a fairly closely united group
linked together by either family or personal ties with the Atholl
family, or by the common faith of Episcopallanlsm. This was
largely a voluntary link formed by a common sentiment. Amongst
the most senior officers there appears to have been an equally
strong, but rather different link • almost all of them were ducal
tenants, and had been told clearly what actions were expected of
them as tenants.
The list of the more senior officers in the Atholl brigade is
(3)
as follows.
(1) See below Chapter 6.
(2) Letter of Robert Lyon to the Episcopal Bishop Alexander, from
Dunblane 12th Sept, 1745 "now this affair has altered all
other measures and D. Cameron and I follow my congregations".
Episcopal Chest. Papers of Scot. Episcopal Church, Rosebery
St., Edinburgh.
(3) Ms. list compiled from papers in the Charter Room at Blair
Castle circa 1890 by the 7th Duke of Atholl.
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Lord Nairn*s battalion:
Major David Stewart of Kynachan.
Adjutant Charles Stewart of Bohally.
Captains Henry Stewart of Fincastle
Robert Stewart of Ballechin
Gilbert Stewart, younger of Garth
James Robertson of Balnacree
Lieutenants Malcolm Stewart, brother to Shierglas
Patrick Stewart of Easter Invervach
Charles Robertson, son of Balnaoree.
Lord George Murray's Battalion;
Lt. Cols. Robert Mercer of Aldie
Andrew Spalding of Glenkilry
Major James Robertson of Blairfettie
Captains Alexander Murray of Soilzarlt
David Robertson of Easter Bleaton
Daniel Spalding of Ashintully
Charles Spalding of Whitefield
Gregor Murray of Coinneachan.
Duncan Robertson of Auchleck
Andrew Spalding, Younger of Glenkilry
Patrick Stewart of Innerslainie
Lieutenant John Spalding, Younger of Whitefield
Ensigns Andrew Rattray of Blaokoralg
John Robertson of Western Bohesplck
Unknown Ranks Charles Robertson of Trinafour and 4 others.
Tullibardine's Battalion:
Colonels William, Lord Tullibardine
Archibald Menzies of Shian
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Lt. Cols. George Robertson of Fascally
Thomas Blair of Glasolune
Majors James Rattray of Ranagluzion
Robert Stewart of Kllliechangle
Captain Archibald Campbell, son of Glenlyon
C1}
Lieut, Daniel Henderson of Perth
It seems almost certain that most, if not all, of these
officers were Atholl tenants. In the Nairn battalion Major Stewart
(2) (3)
of Kynachan was a tenant, as were Stewart of Fincastle, Robert
(4) (5)
Stewart of Ballechin, the father of Gilbert Stewart of Kinnaird,
(6) (7)
William Stewart of Garth, and James Robertson of Balnacree,
All of these held the rank of Captain, Of the three Lieutenants,
Patrick Stewart of Faster Invervach, and Charles Robertson, younger
of Balnacree, were a Ducal tenant and a son of a tenant respectively,
while both Shierglas and Bohally were Atholl property.
Not only, therefore, was the Nairn battalion officered almost
entirely by those who held their land from the Duke of Atholl, but,
in its officers at least, it was entirely territorially raised.
The officers all occupied land within a triangle formed by Blair
(1) This list gives a total of 38 officers but the manuscript list
of Perthshire gentry who held commissions in the Atholl bri¬
gade (compiled from Mss, in the Charter Room at Blair Castle
by the 7th Duke of Atholl) gives the name of a further 73
Atholl officers, but without more details of their land
holdings,
2) See maps of Atholl Estates, Charter Room, Blair Castle,
3) Maps of Estates, Blair Castle,
(4) A trustee of the 1st Duke in 1714 - Charter Room Blair Castle,
Ms, Box No, 42,
(5) Kinnaird was part of Balnagard, the feu duties of which were
payable to the Duke of Atholl, see Box 42, Mss, relating to
Rentals 1699/1748 Charter Room, Blair Castle,
(6) ibid. Box 42 Rental Roll.
(7) ibid.
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Atholl, Loglerait and Glenlyon, a triangle whose sides were at
the most twenty miles long.
Lastly, and equally Important, Ducal tenancies were referred
(1)
to as tacks, Implying the consequent military obligations of
service. The use of the word "tack" for a lease or tenancy is not
in itself conclusive of such military obligations. The term may
have been used to denote only a financial and not a military
relationship, but the Nairn battalion, in fact, faithfully re¬
produced the model military organisation of a clan regiment raised
on semi-feudal lines. The Colonel of such a regiment was always
the chief or a dose member of his family - in this case Lord Nairn.
The remaining officers were provided by the members of the chief's
family and the tacksmen, the lesser of whom are also found amongst
the senior non-commissioned officers. In general, however, each
tacksman commanded a company raised by himself from his family and
tenants. Here, in the case of the Nairn battalion, such companies
were provided by Fincastle, Balnacree, Garth and Balleohin.(2)
Furthemore, a letter from Mercer of Aldie to Tullibardine of Sept,
(3)
8th refers to other "vassals" and is a further illustration of a
feudal attitude to reoruitment.
Dunoan Forbes of Culloden's famous saying of the Atholl family
"The Murray's is no Highland family" is often quoted, but in spite
of what may be ethnically true, the Atholl estate in the mid-
eighteenth century had all the characteristics of a Highland system
of land tenure. The lands were divided amongst tacksmen, leases
1) In the Estate Rentals, Box, 42, Blair Castle.
2) See above p.4^
(3) "Atholl Correspondence," p.12.
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(1)
were referred to as tacks, the tacksmen being in many cases
originally the near relations of the proprietor. Further, in
accordance with Highland custom, amongst these the newest oadet
branches and those therefore closest to the present chief, held the
positions of most importance. That position, in the case of the
House of Atholl, was held by Lord Nairn and Mercer of Aldie, both
nephews of the 1st Duke of Atholl. Also, and again in accordance
(2)
with Highland custom, the tacks were short leases, at will, with
a fairly substantial food rent in addition to a low money rent.
The total rent, for instance, from the Logieralt, Kllliechassie,
Dunkeld triangle, was "£3,557.11.0. scots, 140 bolls 3 firlots
(3)
bear, and 175 bolls, 1 peck, 1 lippie meal".
The money rent paid by a tacksman was normally low, in view
of the fact that military service from the tacksman himself, and a
company raised by him, was expected. Both Lord George Murray and
Tullibardlne recognised this fact, and Lord George recommended to
his brother to threaten to break the tacks, and destroy the property
(4)
of those who would not provide that service.
The second and third of the Atholl battalions present a
similar pattern of territorial and feudal recruitment. Robert
Mercer of Aldie, like Lord Nairn, was a cousin of Tullibardine
and of Lord George Murray. Of the remaining officer^, Spalding
(1) See 16th Century Rentals. Charter Room, Blair Castle,
(2) A new tack for Strowan, for instance, was granted and
Robertson of Balnacree in 1727 surrendered the tack of
Tullinet. Atholl Charter Room, Box 42.
(3) ibid. Box 42.
(4) "Atholl Correspondence", p,149/5Q. Letter of Jan, 21st 1746,
from Lord George Murray to Tullibardine.
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of Glenkllrie, Robertson of Blalrfettle, Robertson of Bleaton,
Spalding of AshintuLly, the two Spaldings of Whitefield, Murray
of Colnneaohan, and Rattray of Blackcralg were all occupying Atholl
tacks, so also were the three Robertsons of Bohesplck (Bohespie)
(1)
Trinafour and Auchleeks# Probably in many of these cases, as In
Lord Nairn's battalion, the tenant was In fact a sub-tenant of a
tacksman# For Instance, In the Nairn battalion, from the geograph¬
ical position of his holding Stewart of Bohally was almost certainly
U)
a sub-tenant of Stewart of Eynachan and the position of their
holdings suggests that Robertson of Auchleeks, Robertson of
Trinafour and Robertson of Bohespie were ell sub-tenants of
Robertson of Blairfettle#
Lord George Murray's battalion also bears the mark of having
been territorially raised# With the exception of Murray of
Soil2arIt and Stewart of Innersialnie and Gregor Murray of
Coinneachan, all the officers' holdings were either within two
miles of Blairfettle or within five miles of Glenkllrle# These
two properties were the holdings of the Major and the Lieutenant
Colonel, respectively, of the battalion#
The third Atholl battalion, nominally commanded by Tullibardlne
but actually commanded by Menzies of Shian, bears the same charac¬
teristics as the other two# The holdings of all the officers
named, with the exception of Rattray of Ranagulzion and Menzies
of Shian, figure either In the Rentals or Maps in the Atholl
Charter Room as Atholl properties. Shian, on the Shian burn,
(1) See Miscall# Rentals Box 42# Charter Room Blair Castle#
(2) ibid, and estate maps in Charter Room, Blair Castle#
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near the head of Loch Freuchie Is not listed in the Atholl Rentals,
but detailed rentals for the years between 1706 and 1748 are not
preserved. Details of land holdings were only given when a tack
was given up or altered in some way, and Shian is only five miles
from the area known as Little Dunkeld, which was an Atholl barony,
and less from Bolfracks, also Atholl property,
A farther indication of the way in which the Atholl battal¬
ions were territorially raised from Atholl tenants is provided
by the list of those to whom demands for support were sent out by
(1)
Tullibardine from Dalnacardoch on August 30th, 1745, The list
is divided into three sections - viz: Strath Tay, Strathardle and the
area known as Below the Pass - a phrase occurring frequently in
Atholl Rental lists, and used to describe the Atholl estate south
of Killiecrankie, All three phrases, in fact, are frequently used
to sub-divide the Atholl estates.
The list consists of 30 names. All those whose holdings can
(2)
be traced, 19 in all, were Atholl tenants. This fact, combined
with the use of subdivisions commonly found amongst Atholl rentals,
is yet another indication of the territorial and feudal nature of
Atholl recruiting.
Another characteristic of the traditional Highland feudal
levy is the use of the Fire Cross to bring in recruits. It was
sent out from Blair, on Tullibardine1s orders on February 6th,
(1) Namely Duncan Stewart of Blackhill, Robert Stewart of Derghullich.
John Reid of Pitnalrnle (Pitnacree), James Menzies of Bofracks
(Bolfracks), Kllchassie, Ballechin, Finlay Ferguson i>f Baladmln
(Baledmund). Henry Balnevis of Edradour, James Robertson of
Strathloch (stralloch), Patrick Small of Dirnanvear, Alex,
Rattray of Tullichcarron, (Tullochcurron), Donald Robertson
of Cultalonie, William Smallof Kindruggin, James Ferguson of
Wester Callle, Duncan Stewart of Miltovin (Milton near
Pitlochry), David Spalding of Whitehouse, David Roberts-!? of
Easter Bleaton and Alex Rattray of Dalrullean.
(2) See note 1 above.
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(1)
1746. It was sent first to Dalnacardoch and it would have been
used even as far south as the Atholl barony of Glenalmond but for
(2)
the occupation by government troops of the area round Crieff.
Further illustrations of the feudal nature of the Perthshire
recruitment are provided by the accounts kept by Laurance Oliphant
of Cask, Lieut. Col. of the Strathallan or Perthshire Horse, From
October 3rd 1745 Lord Strathallan, with Gask as his deputy, comman-
(3)
ded the Jacobite force at Perth, and Gask kept detailed accounts
of Jacobite expenditure at Perth from October 11th until February
4th 1746. On October 31st Gask paid out £1 "to Capt. Reynold's
charges bringing up 78 men from Lord Nairn's estate". Later,on(
(4)
January 24th 1746 £3.7.0. was paid out to "Gregor Murray and his
Glenalmond men as 4 days pay, and a further £1.10.0. paid to ditto
(5)
for levying his men in November". This is the Gregor Murray or
MacGregor of Coinneschan to whom Tullibardlne wrote on September 2nd
1745 telling him to raise "the tenants and wad setters of Glenalmondw •
A final example of recruitment on feudal lines is provided by
Robert Mercer of Aldle's letter of January 22nd, 1746 to Tullibardine .
(6)
In this letter he tells Tullibardine that all feuars had been
convened and had been told that those unable to attend for hosting,
hunting and warding were to send substitutes.
Section IV.
Enlistment of Other Ranks in Perthshire.
While officers were recruited from Perthshire largely as a
(1) See "Atholl Correspondence", p.191. The use of the Fire Cross
was suggested to Tullibardine by Lord Kilmarnock in a letter
of Feb, 5th.
(2) See "Atholl Correspondence", p.198. Letter of Gregor Murray
from Glenalmond to Mungo Murray at Blair.
(3) "Jacobite Lairds of Gask," Kingston Oliphant p.129 et seq.
(4) Off Colnneachan, Glenalmond - and Atholl barony.
(5) " Jacobite Lairds of Gask". p.74.
(6) "Atholl Correspondence", p.151.
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result of their status as Atboll tenants, the rank and file were
recruited by a mixture of threats, insults, military force and a
rudimentary quota system. The chief agents in this for Tulli-
bardine were Bobert Mercer of Aldie, Measles of Shian, Spalding
of Glenkilrle and Stewart of Kynachan. Although the Duke of
Perth had already raised some StewartB of Appln before he joined
Charles at Perth, about September 4th, serious recruiting in
Perthshire seems to have begun about September 8th. On this date
(1)
Mercer of Aldie wrote to Lord Nairn telling him he had ordered
the men of the "Propertie lands to meet on Thursday (Sept. 12)
to execute further orders" by which time the Strathardle men were
also expected. By September 10 came the first mention, in a
letter from Spalding of Glenkilrie to Tulllbardine, of the need
for a party to secure recruitment • "Nothing will raise them
(the Glenshee men) without a party", A party i.e. a company of
men prepared to use military force to secure recruits, was most
useful if it consisted of strangers. "Robertson of Bleaton, from
the Glenshee area, for instanoe, wanted the service of a party of
(2)
Rannoch men, the Appin Regiment was used in the Logierait area,
and Blair of Glasclune, on February 8th, asked Tullibardine for
"a party of strangers" to help recruiting. By September 30,
(3)
Spalding of Aehlntully was writing to Tullibardine of the
impossibility of keeping his men together without a party, adding
"how soon the party was gone, they were all unwilling".
(1) "Atholl Correspondence," p.12.
(2) "Atholl Correspondence," p.167. Letter of Bleaton to Colville,
Tulllbardine's Secretary, January 28th 1746.
(3) "Atholl Correspondence," p.37.
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Already a system of military quotas from each area had been ad¬
opted; the first mention of it is in the letter of John Stewart
of Stenton on September 15th 1745 to Tulllbardine of his diffi¬
culties in recruiting in the Dunkald district. Inwar and Little
(1
DunHeld had delivered only 4 men as their quota to Meroer of Aldie.
Already throats had been used to try to secure recruits.
Oliphant of Gash had forbidden his tenants to cut corn or pasture
(8)
their cattle unless they came out, and his embargo was only bro¬
ken on the request of the Prince, passing through Gask on his way
South from Perth, on September 11th 1745. Later, Blair of Glasclune
reported to Tullibardine, on February 8th 1746, that he had been
forced to use the burning of property and of crops to execute his
orders and had "succeeded tolerably" by raising 40 man from
Logierait on February 7th, some of vdiom had already deserted by
(3)
the next day.
The first roferences to desertion among Perthshire recruits
are in. Lord George Murray's letter of September 26th to his brother
in which he complains of Atholl desertions after the crossing of
(4)
the Forth at the Frews on September 13th. From this date on,
Tullibardine's correspondence is full of complaints of desertion
(5)
from Lord George Murray, and requests for a party to aid re¬
cruitment from those raising men on his behalf in Perthshire.
(6)
Stewart of Kynachan, by October 12th, for instance, writes of
(1) "Atholl Correspondence", p.16.
(2) "History of the Rebellion of 1745/6" Robert Chambers, 5th
Edition,Edinburgh, W. & R, Chambers 1840. Vol.1 p.69.
3) "Atholl Correspondence", p.200.
4) ibid. p.31.
5) On Sept. 27th and 29th for instance, ibid. p.32 onwards.
6} To Mercer of Aldle, "Atholl Correspondence", pp.179 and 180.
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the need for a strong party to raise the men of Glenlyon and
Rarraoch, while on the following day Lord Strathallan makes a simi¬
lar demand for Breadalbane.
By the middle of October, however, the first phase of Perth¬
shire recruiting had come to an end. Tullibardine had been re-
(1)
ceiving frequent requests to hasten the despatch of recruits
south. He was now chiefly concerned with doing this, and with the
moving from Montrose of the French arms, which arrived there on
(2)
the 7th, 10th and 17th of October, rather than with further re¬
cruitment, By October 14th the Master of Strathallan had reached
Edinburgh with one company, and on October 20th Tullibardine order¬
ed Menzies of Shlan and Robertson of Struan to join the main body
(3)
at Edinburgh* From now on Perthshire recruits began to move south
until the last, under Tullibardine himself, arrived in Edinburgh on
October 30th.
At this point recruiting in Perthshire, in the absence of
Tullibardine comes to a virtual stop. Between now and Tullibardine,s
return to the county nearly 2§ months later, only 200 further re¬
cruits were enrolled, but on January 13th Tullibardine returned to
(4)
Blair Castle and the pattern of forced recruitment is resumed.
During his absence Atholl recruiting seems to have been largely in
the hands of Robertson of Drummachine and Robertson of Blairfettie,
both of whom had been trying to round up, prevent, and intercept,
deserters.
The beginning of the seoond phase of Atholl activity is marked
(1) On, for instance, Oct. 9th,14th,19th,21st from his brother, Lord
George Murray. See "Atholl Correspondence", p.73 onwards.
(2) See Chapter 4
(3) "Atholl Correspondence", p.116,
(4) He returned on the suggestion of Lord George Murray, made in
letter of Jan.11 see "Atholl Correspondence", p.137.
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by Tullibardine^ return to Blair Castle on January 13th. From
now on, recruiting difficulties and desertions increased, and more
and more severe methods had to be used to seoure recruits. Already
Drummaohine had been trying to intercept deserters by posting par¬
ties on the Tay and Tummel, but, as he pointed out to Tullibardlne
on January 11th, 24 men on Loch Tay were far too few for this
purpose; at least 100 were needed in Rannoch and between 300 and
(1)
400 were needed in Perthshire. The military force which
Tullibardine would need, however, was only estimated at a maximum
(2)
of 200 by Lord George Murray and this was apparently all he
brought to Blair, By January 17th, the date of the battle of
(3)
Falkirk, the Atholl brigade was reduced by desertion to 600 men.
By January 19th at least 100 men were employed in seizing deserters
and Colville, Tullibardine,s Secretary, reckoned that in order to
raise a possible 500 or 600 men from Breadalbane, a military party
(4)
of at least 400 would be needed. The problem was aggravated by a
shortage of suitable officers, Drummachine had stressed the need,
on January 11th, for active officers and these views were echoed
by Spalding of Glenkilrie and Robertson of Bleaton. Instead,
Tullibardine had to deal with shifty and untrustworthy agents
like Spalding of Ashintully, whose correspondence to Tullibardine
is full of self justification, demands for money and insinuations
(5)
against others.
More stringent methods to ensure recruitment had now to be
used. Lord George, in a letter of January 21st, recommended the
(1) "Atholl Correspondence" p.136.
2) See his letter of 11th Jan. to Tullibardine ibid. p.137.
(3) Elcho, plan of the battle of Falkirk following p.372.
(4) "Atholl Correspondence", p.135.
(5) See, for instance, Spalding of Glenkilrio«s letters of Feb ,84th
and March 18th accusing Ashintully of interfering with Ms
men. Atholl "Corresp"". pv208.
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(1 )
destruction of the tacks of those who would not come forward.
The quota system was more vigorously enforced, George Scott, who
had been recruiting under Bleaton, urged Colville on February 1st
to insist on the full quota from each area, adding of the Strath-
ardle men "let them be spared no further than the list agrees with
(2)
the mark lands •••• for there's plenty of men in the country"
Stewart of Ballechin also warned Colville to be wary of deceptions
over the numbers of men available, telling him that in Tullinet,
an Atholl barony, many had produced reoeipts for money in lieu
(3)
of men when men were in fact available, Bleaton had pointed out
(4)
to Colville the difficulty of applying a quota system of one man
from each markland when in Strathardle, for instance, there were
large uninhabited areas. He had been forced to give receipts to
all those who had produced any men at all, whether the right quota
had been provided or not, but he warned Colville that when a proper
reeruitihg party arrived, its commander should not necessarily
aocept such reoeipts without query.
By Fehruary 8th, Blair of Glasdune had been forced to use
(5)
burning in order to secure recruits and the urgency of the situ¬
ation was making Tullibardine's language more violent. He wrote,
on February 1st, to Mercer of Aldle of "such singularly refractory
and chicanering people, mean spirited successors of former Atholl
(6)
tenants", while George Scott referred to the Strathardle people










ibid, letter of 31st January, p,170,
ibid, letter of Blair to Tullibardlne Feb. 8th p.200.
ibid, p.179.
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Desertion was increasing rapidly. By Febrflkry 8th some of
> •*
those enlisted by Stewart of Gourdie the day before, had already
deserted, and on February 5th Robertson of Ki.lliechangie had to
report that all those recruited recently by him had dispersed, on
news of the retreat north from Stirling. Tullibardine, on
February 8th, had to abandon a plan to advance on the Campbells
now stationed at Dunkeld because of lack of support. He had ar¬
ranged that he should be joined in a movement on Dunkeld, by Menzies
of Shian and Stewart of Kynachan with the recruits that they had
(2)
raised, but because of lack of numbers this had to be abandoned.
Perthshire recruitment was now virtually at an end. The last
Perthshire recruits joined the main Jacobite body in Badenooh on
February 20th. They were "four Atholl lads" sent by Robertson
(3)
of Drummachine to join Tullibardine. Stewart of Kynachan,
Robertson of Drummachine and Menzies of Shian had remained behind
when Tullibardine went north on February 10th. They had orders to
destroy the Tummel bridge at Kynachan and the passage boat at
Kinloch Rannoch, but neither could be achieved because of the
absence of stone masons and because of the arrival of governmeat
troops at Taybridge, Appin-Dull, and Taymouth. Formal recognition
that there was no further prospect of recruitment came with
(4)
Sheridan's letter of March 28th to Tullibardine that Charles was
determined to "grant no more commissions, the few he has already
given being at least enough to give employment for all the men he
(1) ibid. p.187.
(2) See letter of Tullibardine to Kynachan, dated Feb.8th,1746 p.196 •
(3) ibid. p.207.
(4) "Atholl Correspondence", p.207.
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(1)
can hope to raise by that method".
The occupation of Blair Castle by Government forces, under
Sir Andrew Agnew, since February, had out off the main Jacobite
body from Perthshire. The passes also were in government hands,
and this ensured enemy communications with the south, and also
effectively extinguished any hope of further Perthshire recruit-
(2)
ment. According to Colonel Kerr of Gradyne, it also prevented
any Jacobite descent into Perthshire to secure food for the army.
For these reasons Lord George Murray's assault on Blair Castle was
decided on, and on March 15th Lord George, with a force of 700,
met Cluny who had between 300 and 400 men in Badenoch. During the
night of March 16th they were able to seize the government out¬
posts round Blair. The siege of the castle lasted until it was
abandoned on April 2nd because of the arrival of four battalions of
Hessians from Perth, Lord George on his return, however, brought
back with him 200 recruits to join the main body. Some of these
men were, according to Lord George, deserters whom he had been
able to recover, but from now on, as long as there was no Jacobite
military force in Perthshire, no further recruits, whether former
deserters or not, could be obtained,
From now on Perthshire's role was at an end, The marked
deterioration of recruiting, since late January 1746, had been due
to lack of military strength. At a time when all of Tullibardine's
correspondents stressed the need for a party to secure any hope of
recruits, his total military strength consisted of only 200 men.
(1) "Lyon in Mourning", Vol.1, pp. 355-365. Account of Kerr of
Graden.
(2) At Bun Rannoch, Kynachan, Lude, Faskally, Blair Fetty and the
village of Blair - see undated Ms. Account of the Rebellior
amongst Miacell. Mss. Charter Room, at Blair Castle.
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The only realistio measures which might have checked desertion;
namely the holding of the Rannoch area and the Rivers Tay and
Tummel would, have needed at least 500 men. The deterioration
was completed by the news of the Jacobite retreet from Stirling
in February. A. body of men, raided by foroed recruiting, threats
and feudal pressure, lacking sufficient able officers and tight
enough discipline, was bound to so deteriorate. That it had
held together so long is a tribute both to the personality and




THE NORTH EASTERN AREA.
The Counties of Moray. Banff and Aberdeen,
Although It is usual to consider the Jacobite force of 1745/6
as a predominately Highland, or even West Highland force, it should
be noted that a relatively much smaller geographical area produced
(1)
between 17$ and 24<& of the entire force raised. This area con¬
sisted of the three counties of Moray, Banff and Aberdeen.
This large proportion was made up in the following manner.
From the Bfaemar area Franols Farquharson of Monaltrie had brought
(2)
400 men to Cortachy by September 19, 1745 while a further 200
(3)
under Monaltrie reached Perth by late December 1745. These
numbers may also include some men already brought to Edinburgh by
James Farquharson of Balmoral, before he left Edinburgh on October
5 to bring in the Balmoral Farquharsons, He then brought a further
(4)
200 of these men to Perth by late November.
Meanwhile, Lord Pitsligo had raised 300 horsemen by September
(5)
29th, and these became a total force of between 180 and 500 Horse
(6)
and Foot arriving in Edinburgh on October 9th 1745. Of these, 150
Horse were still serving as a separate body by November 8th 1745,
while the foot had apparently been merged with those raised by the
Duke of Perth.^
(1) As shown in the Introduction,
(2) "Atholl Correspondence", p.20. The figure is given by Tulllbar-
dine in a letter of Sept. 19th to Lord Ogllvy.
(3) Elcho p.319.
(4) Elcho.p.S19.
(5) "Atholl Correspondence", p.36. Letter of James Scott to Mercer
of Aldie.
(6) There are 2 estimates of his force. - The Gentleman*s Magazine,
November 1745, gives a figure of 500 and Elcho gives a figure
of 180, (Lord Elcho p.283).
(7) Elcho p.324 inset ..
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The last group of recruits came from the Gordon areas of the
North West of Aberdeenshire and Banff. They were raised by John
Gordon of Avoohie, James Molr of Stoneywood, William Moir of Lonmay
(the Countess of Errol's factor), John Gordon of Glenbucket and John
Hamilton, factor to the Duke of Gordon. All these men, however,
were in fact acting as agents for Lord Lewis Gordon, brother of the
Duke of Gordon.
The nucleus of these recruits were 130 raised by Glanbucket in
the Strathdon and Glenlivet districts. These had been raised by
(1)
September 7th 1745, and had been increased to a force of at least
(2)
300 under Glonbucket and Avochie by September 11th. These men
(3)
reached Edinburgh on October 4th, 1745. Apparently, however, a
further force may have arrived under John Hamilton on the same day.
i< •» (4) * «•
The Gentleman's Magazine, using the Caledonian Mercury as its
source of information, states that two separate bodies of 400 and
480 men, under Glenbucket and Hamilton respectively, reached Edin¬
burgh on October 4th. On the other hand a letter from Thomas Grant
of Arndlllie to Ludoviok Grant suggests that Hamilton and Glenbucket
were raising a joint force, so there may be some duplication of
(5)
figures here. Of the above men, 200 remained in arms by November 8th.
A further 60 were recruited by Stoneywood, and were assembled
at Aberdeen by October 1st, This force had risen to 300 by late
(6)
December 1745. Sixty more men were assembled under Avochie at
(1) "Chiefs of Grant", Vol.2, p.155, Letter of Ludovick Grant to
Sir John Cope. Sept.12. 1745.
(2) ibid, p.158. Letter of Hugh Rose of KilravocK to Ludovick Grant.
(3) Blaikie, p.19 and Elcho p.282,
(4) November, 1745.




Keith by December 10th 1745. Six days later th9 force consisted
(2)
of 180. and on its arrival at Perth at the end of the month it had
(3)
grown to 300 men.
Lord Lewis Gordon returned north from Edinburgh to recruit,
some time before October 20th, and a number of additional recruits
may have been raised by him, apart from the men forming the Stoney-
wood and Avochie contingents. According to the Burgh Records of
Aberdeen a Jacobite force of between 1,800 and 2,000 was occupying
Aberdeen by December 7th 1745, and it contained the two Stoneywood
and Avochio battalions, totalling 600, a force of about 400 raised
by Farquharson of Balmoral and Farquharson of Monaltrie, and a
maximum of 400 of Lord John Drummond's French Regiment. This, if
we accept the figures in the Burgh Records, leaves a potential 400
or 600 further recruits in Aberdeen, which may have been those rais¬
ed by Lord Lewis Gordon.
The total apparently raised from these areas would, therefore,
be as follows:
Under Farquharson of Monaltrie: 600 men
Under Farquharson of Balmoral: 200 men
Under Lord Pltsligo: 300/500 men
From the Gordon Areas: 900/1,380 men
plus a possible further 400/600 raised by Lord Lewis Gordon.
This would give a maximum raised of 3,280 men, a minimum of
2,000 men.
Three factors are largely responsible for the high level of
(1) "Chiefs of Grant", Vol.2 p.191 Letter of Thomas Grant of
Acholnany to Ludovlck Grant, Dec.10th 1745.
(2) ibid, p.197. Letter of Sir Harry Innes to Ludovick Grant.
(3) ELcho, p.319.
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recruitment In these areas.
Firstly, the district was under large scale Jacobite military
occupation for a considerable time. By early September 1745
GELenbucket was in the Glenllvet area with a force of 300 men, and
from this period until the final Jacobite retreat across the Spey
on April 12th 1746 the area was under more or less continual
occupation, with corresponding opportunities for recruitment,
Seoondly, the chances of recruitment were greatly enhanced by
the support and local influence of Lord Lewis Gordon, Lord Pitsligo,
and the two Farquharsons of Balmoral and Monaltrie, These four men
between them possessed great local Influence. The force of nearly
300 horse men which Pitsligo was able to raise rapidly from his
friends and tenants in Banff and Aberdeen testifies to this in¬
fluence.
Thirdly, this area contained strongholds of both Episcopacy
end Roman Catholicism, both factors of considerable, though differ¬
ing importance in recruitment. Further details, however, of these
religious factors are discussed elsewhere, in the separate chap¬
ters concerned.
Although these north eastern counties produced an apparently
large number of Jacobite recruits, the number of such men who in
f«ct served in action with the main Jacobite body is very much
smaller.
At the Battle of Prestonpans, September 21st, 1745, no recruits
from these areas served, as the earliest of them had not yet
reached the main body. On the march South from Edinburgh, on
November 1st, 1745, the actual serving force from these parts was
small. It consisted of about 150 of Pitsligo*s Horse, an unknown
number of Pitsligo's foot(but not more than 350) now merged with
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(1)
the Duke of Perth's Regiment, and 200 men of Glenbuckat*s. This
would give a total of only 900, Furthermore, the total serving in
arms at the Battle of Falkirk would not reach much more than 1,00&^
though this was the point at which, swollen by the force gathered
under Strathallan at Perth, the Jacobite army was at its maximum
strength.
The apparent explanation of the smailness of these numbers
would be the existence of large scale wastage through desertion.
But here an important, and relatively new, factor emerges. The
existence of desertion on a large scale from the Jacobite forces
has always been recognised. But those desertions have baen gene¬
rally accepted both by contemporaries and by later writers as
coming at least after the Battle of Prestonpans and chiefly after
the departure into England at the beginning of November, reaching
a maximum during and after the occupation of Falkirk end Stirling
in January 1746, Lord George Murray refers frequently, both in
his "Marches of the Highland Army" and in his letters to his brother
(3)
the Marquis of Tulliberdine, to the problem of desertion again
*
after the Jacobite forces occupation of Edinburgh, Lord Elche in
his "Affairs of Scotland" paints a similar picture. He estimates
the Jacobite army, at the last review in October before leaving
(1) ELcho p.324 inset.
(2) Mad© up as follows:
Under "Farquharson of Balmoral 200
" « « Monaltrie 200
" Avochie and Stoneywood 400
" Glenbucket (but engaged I11 th©
siege of Stirling Castle) 200
Pitsligo's foot (merged with Perth's (unknown numbers),
" Horse - an unknown figure which by March had
dwindled to nothing.
The figures here are Elcho's figures, pp.372 (inset) and 423.
(3) "Atholl Correspondence", Letters of Lord George Murray to his
brother of Jan.11th (p.137), Jan,16th (p.141), Jan.27th
(p.160) and Feb. 5th (p.186).
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(1)
Edinburgh, to consist of 5,000 foot and 500 horse but to hare
dwindled to 4,500 in all, by the arrival at Carlisle on November
8th. Furthermore, the widespread desertion by the end of January
was the main reason for the decision to retreat North from Stirling.
However, it seems possible that both contemporary and later
writers have focussed too much attention on the undoubtedly wide¬
spread Atholl desertions, assuming that desertions from other sec¬
tions of the army were similar in point of time. Lord Hcho, al¬
most alone among contemporary writers suggests, but does not follow
up, something different. He remarks thst the review held at
Glasgow about December 27th showed that there had been in fact
only inconsiderable general losses while the force had been in
(2)
England.
Lord Eloho does not attempt to reconcile the apparently un¬
disputed fact of the smallness of the Jacobite force in late
December, with this last observation, which in itself implies the
absence of widespread recent desertions. The two facts can how¬
ever be reconciled if we consider two possibilities. First, that
as great wastage of recruits took place before the smaller groups
reached the main force, This was certainly true of the Atholl
recruits. The second possibility is that there was much optimistic
exaggeration by local recruiting agents of the numbers first re¬
cruited. When a much smaller force than was justifiably expected,
did actually arrive, the discrepancy was put down to desertions.




bear this out. Between them, Gordon of Glenbucket, Avoehie,
Stoneywood, Lonmay and John Hamilton were believed by Lord Elcho
and others to have enlisted at least 480 and possibly 880 men by
(1)
October 4th. Of these only 200 were actually serving by November
8th 1745. Almost certainly the original figure of 880 was opti¬
mistically over exaggerated. Furthermore, from the Braemar area,
Farquharson of Monaltrie was believed by Tulliberdlne to have
raised a force of 400 with which he had reached Cortachy by
(2)
September 19th 1745. But a letter of September 29th from Dunkeld
(3)
to Mercer of Aldie refers to Monaltrie's force which had now
reached Dunkeld as totalling only 70 or 80 men, It is extremely
unlikely that desertions could have reduced a force of 400 to less
than 80 men in ten days. Almost certainly Tullibardine^ figure
of 400 was the result of previous optimistic inaccuracy, Blaikie,
who usually includes the highest contemporary estimates, puts the
(4)
number reaching Edinburgh under Monaltrie on October 3rd at 30,
suggesting, however, that here again considerable desertion took
place before the body of men reached the main Jacobite force. In
this case a force of at least 70 at Dunkeld on September 29th had
dwindled to only 30 at Edinburgh on October 3rd. To sum up, some,
at least of the wastage from this area seems to have occurred be¬
fore local recruits joined the main force. More important still,
however, much of the apparent wastage was almost certainly caused
by inaccuracy or exaggex'&tion over numbers actually recruited.
(1) As shown earlier in this chapter.
(2) "Atholl Correspondence", p.20, The total force numbered 800
but of these a separate 400 had been enlisted by Lord Ogilvy.
3) ibid. p.35.
4} Blaikie, p.19, citing Allardyee Papers TT. p.480,
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Section II.
The Social Strata of Recruits from these Areas.
Much of the available information on this comes from the
(1)
Excise Officers "Lists of Persons Concerned in the Recent Rebellion" «
In this area occupations may be sub-divided as follows: -
Area and total Profess- Tacks¬ Fishers Mer¬ Cottars
of named Gentry • ions. men erafts- chants. Labourers Others.





Aberdeen 207 20 10 22 66 11 78 13
Banff 203 31 7 31 68 4 54 8
Old 112 18 4 10 21 9 48 11
Meldrum
(3)
Elgin 183 51 8 46 32 18 28 m
There are some characteristics common to all these figures.
Gentry and tacksmen together account for exactly £ of the total
recruited from Elgin, i of those from Old Meldrum, and slightly less,
about 1/5, of those from Aberdeen. Of the 110 gentry from these areas
many were probably among the 120 horsed gentry brought to Edinburgh
(1) "A list of Persons concerned in the Rebellion". Transmitted to
the Commissioners of Excise". Preface by Lord Rosebery. Ed in.
University Press. Publications of Scottish History Society,
Vol, VIII 1890. Cited hereafter as Rosebery.
(2) The actual total of adherents was 220, but in the case of 13
no occupation was given.
(3) Here 388 rebels were listed, but only in 183 cases were occu¬
pations given. The details are therefore incomplete.
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on October 9th by Lord Pitsligo.
Another major group, that of cottars and labourers, servants
and gardeners was also relatively stable. In Aberdeen It produced
17.7$, in Banff, 26.6$, In Old Meldrum, the only entirely inland
area listed, It was larger, 42.8$ while the incomplete Elgin
figure, reached 15.3$.
A large group among the Aberdeen men listed seem to have been
active only locally, not serving with the main force at all. Forty
three are given as concerned only in local activities or merely
involved in demonstrations, There are no precise details given of
Jacobite service from Banff, but the number of those active only
locally in the Elgin area is 7 and in the Old Meldrum district 16,
(1)
The Burgh Records of Aberdeen lists 69 persons from the town
(as distinct from the Excise district) who were concerned with
the rebellion. This list also shows two characteristics common
to the Excise figures. Firstly a high proportion of the men were
engaged in trade or crafts. All 69 are either tradesmen, crafts¬
men, merchants, fishermen or labourere, except for 2 writers, 1
(2)
surgeon and 8 whose occupations are not given. Secondly there
Is a high proportion of only local activity. Out of the 69, only
(3)
27 were in regular service with the Jacobite force and 35 were
(4)
engaged only locally. The presence of a considerable rebel force
(1) "Historical Papers Relating to the Jacobite Period": Edited
by Col. James Allardyce. New Spalding Club, Aberdeen, 1895,
Vol.1, p.235 et seq.
(2) Of the Excise figures, 66 were engaged in trade or fishing.
See above.
(3) 2 served undef Stoneywood, 9 in other unspeoifled corps. 3
served from before the march into England, 2 Joined in
Oct, 1745 and one before the battle of Falkirk.
(4) 9 of these were asked to find cautions for their behavicur,
which suggests activities of minor importance, 13 helped to
transport and guard the arms landed at Peterhead and a
further 13 were engaged only in local disturbances.
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over a long period in the area was very bad for trade. In
(1)
Aberdeen there was almost a complete stoppage and the conse¬
quent lack of money and work would encourage the sufferers to
seek occupation and pay from the rebels.
One other interesting conclusion can be drawn from the Ex¬
cise, (Rosebery) statistics. The number of those claiming to
have been forced or hired out is as follows
Prom Aberdeen 9 forced out
From Banff 2 foroed out, 29 hired out
From Old Meldrum 1
From Elgin 69
The size of the number forced or hired out from Banff and
Elgin is probably due to the recruiting activities of Lord Lewis
Gordon in these parts from November 1745 onwards. By the end of
(2)
December, he was holding Banff and Aberdeen with a torse of 600.
This was largely raised by sending out parties to bring in one man
(3)
or five pounds sterling from every4L00 Scots of valued rent. By
December 6th he was sending out similar parties from Huntly, and
on December 7th Moir of Lonmay, who was occupying the town of
Aberdeen with a force of between 1,800 and 2,000, was demanding
(4)
also one recruit from every £100 Scots of valued land there.
Any man so recruited would presumably claim to have been foroed
(1) This is illustrated in a letter to Sir Everard Fawkener, on
behalf of the town of Aberdeen, 9th April, 1746. "There
has been a total interruption of the trade of this place,
ever since the commencement of this wicked unnatural re¬
bellion, whereby all trading people have suffered greatly,
and unless Trade be allowed to go on many of their fami¬
lies will be reduced to straits, particularly tnose who
deal in manufactures of cloth and stockins" Allardyce op.
cit, Vol.1, p.240,
(2) National Library of Scotland, Culloden Papers, Ms.2969,
paper 35.
(3) See below Chapter 3 p,&3.
(4) Allardyoe, p.XXXVIII.
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out. Of course, such methods of raising men are only possible
when a large enough number, for use as forcing cut parties, has
already been raised. Such a number was probably available even
earlier, for Gordon of Glenbucket had already enlisted three
(1)
hundred men by September 11th, while later in the campaign
Lord Pitsligo with his own troop of horse occupied Elgin from
February 19th to April 12th, During that time his forces were
Joined by those of Lord John Drummond, Stoneywood, Avochie and
eventually by all Jacobite troops on Spqyside - a final force of
2,500. During this occupation of Elgin, orders for forced
(2)
levying of meal and money were issued by Pitsligo and he had
sufficient military force to obtain more men, in this same fash¬
ion. That such methods were employed locally is suggested by a
letter of Lord George Murray, writing from Nairn on February
22nd, in which Lord Pitsligo is instructed not to offer the al¬
ternative of one man per £100 valued rent, but to accept only the
fixed sum, as the offering of an alternative had been abused,
(3)
probably by immediate desertion, in other areas. Some further
confirmation of this method of levying is provided by a letter
to Ludovick Grant of December 12th 1745; "a great many of them
(Lord Lewis Gordon^ force) are press*d, and want but an excuse
to get away. They are mostly herds and byremen in and about
(4)
StrathbCgie". The letter continues that, although "Avochie is
(1)"Chiefe of Grant" Vol.11 p.158,
(2) "Jacobite letters to Lord Pitsligo 1745/6". Edited A, & H.
Tayler, Milne and Hutchison. Aberdeen 1930, p.69 and 70.
(3) Pitsligo p.68.
(4) "Chiefs of Grant", Vol.2 p.190, Letter of Thomas Grant of
Achoinany to Ludovick Grant.
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playing the devil with Findlater and Glengarrick's tenants, many
of them are praying and wishing they were young men, and if you
would send down a hundred men, they would all join and rather
dye than be used in the way they are".
Such forcing out seems to occur frequently in those areas
whose remoteness made it difficult to provide protection for
those loyal to the government. The Grant tenants in Urquhart
were very vulnerable to such threats , both because of their
distance from Gastle Grant and because they were surrounded by
disaffected Erasers, and Glengarry Macdonalds. Early in September,
Glenbucket was reported to be threatenting with plunder, those
<l)
who would not join. Ludovick Grant, in order to counter such
threats, sent to his factor in Urquhart an open letter for gene¬
ral publication emphasising the large size of the government force
(2)
and the great danger of opposing it. This apparently had some
(S)
success as Grant's factor in Urquhart reported by September 12th
that some of those who had set off to join the rebels had been
Induced to stay at home. In areas like Strathdon and Glenlivet,
even more vulnerable to Glenbucket pressure, evasion was less
easy, unless the loyalists left their home area, and Ludovick
U)
Grant refers to the arrival into Grant country of many resi¬
dents; of Strathdon and Glenlivet. They brought with them their
cattle and intended to remain there till Glenbuoket had gone.
(5)
The Excise List (Rosebery) states that Charles Gordon of
Blelock forced men out of the Earl of Aboyne's estate in
(1) "Chiefs of Grant", Vol.2, p.152/3. Letter of Capt. Grant of
Dunballoch's wife to Ludovick Grant, 5th Sept. 1745.
(2) ibid, p.153.
(3) "Chiefs of Grant", Vol.2 p.156.
(4) ibid p.155, letter of Ludovick Grant to Sir John Cope 12th
Sept.
(5) "List of Persons Concerned", p.95 et seq.
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Aberdeenshire, and that John Gordon of Avochie In Banff, forced
on the inhabitants the hiring out of men to serve. William Moir
of Lonmay, factor to the Cantess of Errol, and the Countess her¬
self were both active in the forcing out of men. A farmer,
William Nisbet of Waterside, Slaine, Aberdeen was threatened with
being turned off his land by Moir and the Countess unless he would
(X)
serve. He was given by them a horse and money, when he agreed
to enlist. Adam Hay of Cairnbanno, Aberdeen, "Joined the rebels
at Edinburgh and levied several men for their service on the re-
(2)
treat North". John Calder, Francis Farquharson and Robert
Calder, all servants from the Aberdeen area, fought at Culloden but
(3)
all claimed to have been forced out.
Section III.
The local Conduct and Discipline of these men.
Jacobite sources make only one open referenoe to serious
plundering to this area. This occurred about 19th March, 1746 at
the home of the Earl of Findlater at Cullen, as a result of the
(4)
Earl's refusal to pay his contribution to the levy money. More
important, something of the same kind may also be implied by the
order of Lachlan Maclachlan, commissary General, to the commander
of the party quartered on the land of Alexander Tulloch of
Tannachie, that he should remove his party, as Tulloch had now
satisfied the demands made on him. There are few references to
plundering in government souroes, though occasionally they occur
(1) "List of Persons Concerned", p.95.
(2) ibid. p.92 et seq.
(3) ibid. p.5, p.10.
(4) Pltsligo. p.27.
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in the correspondence of Ludovick Grant. On September 19th, Thomas
(1)
Grant of Arndillie wrote to him that Gordon of Glenbucket had
been seizing horses and arms at Gordon Castle and in the Fochabers
area on the previous day and was also in the Afflunkart district
on the 10th. On October 10th 1745, some arms were stolen from
(3)
the town house at Nairn by a party of Clan Chattan. These are
the only references to any plundering in this correspondence.
Rosebery*s List, accuses only five persons of plundering, three
of whom came from near Aberdeen. They were John Garvioh, servant
(3)
of Buckholy Aberdeen "ia private man but very oppressive" , James
Anderson, gardener of Drum near Aberdeen, present at the Battle
(4)
of Falkirk "from which he carried off a good deal of plunder" ,
(5)
Robert Easson, labourer of Aboyne "very active in plundering
also WiMam Taylor, a farmer*s eon of Banff, who with William
Gray, a salmon fisher from Fochabers, was at the plundering of
the Earl of Findlater*s house". #
When plundering is mentioned it appears, not unnaturally, to
come from the poorest elements of the rebels. Some credit for the
absence of extensive plundering in this area may be due to Lord
Fitsllgo who exercised control from Elgin, from February 19th
onwards, over the forced levying of meal and money in these
parts. There seems to have been some official sanction for the
plundering of the Earl of Findlater, and the threat of it may have been
used
(1) "Chiefs of Grant", Vol.2 p.157.
(2) "Chiefs of Grant", Vol.2 p.172 letter of Rev.Patrick Grant
of Calder to Ludovick Grant.




In other cases to enforce payment, but there is little actual
(1)
evidence to prove this. There may be an implication of the ex-
(2)
istence of plundering or risk of it, in the report of John
Gordon of Minmore, Elgin that "he behaved discreetly and protec¬
ted the houses of Sir Henry Innes and several ministers." Quarter¬
ing, however, as distinct fremplundering, was used as a common
punishment for non-payment of cess in the Elgin and Speymouth
districts.
Section IV.
Money Raised ,by the Rebels from This Area.
The lengthy military occupation of this North Eastern area
gave the Jacobite force very considerable opportunities for using
this military force to raise money. A general account of the
financial resources of the rebel army is given elsewhere, in a
separate chapter. Here further details are given of the parti¬
cular methods used in this area. The rebels found particularly
useful the co-operation of at least the lower ranks of local
government officials. Collection of local levies, however, only
took place after the formal appointment of an officer of higher
rank to act as receiver of these monies, ludovick Grant reports
to Loudoun that the cess from the Gordon Castle area was being
collected by a Captain Gordon, to intercept whom Grant had sent
a party of 30 men. Lord Lewis Gordon, by late October 1745, was
investigating the levying of the cess in \berdeen, and reported
to the Duke of Perth that £1,700 cess, unpaid at the last
l3)
(®overamerrt) collection was due from Aberdeen. During
(1) "List of Persons Concerned", p.28 and 38.
(2) ibid. p.108.
(3) Sir Bruce Seton, "Prisoners of the Forty-Five", Edited fror
State Papers, Edin. University Press (Scottish History
Society)1928 p.140.
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October Lord Lewis Gordon had been appointed by Charles, to be Lord
Lieutenant of the county of Aberdeen, and William Moir of Lonmay
to be Governor of Aberdeen, and Lord Lewis Gordon had arrived in
Aberdeen on November 1st to supervise the collection of public
(1)
money from the town. On December 6th the first of a series of
special demands was made to the City of Aberdeen by Moir of Lonmay.
(2)
The sum demanded was £2,847.16s.l0d. this being one year*s subsidy.
On December 12th, Lord Lewis Gordon Issued another order to Aber¬
deen for the payment of the sum by December 18th, either to Moir
(3)
of Lonmay or to Alexander Dixon, appointed as collectors. Coupled
with this was a demand for the furnishing of one armed man for
each £100 rent, to be delivered to James Moir of Stoneywood by the
same date. Failing the delivery of each man, a further levy of £5
in lieu of each man was to be paid to Moir of Lonmay. These monies
were to be paid under threat of military execution, but they were
still unpaid by December 26th, when Moir made a further demand to
(4)
the Town Clerk of Aberdeen for the £1,000 now due in lieu of men.
By December 31st, after bargaining by the special committee appoin¬
ted, the demand had been reduced to £500, to be paid at once, and
(5)
a further £500 at Candlemass. Bills were drawn up on January 2nd
(6)
for this payment. By January 20th the government forces were
also attempting to raise the cess from Aberdeenshire, to pay
government forces in Inverness, and they found understandable re-
(7)
luctance to pay without proper receipts.
(1) "Chiefs of Grant", Vol.2 p.183. Letter of Forbes of Culloden, to
Ludovick Grant Nov. 5th 1745.
(2) Allardyce, Vol. I p.209,
(3) ibid. p.209.
(4) Allardyce Vol.I.p.210. Extracts from Becords of Burgh of Aberdeen.
(5) ibid. p.213.
(6) ibid. p.226.
(7) "Chiefs of Grant". Vol.2 p.216. Letter of Lord Lyon to Ludovick
Grant, Jan. 20, 1746,
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On February 21st, Lord George Murray, from Nairn, wrote to
Lord Pitsligo in Elgin, authorising Pitsligo and Lord Strathallan
(who were to command jointly in Elgin) to raise from Moray and
(1)
Nairn the cess due on March 1st, and any cess previously unpaid.
On the following day, February £2nd, formal orders for this were
(2)
sent, signed by Lord George and the levy money of 100 marks Scots,
per £100 sterling of valued land, from all who had not joined,
was also to be collected. After some contradictory orders. Murray
(3)
of Bropghton, in an undated letter of about February 26th,
authorised Pitsligo to use the collected cess for payment of meal
collected in the area, and to accept meal in lieu of levy money.
Similar payment in kind was also accepted in the Gordon area.
John Goodwillie, Secretary to Murray of Broughton, wrote from
Elgin to a Captain Ramsay, authorising him to accept the levy
money of Sir Robert Gordon at Gordonstown in wheat, oats, and
barley, but not to accept any commutation of the £132.16s.7d.
(4)
due from Sir Robert as cess.
It is not clear how much money was actually raised from cess
and levy in this area. The willingness to accept payment of levy
in kind implies increasing difficulty in collecting it in cash.
Possibly payment of cess had often been in arrears in the past.
Lord Lewis Gordon states that this was true of Aberdeen at the
last government collection, and on February 26th Lord Pitsligo
complained that no cess or levy money had yet been paid in Elgin,
(5)







£1,000 levy money required of Aberdeen was apparently paid in full,
the money was to be 'uplifted from any persons that were debtors
to the town and failing thereof.,..,borrowed for making up the
(1)
same*. In July, 1746, a special tax was imposed to pay back
this sum to those who had lent money. By late March, however,
there was much confusion over the raising of money. Lord John
Brummond, writing on March 25th, 1746, to Lord Pitsligo, refers
to the oonfusion caused by John Goodwillie {Seoretary to Murray
of Broughton), who sent parties to quarter for non-payment of
(2)
cess, in houses already full of troops.
The cost of meal and of fodder for horses was one of the chief
expenses faced by the rebels in these parts. This had to be col¬
lected and distributed to the force which, under Lord Pitsligo and
Lord Strathallan, was by late February 1746 building up in Banff
and Moray. Pitsligo reached ELgin on February 19th, and from then
on was responsible for collecting and forwarding meal from Elgin
to Forres and Inverness, Meal had already been ordered at Elgin
by Lord George, who arrived there February 17th, leaving for
Forres two days later, on his way to join the main body at Inver¬
ness. On February 19th he wrote from Forres to Lord Pitsligo,
(3)
telling him to forward to Forres the ordered meal when it came In.
(4)
On February 21st, Lord George Murray sent Instructions that the
meal, already ordered, should be sent on to Inverness. Further
(5)
orders from Lord George on February 23rd said that, in view of






the shortage of granary space, part of the meal was to be stored
at Elgin, and part at Forres. This meal was to be paid for, when
delivered, out of cess or levy money. Next day, however, orders
from Murray of Broughton contradicted this, and ruled that al¬
though receipts were to be given, no such money was to be used as
(1)
payment. But, in reply, Lord Pitsligo, on February 26th, pointed
out that such non-payment would greatly hinder future collections
(2)
of meal, and he was authorised by Murray of Broughton to use
(3)
cess money to pay for meal and barley# On March 1st, Pltsligo
was ordered to send, at once, all meal stored at Elgin and Forres,
(4)
to Nairn for Inverness, These orders were repeated the following
(5)
day by Lord John Drummond, who took over Gordon Castle as head¬
quarters from Murray of Broughton. By March 25th meal was be¬
coming desperately short, and Lord John Brummond asks for another
(6)
60 bolls of meal immediately, and more as soon as possible.
The confusion caused by this desperate scarcity is shown by a
letter of Lord John Drummond of March 26th, 1748 from Speymouth
to Lord Pltsligo, in which he laments the sending of orders by a
Mr. Comry "for the carrying off of corn and hay from homes where
(7)
we live when we ourselves are in great want of both".
There seems, on the part of the Jacobite High Command, to have
been some Ignorance of the real state of supplies. On March 30th,
1746, Tullibardine wrote from Inverness to Lord George Murray, who
commanded the siege of Fort William, that It was understood in
(1) Pitsligo, p.73.
(2) ibid p.76, Letter of Pitsligo to Murray of Broughton.






Inverness that plenty of provisions were available for his siege
(1)
party from below the Pass of Killiecrankie. Again, Maxwell of
(2)
Klrkeonnell states that as late as April 15th, 1746, there was
still a fortnight's supply of meal in Inverness, at a time when,
in fact, many of the foodless rebel army had already dispersed in
search of provisions. These men were refusing to return, when
officers were sent to bring them back to the main body for the
night march on Cumberland*s army, which preceded the battle of
Culloden, There is no doubt that the disastrous scarcity of
provisions with which the Jacobite force were faced by April 1746
was largely inevitable, since It wss caused chiefly by the absence
both of money and of local sources of supply. However, it seems
likely that an already disastrous situation was made even worse,
as Maxwell of Kirkconnell suggests both by official over-
optimistic assessment of local supplies available and by con¬
fusion in gathering these supplies in.
Section 7m
Financial and other Motives for adherence in this area.
The financial position of the chief adherents in this area was
not such as to enable them to bring important money contributions
to the rebel cause. The only local adherent of importance who held
estates known to be unencumbered with heavy debts is Gordon of
Terpersie of Aberdeen, His estates brought in a gross annual rent
of £648,13,10, Soots on which £121,10,0, Scots was payable in
(3)
public taxes. The estate of Farquharson of Monaltrie valued at
(1) "Atholl Correspondence", p,218/9.
(2) Maxwell, p.142.
(3) "Forfeited Estates Papers". p#145.
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£1,613.0.9. Scots was bankrupt, the debts representing between
34 and 35 years purchase of the estate. Gordon of Glenbucket's
lands were leased from the Duke of Gordon, and brought in a gross
(2)
annual rental to Glenbuoket of £510.4.7. Scots, exclusive of all
public burdens due from the lands, but they were already mortgaged
for £20,000 Scots. Part, at least, of all the rents due to Glen-
bucket were paid in kind. Very possibly the debts encumbering
these estates may have been an important factor determining Jaco¬
bite adherenoe. The financial position of at least one of the
rebels in this area, reveals a further factor which may have in¬
fluenced adherence. George Abernethy, a merchant of Aberdeen,
convicted of high treason for his support of the rebels, was in
debt to John Hamilton, factor to the Duke of Gordon, an active
(3)
Jacobite.
The financial position of the other adherents from this area
is uncertain. The annual income of the estates of Parquharson of
Monaltrie is difficult to ascertain accurately. A letter of 1784,
(4)
among the Forfeited Estates Papers, refers to the estate "being
worth little more than £40 a year" and regards the debts as
standing at £1,492.12.0. while a valuation of 1762 puts the yearly
(5)
rental at £54.18.11. and a third figure of £61.15.4, is quoted
(1) "Scottish Forfeited Estates Papers", p.309. This figure is
somewhat higher than that arrived at in other valuations.
Edit. H.H. Millar, Scot.HiSt.Soc. Vol.LVII 1809.See below.
(2)ibid. Glenbucket Rent Roll. p.180, 181.
(3) He owed £590.12,6. Scots to Hamilton, a debt contracted on
29th Oct. 1744. See "Forfeited Estate Papers" p.165-171 et seq.
(4) "Forfeited Estates Papers", Papers of John Russell, p.l5o to 155.
(5) ibid, valuation figure of Thomas Miller, Advocate, in his
petition to the Lords of Session p.160.
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(1)
as the rent roll on a report dated December 25th, 1752. The
debts are apparently equal to a sum between 24 times and 37 times
the annual income of the estate. The lands themselves had until
their forfeiture in 1715, formed part of the estates of the Earl
of Mar and had thus a continuous Jacobite association. It may
fairly be here assumed that, as in the case of Gordon of
Glenbueket and others, the debts encumbering the estates were
an important additional factor influencing Jacobite adherence.
Of those who, on the rebel side, had territorial and personal
influence in this area, the Gordon and Farquharson interests were
the most important, and their long and continuous Jacobite con¬
nections must be noted. In 1745, it is true the last Roman
Catholic Duke of Gordon was dead and the new Duke took no action,
although his was a powerful name in the North East with extensive
(2)
superiorities and jurisdictions in Badenooh and Lochaber as well.
Farquharson of Invercauld, the superior of Farquharson of Balmoral,
and of Farquharson of Monaltrie also remained inactive. On the
other hand, the Duke of Gordon, despite appeals from Craigie, the
(3)
Lord Advocate made no move to support the government. Like
many others he was conveniently away from home in the early
stages of the rising. When he returned later, he entered into no
correspondence with the government or its representatives, leaving
his wife to reply to official letters. He, himself, ignored all
letters from Forbes of Culloden and Brodie of Brodie until his
decision to join Cumberland at Aberdeen in March 1746.
(1) ibid. p.150.
(2) Undated paper, probably prepared by Forbes of Culloden as a
report on the State of the Highlands. Allardyce p.166.
(3) His departure from Gordon Castle secretly on March 9,1746, to
join Cumberland in Aberdeen was his only official indication
of his attitude.
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Gordons had fought in the Stuart Interest in the days of
Montrose, under Dundee, and in 1715 under Mar. John Gordon of
01enbucket had himself served under Mar, and was connected, through
his daughter's marriage, with the important Jacobite families of
Macdonald of Lochgarry, and Macdonald of Glengarry. He was a
former factor of the Duk© of Gordon and was probably aged 72 in
1745, and had been given a Major General's Commission by the Old
Pretender in 1738.
The Farquharsons of Invarcauld had a similar history of
loyalty to the Stuarts. They were a sept of Clan Chattan, and
Colonel Anne Macintosh, who acted as chief of those Macintoshes
who joined the rebels, was a daughter of James Farquharson of
Invercauld. Her father was an old man by 1745, and remained in¬
active. Those Farquharsons who joined the rebels served under
Farquharson of Monaltrie or of Balmoral, Farquharson of Inver¬
cauld had close financial relations with Cluny Macpherson, an
important Jacobite, through the letter's system of private watch.
Invercauld contributed annually to this, in return for protection,
and there are several letters from Invercauld to Cluny, about
protection and the charges due, amongst the papers at the West
(2)
Highland Museum at Fort William.
The report, cited earlier referred to above (p.89, note a)
and probably compiled by Forbeo of Culloden, on the State of the
Highlands, assessed the potential fighting power of the Gordon
(1) One of his 3 daughters married the elder Lochgarry. Another
married the elder Glengarry and was the mother of Angus Og,
who was accidentally shot in Falkirk in 1746.
(2) The most recent being a letter of May 23rd 1745 from Inver¬
cauld to Cluny written on behalf of Old Farquharson by his
son, protesting against Cluny's proposal to increase his
charges. Ms. letter. Miscellaneous Cluny Papers, West
Highland Museum.
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interest at 300 men from Stathaven and Glenlivet, plus a large
posse of gentlemen in Enzie and Strathbogie. The fighting power
of the Farquharsons was estimated in the same report as 500 men.
Lochgarry in a report on the Highlands after his visit with
Dr. Archibald Cameron, to Scotland 1749-50, assesses the Gordon
(1)
manpower at 500, These figures imply a fighting force of con¬
siderable importance.
While, however, the titular heads of both the Gordon and
Farquharson families remained aloof in 1745, the important family
interest of both these connections was mobilised for the Jacobite
side by Lord Lewis Gordon and the two Farquharsons of Balmoral
and Monaltrie.
The Gordon area remained, like the Atholl area in Perthshire,
a sphere where personal influence was of great importance. The
force raised by Lord Lewis Gordon was, in origin at least, a force
recruited and officered by family tenants. The Gordon estates
consisted at this period of the Lordships of Huntly, Enzie,
Strathaven, and Urquhart, with some lands in Fochabers, Lochaber,
(2)
Aberdeenshire and Inverness. These areas were the recruiting
grounds for the Gordon regiments. The two battalions raised by
John Hamilton and John Gordon of Avochie, named after two of the
four family Lordships, were commonly known as the Strathbogie
(or Huntly) and the Enzie battalions. The first moves towards
recruitment were made by Lord Lewis Gordon, Gordon of Glenbucket
(1) "Pickle The Spy." Andrew Lang. Longman Green & Co., Ltd. 1897
p.214 et seq. Memorial compiled by Lochgarry in 1750 and
forwarded by Pickle the Spy to government authorities in
England in 1733.
(2) H.M. Register House, Edinburgh. Inventory of Gordon Titles,
Vol.3 & 4.
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(a former ducal factor and occupier of Gordon land) and John
Gordon of Avochl®, vdio was also a Gordon tenant, Gordon of
Glenbucket began to raise men on September 7th in the Strathdon
ii)
and Glenlivet areas, and these formed part of the Gordon Lord-
(2)
ship of Strathavon, Two days later he was recruiting in Fochabers
(3)
another Gordon property, and on September lltb in Strathbogie,
part of the Gordon Lordship of Huntly, The part played by Gordon
tenants in providing officers for the force is illustrated by the
roles <pf David Tulloch of Bunberman, John Gordon of Avochie and
Charles Gordon of Glastirum, Tulloch of Dunbennan was a Gordon
(4 )
tenant in the lordship of Huatly and he held joint command of
the Enzie Battalion with John Hamilton, the former factor to the
Duke of Gordon, John Gordon of -wochie, who raised the Strathbogie
(5)
Battalion, was a tenant in the Lordship of Huntly, while Gordon
of Glastirum, who raised one Gordon company, was a tenant in the
(6)
Lordship of Ensie,
A further proof of the strength of Gordon influence lies in
the location of Roman Catholic chapels at this date. There were 8
(7)
Roman Catholic congregations in this area. Their priests had
chapels, or celebrated Mass regularly, at Kortlach, Preshome,
(6)
Robistown, Ruthven, Huntly, Scalan and in two places in Glenlivet.
(1) "Chiefs of Grant" Vol,2, p.155. Letter of Ludovick Grant to
Sir John Cope,
(2) ibid, p,157, letter of Thomas Grant of Arndillie to Ludovick
Grant,
(3) ibid, p,157.
(d) H.M. Register House, Edinburgh, Inventory of Gordon Titles,
Vol,3,
(5) ibid, Vol.3.
(5) ibid. Vol.3, See also above, Chapter 5.
(7) See Chapter 5.
(8) See Chapter 5,
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Mortlach end Rathven were Gordon properties in the lordship of
Huntly, as of course was Kuntly itself, Preshome formed part of the
lordship of the Enzie, while Sealan and Glenlivet formed part of
(1)
the Lordship of Strathsvon. Seven of these eight congregations
were sited, in other words, on land belonging to the House of
Gordon, end this is a powerful testimony to the protective power
of that family*s influence.
Gordon family influence was obviously of very grest impor¬
tance at this date, and was wielded in the Jacobite interest by
Lord Lewis Gordon, However, as the frequency of both hiring and
forcing out proves, attachment to the Gordon family v;as not in
itself sufficient to secure recruitment on a large scale, unless
this attachment was reinforced by pressure, in the form of military
occupation and a quota system of enforced recruiting.




In the Lowlands the towns of chief strategic importance to
the Jacobite army were those of Montrose, Stonehaven, Dundee,
Stirling, Alloa and Edinburgh. The importance of the first
three is due to the fact that they were ports, and so were vital
for the Jacobite communications with France. These were not the
only ports in Jacobite hands, but they were of considerable im¬
portance in view of their comparative nearness to the Jacobite
headquarters at Edinburgh and Perth. Even so, the transport of
the French arms and equipment landed at Montrose and Stonehaven
was to present considerable difficulties. This was largely be¬
cause of the presence of a Government garrison at Stirling, and
of Government ships at Alloa.
The lowland area, as a whole, is strategically important
for two quite different reasons. The counties of Angus and
Kincardine provided valuable and fertile recruiting grounds for
Lord Ogilvy, while the remaining counties were important for
financial and economic reasons rather than merely as sources of
recruits.
The type of recruiting in Angus and the Mearns district of
Kincardine has much in common with recruitment in the Aberdeen
area tinder Lord Lewis Gordon. Under Lord Ogilvy, eldest son of
the earl of Airlie, pressure was brought to bear on his family's
tenants. Forcing out and hiring out were common, and the recruits
acquired were enlisted in Lord Ogilvy's own regiment in the same
way as the Gordon recruits were enlisted in Lord Lewis Gordon's
regiment•
(1) See below, Chapter 7.
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The Ogilvy Regiment was largely raised from Angus and the
(1)
Mearns. It consisted of 300 men brought by Ogilvy to Edinburgh
on October 3rd, 1745, and a further 2nd Battalion, raised by Sir
James Kinloch with which he held Angus during November and December,
1745. According to Lord Elcho, this battalion numbered 600 at that
time and although there may be some exaggeration here, for Elcho
himself was with the Jacobite force in England at this point,
Kinloch certainly brought between four and five hundred to join
(2)
the main body before the battle of Falkirk. These men were
almost all raised, as will be shown later, as the result of
either economic pressure or forcing or hiring out.
Recruiting in the remaining Lowland areas had, however, little
in common with recruiting elsewhere. Followings, in the Highland
sense, did not exist in the Lowlands. Lord Elcho, for instance,
brought with him to join the Prince at Edinburgh his personal
servants, Lord Traquair brought his factor and three servants, and
Murray of Broughton provided two servants, but this probably ex¬
hausted the contribution of such men. Among the recruits from
Lowland counties very few tenant farmers are found, and there is
no evidence that any pressure was brought to bear on such classes
in the Lowlands. Few men complained of being forced or hired out,
and in these areas, although quite a high proportion of those who
(1) Heho gives this figure p.282 - Blalkie puts 0gilvy*s force in
October at 600 but he is almost certainly including here the
second Battalion under Sir James Kinloch, which was not
raised until later. Certainly the regiment did not exceed
700 by January, when it had been joined by Kinloch*s battalion.
(2) By this point the 2 battalions numbered 700, according to
Elcho, but the first battalion had fallen to only 200 by the
siege of Carlisle in the previous November. See El oho p.324
and p. 372, plans inset.
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joined the rebels were classified as gentry, they did not bring
with them anything in the nature of the followings which would
have been provided by men of similar standing north of the
Highland line. From Edinburgh, Haddington, Dunfermline and
Stirling a large proportion of those joining were either
tradesmen, craftsmen or workmen. These men came from classes
upon whom no economic pressure, of the kind found in the High¬
lands, could be exerted, and joined presumably for personal or
private financial reasons. Their adherence was apparently
voluntary - few complained of being forced out and none of
being hired out.
Much of the information available of the social structure
of the Lowland force comes from the Government lists of Persons
Concerned in the Recent Rebellion (Rosebery). These reveal an
interesting pattern of recruitment. In the Excise districts of
Dundee and Montrose the pattern is alike. 490 persons are cited
as involved in rebellion in Dundee, and 335 in Montrose. Both
these numbers are far in excess of any other Lowland areas here
(1)
considered. In Dundee 89, and in Montrose 110, of these persons
can be classified as either craftsmen or tradesmen, forming in
Dundee about 1/5 and in Montrose about 1/3 of the recruits. A
further 231 in Dundee, and 53 in Montrose, were classified as
servants or workingmen, while 1? in Dundee, and 28 in Montrose,
were stated to be either farmers or tenant farmers. These last
(1) Aberdeenshire and the adjacent areas are for these purposes
considered separately.
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may have been, and in all probability were, tenants of the Earl
of Airlie, Lord Ogilvy*s father, and therefore susceptible to
pressure from him. While the Jacobite force was at Perth in
early September 17«. Lor* Ogilv. was Lof Lieutenant of
Angus and ordered to go there to raise men. By September
(2)
10th he was initiating recruiting in Glenlsla, and by September
(3)
26th had reached Coupar with his recruits. This was the force
of about six hundred men with which he reached Edinburgh on
October 3rd, and it had been raised largely in Dundee, Montrose
and Angus, A Manuscript List of "Gentlemen and common people
in the parish of Tannadice, in the shire of Angus, who bore
(4)
arms or went along with the Rebels^ gives a list of 33 names
of "Common people, for the most part first threatened or im¬
prisoned by the rebels and afterwards hired by fees by the
threatened Tenants", again suggesting the use of pressure on
Airlie tenants. Seven gentry are also named in the list and all
were Airlie tenants. A further manuscript, headed "Examinations
(5)
in Glenesque (Glenesk) area, 26th May 1746", states that "Thomas
Low in the parish of Edzell declared that orders to convene the
tenants of the barony of Edzell to meet Lord Ogilvy came to
Alexander Dulcaston and William Watt",
The large numbers of servants, working men or tradesmen in
the two Ogilvy battalions is significant. It is borne out by
(1) Elcho p.249.
(2) "Atholl Correspondence", p,14. letter of Spalding of Glenkilrie
to Tullibardine,
(3) ibid, p,34. letter of George Stirling from Perth to Tullibardine,
(4) National Library of Scotland. Albemarle Papers, 3730.Ms,66.
(5) National Library. Albermarle Papers 3730.Ms.4.
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two further manuscript lists, numbers 99 and 101 in the Albemarle
Papers. The first gives a list of Brechin rebels and their oc¬
cupations. Of twenty-two named rebels, five were servants or
workingmen and eleven trades^or craftsmen. The second lists
the occupations of nineteen men of 0gilvy,s second Battalion
who surrendered in June 1746. Of these, ten were servants or
working men, eight were trades or craftsmen.
Amongst those who were classified as servants or working
men in Dundee, Angus and Montrose, were large numbers who were
either forced or hired out. In the Dundee Excise district,
according to Rosebery's list, fifty claimed to be forced out and
thirty-seven to have been hired out. In the Montrose district
seven claimed to have been forced out and fourteen to have been
hired. From the parish of Tannachie in Angus out of thirty-three
common people, three claimed to have been pressed or forced out and
twenty-one to have been hired out. These recruits included five
(1)
workmen and seventeen servants. From the Glenesk area Charles
Ego or Eque of Little Bridge of Glenlee gave a list of twenty-four
persons hired by the inhabitants of Glenesk to join Lord Ogilvy,
and gave also the names of two persons forced out. The list of
those hired out was confirmed by Robert Clark of Glenesk in
examination, and two more names added to it, and the name of one
(2)
other man forced out was added by Alexander Duncan of Midtown.
Midtown was Itself Airlie property, as was Tannadiee, Edzell and
(3)
Alyth, and at least the lower part of Glenisla, where Lord Ogilvy
(1) See Albemarle Papers. Ms.66. cited above,
(2) ibid. Ms.4.
(3) H.M. Register Rouse, Edinburgh. Alrlle Muniments. Section 30.
15. Misoell. Rentals. Airlie,
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began his recruiting. The family also owned property in Brechin,
and these facts suggest that Lord Ogilvy seems to have relied on
his family's property to provide the main recruiting ground for
his force.
The available statistics for the remaining Lowland areas
provide, however, a completely different picture. These consist
of the Excise districts of Stirling, Fife and St. Andrews,
Dunfermline, Kirkcaldy, Linlithgow, Haddington, Edinburgh
Glasgow, Lanark, Kelso and Dumfries.
All these areas, both according to Rosebery's list and to
all other statistics produced only a small number of recruits
each. The largest number of recruits, totalling 133 according
to Rosebery, came from Edinburgh. Haddington produced 59 and
the other numbers ranged from 46 from Stirling to 5 from Kelso.
Almost all, however, produced a proportionately very high number
of gentry among their recruits, the highest proportion being ten
(1)
gentlemen out of a total of nineteen recruits from Dumfries.
In an area north of the Highland line, such a number of ad¬
herents classified as gentry, would have produced a much more sub¬
stantial force of recruits from amongst their followings. The
contrasting social structure of the Lowlands is amply demonstrated,
(1) The other figures are as follows:
Area. No,of Total
gentry named %
Dumfries 10 19 73
Kelso 2 5 40
Glasgow 6 16 35
Dunfermline 6 19 31
Stirling 13 46 28
St. Andrews 9 44 25
Lanark 2 9 22
Linlithgow 5 27 18
Kirkcaldy 2 24 8
Edinburgh 10 138 7
Haddington 4 59 6
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however, by the actual paucity of recruits from these areas. A
further instance of the independence of these areas is provided
by the fact that out of 406 persons named as concerned in the
rebellion from these areas, only 6 claimed to have been forced
out. Five of these were from Stirling and one from Edinburgh
and none claimed to have been hired out.
Apart from the preponderance of gentry from these Lowland
areas it is not possible to make any other important generalisa¬
tions about the social structure of recruitment. From Edinburgh
and Haddington there was a fairly large number of craftsmen and
tradesmen, sixty-seven from Edinburgh and seventeen from
Haddington, and the largestnumber, thirteen of those engaged in
the professions, came from Edinburgh, Edinburgh also produced
seven recruits classified as merchants and this was a larger
number than any of the other areas, except Dundee and Montrose,
produced. Haddington also produced seventeen salt or Excise
officials. The only other area to provide such recruits was
Dunfermline which produced one. For the rest, the recruits
from these parts were almost equally divided between craftsmen,
tradesmen, servants and working men, with a sprinkling of
merchants and tenant farmers. These figures, in fact, like the
presence of twenty-one merchants from Dundee or twenty-seven from
Montrose, provide us with a reflection or cross section of local
occupations in these areas, but do not suggest that recruitment
came from, or affected solely, or even particularly, one social
class rather than another,
A mora useful conclusion can be drawn, however, from the
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numbers who, in Roseberyfs list, were stated to have been engaged
in only local Jacobite activities. Large numbers of such persons
are mentioned in Montrose, Haddington, Stirling and Kirkcaldy where
the respective proportions are 1/5, 1/3 and £ of the recruits.
The large number involved in local Jacobite activities in these
areas is explained by the need, in Montrose, to transport from
there the French arms landed in October and November, and the
need in Edinburgh, Stirling and Haddington to raise money and
seize horses for the main Jacobite force in Edinburgh,
The rebel occupation of Edinburgh for six weeks, during
September and October of 1745, afforded a considerable and much
needed opportunity to raise both money and goods in kind from
the area, as has been shown below in Chapter 7. During the stay
(1)
in Edinburgh proclamations were issued to call in horses for
the use of the rebels, and to secure payment of the excise and
other local levies. There was also, apparently, considerable
activity in the way of seizing of horses for the use of the
rebels. In Rosebery*s lists ten persons from the Edinburgh
and Linlithgow areas are stated to have been active in seizing
horses for the rebels, and several others were either active in
stealing fodder for the rebel horse regiments, or assisted in
driving waggons for the rebels. Similar activity was also to be
found in the districts round Montrose, Brechin and Forfar, where
for instance, John Struan, wright of Montrose "was active in
(2)
oppressing the county for horses and carts". These districts
(1) See below, Chapter 7.
(2) Roeebery p.186.
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and the Edinburgh, area are the only places where large scale
seizing of horses, carts roller are Lionel. In the
of Edinburgh the roason was the needs of the Horse Regiments,
and also for the transport, on the march into England, of the
rebel artillery which they had now acquired, partly from Franc©
in October, and partly through the capture of Cope's artillery
after the battle of Prestonpans,
The need for horses in the Angus area was again the result
of these French landings in October, The artillery landed at
(2)
Montrose and Stonehaven between October 7th and 17th had to be
transported to Edinburgh to ^he main Jacobite force there.
This was no easy task, in view of the need to carry it aoross
the Forth, and also in view of the presence of government ships
at Alloa, A government garrison at Stirling Castle prevented a
crossing of the river at Stirling itself. The result was that
this artillery did not reach Edinburgh until October 30th, and
(3)
two hundred and fifty carts were needed to transport it to
Alloa, Here it was to be met on October £3rd by two hundred
(4)
carts, after the passage of the Forth.
In order to achieve this passage for the artillery, a small
battery of the Swedish cannon, which had arrived with the French
arms, had to be erected to protect the passage from the Government
(5)
sloop "Happy Janet" which was at Alloa,
Later, in early January, the passage for the transport of
(1) Namely Elcho's and Balmerlno's Life Guards, Kilmarnock's Horse
and Pitsligo's Hoi'se.
(8) See below Chapter 7,
(3) "Atholl Correspondence". Letter of Tullibardine to Menzies of
Shian of October 20th, 1745. p.116,




Lord John Brummond's artillery, which had arrived with him the
previous November, was even more difficult to secure. The natural
crossing point of the Forth at Stirling was still blocked because
of the government garrison holding the Castle, and to cross further
up river would involve even more of a detour for a force marching
from Perth to join the main Jacobite body between Stirling and
Falkirk. To increase the difficulties of the situation, Eawley
had now some twenty small ships off Airth from January 8th on¬
wards, the date when the cannon, escorted by Lord John Drummondfs
and Lord Cromartie^ regiments arrived at Alloa. By January 10th,
Hawley had twelve foot regiments and two of dragoons at Edinburgh,
and was able to land a small force between Clackmannan and
Kincardine on January 10th to menace the Jacobite position at
(1)
Alloa, which was held by Cromartiafs and Lochiel's regiments.
The result of these government activities was that much of the
artillery which arrived at Alloa on January 8th did not reach the
main Jacobite body until after the battle of Falkirk, on January 17th.
The delays and difficulties in transport experienced here and
in the previous October, and also experienced by Lord George Murray
in negotiating Shap, are ample proofs of the importance of the
waggons, carts and horses which the Jacobite army so frequently
lacked. This explains, therefore, the demands served on Leith
and Edinburgh to provide horses and carts during October 1745.
(2)
Orders on pain of military execution for the provision of these
by the 15th and 23rd October, were issued, and apparently some
one hundred waggons and between six and seven hundred working
(1) See Elcho p.367.
(2) See Vol.XV Gentleman*s Magazine. October 1745. Historical
Chronicle p.556.
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horses were gained from East Lothian farmers alone.
The Lowlands, moreover, played an Important part in producing
Jacobite cavalry. The Jacobite Horse consisted of four regiments
commanded by Lord Elcho (The Jacobite Life Guards}, Lord B&lxaerino,
Lord Kilmarnock (The Strathallan or Perthshire Horse) and Lord
Pitsligo, and a troop of Hussars raised by Murray of Broughton,
Elcho's Horse, according to himself numbered one hundred and
fifty with the inclusion of officers* servants and others, or
(1)
one hundred without such men, Balmerinots Horse numbered ap¬
parently much less, Blaiki© puts the figure at forty on the
departure South from Edinburgh on Novamber 1st, 1745, and by
November Sth at the siege of Carlisle Elcho omits them entirely
from his enumeration of the cavalry, Kilmarnock*s Horse, more
usually known as the Perthshire Squadron probably numbered at
(2)
least one hundred and thirty on the march south from Edinburgh,
Pitsligo's Horse was apparently somewhat larger, Elcho, who by
reason of his own cavalry command is likely to be reasonably ac¬
curate over cavalry figures puts Pitsligo's fiorse at one hundred
and eighty on their arrival at Edinburgh and one hundred and fifty
(3)
by the siege of Carlisle# with the exception of Pitsligo's
Horse which was raised in Aberdeenshire and Banff, the majority of
the Jacobite Cavalry was recruited in the Lowlands, Elcho's and
Balmerlno,s Horse were entirely raised daring thQ occupation of
Edinburgh, as were Murray's eighty Hussars, though the command of
(1) Elcho, plan of the Prince's Army, following p#324.
(2) This i.3 the figure Elcho gives the Squadron by November 8th
at the siege of Carlisle, Elcho, plan following p,324,
(3) ibid, p.283,
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them was given,before the march into England, to Bagot, an Irish
officer arrived from France during October. This change of
command was the result of Murray's other more important duties
as the Prince's Secretary. The remaining Horse, the Perthshire
Squadron, also contained a large number of Lowland recruits.
According to Elcho, the squadron on the crossing of the Forth
(1)
at the Frews, on September 13th, numbered only thirty-six
and almost certainly it only reached its larger figure by November
1st because of the introduction of Edinburgh and Lowland recruits.
The value of Lowland recruits for thb Horse regiments is also
suggested by Rosebery's lists. Out of twenty-seven named adherents,
(2)
from the Linlithgow district, ten served with the Jacobite Horse.
Recruits for Horse regiments did not exhaust the contribution,
however, of the Edinburgh area. Lord Elcho's condemnation of the
(3)
backwardness of this area in providing recruits is familiar.
Apart, however, from those Joining the Jacobite Cavalry, Murray
of Broughton pointed out that a good many Edinburgh recruits were
drafted into the Duke of Perth's regiment, while John Roy Stuart's
Regiment was intended as an Edinburgh Regiment and was so entitled
officially. Here, however, as in the case of Perth's regiment, it
is impossible to assess accurately Edinburgh's contribution as
various Perthshire recruits, Including the Stewarts of Grantully
and othersj were also drafted Into the Regiment, which numbered two
hundred on the departure south from Edinburgh. Enough, however, is
(1) Elcho, p.253.
(2) Rosebery, p.264-269.
(3) Elcho, p.261 "not one of the mob who were so fond of seeing
him ever asked to enlist in his service".
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known to suggest that the contribution of the Edinburgh area was
not as slight as Heho and other writers following him would seem
to Imply. That there was not a larger still contribution was pro¬
bably caused by two factors. First the predominantly Highland
character, at least superficially, of the force when it arrived
in Edinburgh. This may have antagonised some. Secondly, and much
more important, probably, the social structure of the area played
its part. Followings, as Murray of Broughton pointed cut, did
not exist in the Lowlands. The personal servants brought by Elcho
or Murray of Broughton were no substitute for this, while the more
mercantile and commercial structure of society in this area made
it also difficult or impossible to effect recruitment by pressure
from landlord on tenant. It was in the absence of these features
that recruitment in this area differed from recruitment in Perth¬
shire, Aberdeenshire, Angus or the Western Highlands,
For these reasons, the role of gentry and landowners differed
here from their role elsewhere. The gentry, merchants and pro¬
fessional classes from Edinburgh, Dundee and the Lowlands, in
general provided staff officers rather than regimental commanders
for the rebel army. With the exception of Lord Ogilvy and Sir
James Kinloch, the gentry of the Lowlands could not bring to the
rebel army the large body of reoruits which would justify their
appointment as regimental commanders except in the cavalry regi¬
ments, Amongst staff officers and administrative officials,
however, provided by this class, were the Prince's Secretary,
John Murray of Broughton, the Assistant Quarter Master General,
Robert Anderson of Whitburgh and the Muster Master, Henry
Patullo, merchant of Dundee. The Secretaries of both Murray of
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Brcmghtcm and Tulllbardina came from this area, they were John
Goodwiliie, the Edinburgh W.S. and Mungo Murray of Kincardine.
Patullo's clerk was Thomas Williamson, a clerk of Edinburgh,
and one of the Prince's aide-de-camps was Sir David Murray of
Stanhope, a nephew of Murray of Broughton. Sir Alexander
Bannerman of Elsick was appointed as Lord Lieutenant of the
Kearns, David Potheringham, a Dundee merchant, as governor of
that town, and Lord HcJjo as Lord Lieutenant of Fife, while the
Earl of Kilmarnock, Lord Balmerino, Lord Elcho, David Hunter of
Burnside, and James Maxwell of Kirkconnell were all Lowlanders
holding cavalry commands.
Amongst many of these men there seems a certain common
tradition of both Episcopacy, and family Jacobitism. Lord Balmerino,
lord Ogilvy, Lord Elcho, Maxwell of Kirkconnell and Murray of
(1)
Broughton, for instance, were all ^Episcopalians. Lord Ogilvy's
uncle had been attainted in 1715, the Earl of Kilmarnock married
(3)
the daughter of a Jacobite attainted after 1715 while Sir
Alexander Bannerman of Hslek was descended, through his mother,
(4)
from the Macdonalds of Sleat.
In spite, however, of the positions of administrative importance
occupied by these men, their presence in the Jacobite army did
little to change it from a force still predominantly Highland in
organisation. The Council of War remained Highland in character,
dominated by the views of the clans, whose wishes on all matters of
(5)
strategic importance prevailed. The composition of the Jacobite




(5) See above, Introduction,
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Privy Council, In contrast to the Jacobite Council of War, provided
an Interesting illustration of this factor. The Privy Council con¬
tained the names of at least eleven Lowlanders, out of a full
(1)
council of eighteen. The Council of War, at this point the more
vital body, however, contained a total of only three Lowlanders
(2)
out of a full body of seventeen men, Highlanders who were
qualified by the size of their followings to dominate the Council
of War were not necessarily equally qualified to dominate the
purely political or administrative Privy Council.
Because Lowland support was not, however, negligible in
amount, the Jacobite army of 1745 was able to avoid some of the
disasters that had previously faced similar forces. It was able
to surmount the obstacle of the Forth, to finance itself more
efficiently than any earlier Jacobite force and to enjoy more
efficient staff organisation. But because the Lowlanders who
brought the force these administrative benefits were not also able
to bring in the large numbers of recruits brought by their op¬
posite numbers north of the Highland line, the force as a whole
did not lose its predominantly Highland character, nor did it
lose the defects consequent on that character.
(1) "Atholl Correspondence", p.25, Letter of Lord George Murray
to Tullibardine, The 11 Lowlanders were the Earl of Wemyss,
Viscount Arbuthnot, Lord Kenmure, Lord Ogllvy, Lord Elcho,
Lord Cardross, Sir James Stewart of Goodtrees, Mr. Wanchope
of Niddsry (Niddrie), John Stirling of Keir, James Graham




The Part Played by Roman Catho] ics and the Roman Catholic
Church in the Rising.
SECTION 1.
It is not easy to assess with any exactness the number of
Roman Catholics in the Jacobite force, nor to Isolate the importance
of this religion as a motive for adherence. Some indications of Its
importance, however, can be gained, first from examination of re¬
cruitment statistics in areas where Catholicism predominated, second
from the attitude to the rebellion implied in official Catholic
correspondence, and third, from the part played In recruitment of
the Jacobite force by Catholic priests.
These sources will show that the Roman Catholic Church was of
considerable strength In those areas where Jacobite recruitment was
most successful. They will also provide us with the names of many
prominent Jacobite personalities who were Roman Catholic. Amongst
Lowland recruits, for Instance, was James Maxwell of' Kirkconnell,
and in the Jacobite Council of War, Catholicism was represented by
the Duke of Perth, Macdonald of Keppoch, Macdonald of Glengarry,
Macdonald of Clanranald, Macdonald of Glencoe, Sir Thomas Sheridan
and Colonel O'Sullivan. At least nine Catholic priests, furthermore,
were intimately conneoted with the movement.
However, further reference to Roman Catholic archives, particu¬
larly the Historical Papers of the Roman Catholic Church in Scotland
at Coiuiaba Rouse, suggests that the association between Catholicism
and Jacobitism Is partly coincidental and that Roman Catholicism as
& primary motive for enrolment in, or association with, the rebel
army is of less importance than has hitherto been accepted*
110.
It must first be stated, however, that many prominent Jaco¬
bites were Roman Catholic; of those Catholics with territorial
influence, who were closely connected with Jacobitism, the most
important in the West were the Clanranald and Glengarry Macdonalds.
Both the Clanranald and the Glengarry regiments in 1745 were ac¬
companied by Roman Catholio priests when they joined the main rebel
army.
The Glengarry family were devout Catholics. John Maodonald,
known as Old Glengarry, was not out in the Forty Five but the
Glengarry regiment was commanded by his younger son Angus because
of the absence of his eldest son in France at the beginning of the
rising. Other prominent Jacobite Roman Catholics included young
Glengarry's cousin, Donald Macdonald of Scotus. He was amongst the
(1)
first to join the Prince at Borrodale in Arisaig.
Maodonald of Morar, who joined Charles on August 16th, 1745,
was a brother of the Roman Catholio bishop Hugh Macdonald. Both
Donald Macdonald of Kinlochmoidart, who joined Charles on July
(2)
26th, 1745, and Donald Macdonell of Tiendrish, who attacked
two companies of the Royal Scots at Highbrldge on August 16th 1745,
were Roman Catholics and both requested the services of a Roman
Catholic priest while in Carlisle gaol.
The Macdonells of Keppoeh had always had long Catholic tradi¬
tions and Alexander Macdonnell of Keppoch, who took prisoner
Captain Swetenham on August 14th 1745, and brought 300 recruits
to Glenfinnan on August 19th, was a Roman Catholic. So, too, were
the Macdonalds of Barrlsdale, including Alexander or Old Barrisdale,
(1) See Lochgarry's Memorial to Glengarry. Blaikie p.112,
(2) Sir John Maodonald's Narrative,"! 745 and After" p.56,
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and his son Coll. Barrisdsle had bean sent from Edinburgh, in
September, with Charles* instructions and requests for aid to
Lord Lovat, and had raised 200 recruits for the Prince, while
(1)
the main Jacobite body was in England. The Macdonalds of
Glenaladale were also Roman Catholic, as were those of Glencoe
and of Boisedale, John Macdonald of Glenaladale Charles
at Arisalg, in July 1745, and Allan Macdonald of the same family
(2)
was the priest who accompanied the Clanranald Regiment.
Alexander Macdonald of Boisedale was Clanranald's brother and
although he advised Charles to return heme, when he visited him
(3)
on July 24th, he afforded him Bhelter in his wanderings after
(4)
Culloden and was imprisoned for his Jacobite sympathies.
It may be noticed that not only was almost every branch of
the Macdonald confederation of clans, Roman Catholic, but in most
cases the heads of each clan had extremely close personal links
with the Catholic clergy.
The Clanranald family had imported Catholic priests from
(3)
Ireland in the earlier part of the century, Macdonald of Scotus*
brother was a Benedictine monk and his son was ordained as a priest
in 1751, Macdonald of Morar*s brother was a Roman Catholic bishop,aril
(6)
was educated at the Roman Catholic Seminary on Loch Morar,
1) Eicho p.320,
2; He was a close relation of the Clanranald family. See Ms,
Memoirs of Scottish Missionary Priests, in the Archives of
the Catholic Church. Transcribed 1901 by William Clapperton.
Miscell, Coluraba House Mss.
(3) Blaikie, p.2.
(4) See Col, 0*Sullivan*s Narrative and also Nlal MacEachain*s
narrative, reprinted in Blaikie, p.101.
(5) Blundell. "Roman Catholic Highlands of Scotland". Edin, p.86
et seq, and page 118.
(6) Columba House Miscell. Mss.
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Maodonald of Kinlochmoidart was a cousin of this bishop. Young
(1)
Glengarry spent some time in the Scots College at Paris. Old
Barrisdale, the father of Coll, had given hospitality to the
(2)
Catholic Bishop Nicholson in his diocesan tour of 1700, while
the Glenaladale family had produced at least three members who
(3)
served as Roman Catholic priests. This close association with
the Catholic clergy does not, however, testify only to the de-
voutness of the families concerned but also to the lack of op¬
portunity for education or employment for their sons.
The Camerons of Lochiel also had strong Roman Catholic con¬
nections, Although the Young Lochiel of the Forty Five was an
Episcopalian, his uncle, Hugh Macdonald was a Roman Catholic
bishop and his brother Alexander was a Jesuit priest.
Amongst important Jacobites in the North Fast who were Roman
Catholics were Gordon of Glastlrum, who joined Charles at Edinburgh
with a body of about 50 recruits about October 12th, 1745, and
Charles Gordon, of Miln of Smlthston, who was held in Carlisle
(4)
gaol with Klnlochmoldart and Macdonell of Tiendrish. In Braemar
the Farquhersons had important Catholic connections. An uncle of
Farquharson of Inverey was a Jesuit who arrived in Braemar during
a174®.
Throughout this period, moreover, the Lovat and Gordon
(1) Columba House Miscell. Mas.
(2) Columba House Miscall.Mss.
(3) They were Angus, eldest son of Ranald of Glenaladale, ordained
in 1682 or 3, and Allan Macdonald, Chaplain to the Clanranald
Regiment and probably a great nephew of John of Glenaladale.
(See Columba House Miscell. Mss. Clapperton Mss. No. 72),
The third member was an Alexander Macdonald of the same family
who entered the Soots College in Rome in 1743,
(4) For evidence of their Catholicism see Miscellaneous papers at
Columba House.
(5) Columba House Miscell. Mss.
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Influence for Catholicism remained strong. Amongst the Forfeited
Estates Papers is a petition of March 1758 from Alexander MaoKay,
minister in Strathglass, in which he states that of the Strathglaes
inhabitants, "more than half are bigotted Papists and always one
(1)
and sometimes two Popish missionaries among them". In 1709 the
Roman Catholic Bishop Gordon had calculated the Catholic laity is
(2)
Strathglass as between 640 and 700. Of Strathfarrar, the Survey
of the Forfeited Estate of Lovat asserts "The people are grossly
(3)
ignorant and among them a great number of Papists". The priest
in Strathglass, a Jesuit, was John Farquharson who surrendered
himself to the government forces after Culloden and was sentenced
U)
to banishment.
Further East, in the Gordon country, although the second
Duke of Gordon, now dead; the last Roman Catholic duke, the
Gordon family interest was still exerted on the side of Roman
Catholicism through his sister Lady Jean Gordon, she had married
the Duke of Perth and was the chief support of Scottish Catholics
(5)
until her death in 1773, Lady Jean Gordon was the aunt of Lord
Lewis Gordon of the *45. By 1736 there were between 500 and 600
(8)
Catholics in Strathavon and 1,000 in Clenlivet. The priests in
charge of these two areas in 1745, were John Tyrle and Alexander
Grant and they drew lots as to which of them should accompany the
(1) "Forfeited Estates Papers" p.98.
(2) Bishop Gordon's Report to Propaganda 1709,Columba House Mis cell.Ifis.
(3) "Forfeited Estates Papers" p,62.
(4) Misoell. Mss. Columba House,
(5) Gatholic Highlands of Scotland. Blundell. Yol.l,p,6.
(6) Clepperton B?ss, Columba House. A letter of Father George Gordon
of Sealan, 24 Oct. 1736, gives the Strathavon figure and a
memoir, Ms, No.74, gives the Glenlivet figure.
114#
(1)
Olenbuoket Regiment to join Charles.
There were strong links with the Catholic priesthood amongst
the various branches of the Gordon family. There were 48 Catholic
priests ministering in Scotland in 1745 and seven were surnamed
(2)
Gordon. Before 1730 there were eleven secular priests with
Gordon connections. The seven priests, in 1745 were Bishop James
Gordon, the Roman Catholic Vicar Apostolic, Father George Gordon,
priest at Aberdeen or at Mortlaeh, who was arrested after Culloden
but soon released, another Father George Gordon at Drummond
Castle, Father John Gordon at Preshome, and Father John Gordon of
Robistown, near Huntly, who preached a sermon lh.the parish of
Rathven near Fochabers, exhorting enlistment in the Jacobite army.
This priest afterwards accompanied to Edinburgh the recruits
raised by Gordon of Olastirum, and he was hunted and in hiding
(3)
for twelve months after Culloden# The remaining two priests
were a third George Gordon, probably stationed near Huntly, and
Father Alexander Gordon, of the Gordons of the Glenoat family,
stationed at Glencairn. He was seized after Culloden and died in
Inverness prison.
(4)
There were eight Roman Catholic chapels in the Gordon area,
and the Vicar Apostolic, Bishop James Gordon of the Gordons of
Glastirum family, prided himself on his relationship to the Dukes
of Gordon. This relationship almost certainly explains his close
personal links with that equally prominent Jacobite family, the
(1) See infr.
(S) Miecell. Mss. Columba House.
(3) ibid, undated Ms. compiled by John Geddes, afterwards conse¬
crated Bishop In 1780, who was a boy in the Fnzie in 1745,
See Scottish Catholics After Culloden. Bishop John Geddes,
Ms. in Columba House.
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(1)
Drummonds of Perth. This connection came about through the
marriage of Lady Jean Gordon to the Duke of Perth. Bishop Gordon's
relationship to the powerful Dukes of Gordon probably explains his
relative freedom from government interference in both 1715 and
1745. The importance of the Gordon connection is even further
emphasised by the fact that seven of the eight chapels in this
(2)
area were built on land owned by the House of Gordon.
SECTION II.
Numerical strength of Catholicism in Sootland in 1745,
examined geographically.
The manuscripts and letters amongst the archives at Columba
House are the chief source of the following figures.
Roman Catholicism was the dominant faith in the Clanranald
areas of Knoydart, North and South Morar, Arisaig and Mo idart,
from, that is, the north of Loch Shiel to Loch Houra. Knoydart
contained one of the largest Roman Catholic congregations in the
Highlands and Moidart and Arisaig together contained, according
(3)
to one source, a Roman Catholic congregation of 2,000 in 1763.
In 1709 Report to Propaganda (the official body in Rome re-
(4)
sponsible for all Catholic Missions abroad) from Bishop Gordon
gives the following figures of Catholic laity:
Moidart 430
Irisalg 300
(1) He died in 1746 at Drummond Castle. See below.
(2) These were the chapels at Mortlaoh, Huntly, Preshoma, R&thvan,
Scalan and two meeting places in Glenlivet. See Chapter
3 p/lZ .
(3) Blundell, "Catholic Highlands of Scotland" Vol,2 p.162, but
the figure is unconfirmed by any figures at Columba House.






Webster gives a total population for the parish of Ardnamu^han
of 5,000 which included Sunart, Arisaig and Morar.
Lochaber also provided an extremely large Roman Catholic
congregation. Aeneas MacGillis, priest resident in Glengarry,
(2)
in a report on his mission, prepared for Rome in 1764, states
that in the Lochaber Mission there were 3,000 Catholics but at
that date no resident priest. There is always some danger of
optimistic exaggeration of the size of congregations from such
Catholic sources but the figure is somewhat borne out by an
(3)
undated anonymous paper headed "Notes to the S.P.C.K. (on)
Papists in the Highlands" which is among the archives of the
(4)
Scottish Episcopal Church. This paper says of the Lochaber
area, near Inverioohy, "there are few who are not Papists",
Roman Catholicism in both Lochaber and the west was undoubtedly
strengthened by the influence of the island seminary established
by Bishop Hugh Macdonald on Loch Morar in 1732. There was also
(5)
a separate priest in charge of Arisaig by 1731,
To the north of the Clanranald areas of Moidart and the two
Morars was the equally strongly Catholic Glengarry country. There
was a series of resident Catholic priests in Glengarry from the
(1) Alex. Webster "Account of the Number of People in Scotland
1755", Scot. Hist. Society Publications, 3rd series Vol,
XLIII Edin. 1952.
(2) Miscell. Mss. Columba House.
3) Written from internal evidence probably in 1712 or 1713.
4) A collection of Papers, known as the Episcopal Chest, at the
Episcopal College, Rosebery Crescent, Edinburgh.
(5) See Father Charles Macdonald, "Moidart - Among the Clanranalds",
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(1) (8)
seventeenth century and Blundell estimates the Catholic
population of the area as 1,500 in the eighteenth century.
Bishop Gordon gives a figure of 1,200 Catholics in Glengarry in
(3)
1709 and Aeneas MacGlllis in his Report of 1764 gives the
figure as 1,500,
Further west, the islands of south Gist, Benbecula, Barrq,
(4)
Sigg and Cama were almost entirely Roman Catholic, There were
(5)
only 60 Protestant families on South TTist in 1700, Benbecula
and South Gist, according to Captain Barlow, writing in 1753, were
(6)
"all Papists", Here the Influence of both the Clanranald -
Boisedale families and of MacNeil of Barra was a powerful support
to Catholicism, Bishop Gordon, in his report to Propaganda in
(7)
1709, gives the following figures for Roman Catholics in the
Islands, In brackets beside each are Alexander Webster's figures
for the year 1755 which establish some kind of impartial check
on Gordon's figures,
Eigg - 400 (316)
Canna - 200 (323)
Ulst - 2200 (2040 including Benbecula)
Barra - 1100 (1100)
Totals - 3900 (3779)
Later, in an extensive visit in 1723, Bishop Gordon confirmed
Blundell - op.cit. Vol,2 p,160 et seq.
Ibid. Vol,2,p,176,
(3) Report to Propaganda, cited above,
(4) W,C, Mackenzie,"History of the Outer Hebrides", Paisley,
Alexander Gardner 1903, p,510 et seq,
(5) ibid. p.510, Aocount of Martin Martin of Skye.
(8) ibid, appendix p.598 et seq.
(7) Columba House. Miscell. Mss.
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(1)
900 in the Islands. There was a series of priests on Barra
(2)
from the 17th century onwards with only one short gap in 1762
(3)
and at least one priest and sometimes two resident on Uist.
On the mainland there was a strong Roman Catholic element in
the Lovat Fraser areas of Strath Farrar and Strath Glass. There
was one Jesuit priest in that area in 1743. He was Lochiel*s
brother. Alexander Cameron and in 1746 a second priest. Father
(4)
John Farquharson, arrived in Strathglass. Both these priests
were arrested after Culloden. Father Cameron died at sea in the
prison ship taking him to the Thames, Father Farquharson was
sentenced to banishment. Bishop Gordon*s 1709 Report referred to
above gives a Roman Catholic population of at least 640 in Strath-
(5)
glass. A Report on Schools on the Forfeited Estates of Lovat,
dated 1761, gives some indication of the surviving strength of
Roman Catholicism in the Lovat areas by 1761, although this was
after the renewed persecution which followed the suppression of
the 1745 Rising. There are no corresponding figures at Columba
House for the area before the outbreak of the rising, but by
analogy with other areas the 1745 figures may be assumed to be
no smaller and probably larger.
The figures are as follows:-
Parish of Kilmorack 600 Papists
" Kiltarlity 360
" " Boleskin and
Abertarf 190 "
Total 1150
(1) Columba House, Clapperton Mss, Ro,40.
(2) Blundell Vol.2 op.cit. p.l et seq.
(3) The priest in 1745 was Alexander Forester, who was arrested on the
Island in 1746 and sentenced to banishment, Columba House Miscall.
Mss.
(4) Columba House, Miscell. Mss.
(5) "Forfeited Estates Papers" p.93 et seq.
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Further south, in the western area of Badenoch, there was a
strong Roman Catholio pocket north of Loch Laggan, from Aberarden to
Garvebeg and Dalchully. This dated from the occupation of the
lands of Gellovy, Tulloohrom, Aberarder, Garvemore and Garvebeg,
(1)
by offshoots of the Macdonell*s of Keppoch from 1602. The MacHabs
(2)
of Dalchully were also Roman Catholic. The area was apparently
served by priests from Lochaber.
(3)
In the last the area from the Enzie to Glenlivet and
Strathavon, as well as the Strathbogie district was a stronghold
(4)
of Catholicism. Bishop Geddes mentions five chapels in the
(5)
Keith - Dufftown - Huntly triangle, two of which were destroyed
by government troops after Culloden. In the Glenlivet and
Strathavon area, where a seminary existed at Sealan from 1717-1799
there were at least two priests from 1727 onwards and in 1745 two
priests, John Tyrie and Alexander Grant, in Glenlivet alone. A
(6)
letter from George Gordon, priest at Scalan in 1736, gives the
number of Catholics in Strathavon as between 500 and 600 and la
Glenlivet as 1,000. The two priests in Glenlivet, John Tyrie
and Alexander Grant, drew lots as to which of them should join
the Jacobite army, and which should remain behind to serve as a
priest in Glenlivet. The lot fell to Tyrie who joined the main
(1) Blundell op.cit. Vol.1 p.122.
2) ibid. Vol. I p.127.
(3) A small hamlet 3 miles from Fochaber but used in Catholic Mss.
to denote the parishes of Bellie and Rathven.
(4) "Position of Scottish Catholics After Culloden." Bishop John
Geddea. London, Bums & Oats. p.8.
(5) At Robentown (Robertstown) and Tulloch. Geddes, op.cit, p.8
Columba House. Miscall. Mss., letter dated 26th Oct. 1736.
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body, probably In Edinburgh and marched with them into England as
far as Carlisle.
South of Strathavon, in the Braemar district the priest,
Father Peter Gordon, drew up an account of his mission in 1740,
(1)
which is among the manuscripts at Columba House, It gives
the number of his communicants at 500, There were at least three
priests in the area, Peter Gordon at Braemar, Alexander Gordon
S.J, at Glengaim and another Jesuit, Charles Farauharson, who
(2)
arrived at Braemar early in 1746, The presence of three priests
in the area and possibly a fourth, a William Reid at Mortlach
(probably Mortiich, about five miles from Aboyne) argues a sub¬
stantial Catholic population. Of these three priests, Alexander
Gordon and Farquharson were arrested after Culloden, Gordon died
in prison and Farquharson was sentenced to banishment along with
his brother John, William Reid went into hiding on the arrival
of Major General Bland, with government troops, in his area but
was arrested and held in prison for some months in Edinburgh until
(3)
he was released on bail in August 1746.
There were at least three Catholic priests in Aberdeen and
district. They were Robert or Patrick Leith, George Gordon and
Andrew Hackett, Again the presenoe of three priest argues con¬
siderable lay support. Of these priests George Gordon was arrested
after Culloden but "released by giving the Serjeant a guinea
(4)
privately" while Leith joined the Jacobite force at some date
(1) Columba House, Clapperton Mss. No.68.
(2) Columba House. Miscell, Mss.
(3) Various papers relating to him and the certificate of his
release are at Colxamba House,
(4) Columba House, Mr, by John Geddes, entitled "A Collection of
Materials tat s history of the Catholio Religion in
Scotland 1542-1793". p.7.
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before Prestonoans, where he was present ministering to the
(X)
wounded. He marched into England with the main body and possibly
fled from England after the oollapse of the Rising. There is no
further reference to him among the Columba House manuscripts. He
does not appear on the Clergy Lists for 1746 and in the list for
1747 he is said to be in Rome, He eventually became Abbot of
Ratisbon,
Exact numbers of Roman Catholic congregations are difficult
to assess, as can be seen, The statistics at Columba House are
vary scanty, John Oeddes, later consecrated Bishop in 1780,
writing as a contemporary, who lived through the renewed perse¬
cution which followed the failure of the Rising, had probably
the best opportunity for assessing the strength of Roman
Catholicism but his figures may be prejudiced. Moreover, he
is more interested in the numbers and personal histories of
priests than In their congregations. His Manuscript "History
of the Catholic Religion in Scotland" at Columba House and the
manuscript lists of Scottish missionary priests compiled in 1760
by George Gordon (a priest in Aberdeen) are the main sources for
what statistics there are, These figures, however, come after
the apostasies and deaths which followed the reprisals of 1746
onwards,
Erom these figures we have the following totals of Catholic
congregations:-
Moidart, Arisaig )
Morar, Knoydart ) 1820
Lochaber 3000
Glengarry 1500
(1) Geddes, "The Position of Scottish Catholics After Culloden" p.5.
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The Outer Islands 3900
Strathglsss 840
Lovat areas 1150
Glenlivet and Strathavon 1500
A total of 13,510 excluding the Braemar, Strathbogle, Huntly
and Argyll areas for which there are no Catholic statistics.
From Alexander Webster's "Account of the Number of People in
Scotland in 1755" we have the following totals of Catholics: -
The Outer Islands 3779
Ross and Cromarty 29
Inverness-shire 5864
Elgin, Moray, Banff and
Aberdeen. 5528
Argyll {without Islands) 4329
Total 19,329
Excluding the islands of Argyll and the counties of Perth and Angus.
The considerable omissions among the Catholic figures would
(1)
explain the difference of just under 6000 in the two totals, for
Braemar, Strathbogie, Huntly and Aberdeen Itself are without stat¬
istics and there are no figures for Argyll which according to
Webster contained 4329 Catholics.
SECTION III.
Catholicism and Recruitment.
Having gained some kind of picture of the numerical strength
of Catholicism at the outbreak of the Rising, the next and more
important questions to be answered are, first what proportion of tha
Jacobite force was actually recruited from predominantly Catholic
areas, and second, to what extent Roman Catholicism was a motive
(1) The difference is 5,819.
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inspiring enlistment in the Jacobite array.
-The following regiments may be presumed to have had a large
Roman Catholic element amongst their men. Beside each regiment are
the numbers probably recruited, though not always remaining for any
length of time under arms. The method by which these totals of
recruits have been arrived at is explained in the Introduction above.
Regiment or Area of Recruiting.








Glengarry's, including recruits )
brought by Macdonald of Barrlsdale )
)
900
Macdonald of Lochgarry and
Macheil of Raasay and some Grants
of Glenmoriston,
between 900 and 1000
)
Keppoch's, including men brought by )
Macdonald of Glencoe. )
CIanranaid's
From Braemar under Farquharson )
)




between 520 and 720
between 350 and 400
800
between 4370 and 5300
This forms a substantial percentage of the total Jacobite force
(1)
recruited, a total of between 12,230 and 14,148 men.
This substantial percentage points at least superficially to
a very strong connection between Roman Catholicism and Jacobite
sentiments. To what extent this was a real connection and In how
far Roman Catholicism actually provided the motive for Jacobite
(1) See above, Introduction.
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activity must now be examined#
The first point to be noticed is that though predominantly
Roman Catholic areas produced over 38& of the Jacobite levy,
Perthshire and other predominantly Episcopalian areas produced a
larger proportion vizi 4C$ at the minimum#
The second is that in the case of prominent Roman Cathollo
Jacobites, there were often family and personal lints with the
Stuarts to explain their Jacobltism, For example, the Maodonalds
of Clanrenald, of Glengarry and of Ksppoch had long lints, both
personal and through correspondence, with the exiled courts.
Next, the official attitude cf the Roman Catholic Church and
Its hierarchy in Scotland to the arrival and activities of Prince
Charles Edward must b© considered#
The Vicar Apostolic for the lowland district until 1746 was
Bishop Jamas Gordon# Bis Pioscesan correspondence is preserved
among the archives of the Catholic Church in Scotland, He was
eighty in 1745 and died on 18th February 1746, at Drummond Castle
aged eighty-one. He had spent the last weeks of his life there,
in falling health, arid the last letters written by him to be
preserved are dated July 1745, The state of his health probably
explains the absence of further letters#
Bishop Gordon made no open declaration of Jacobitism, and his
correspondence contains no reference to the Rising, Go no official
Jacobite lead was given by him,-though his attitude may have been
the result of increasing infirmity as well as lack of Inclination,
His earlier letters contain no reference to the possibility of a
(1) See Correspondence of Bishop Gordon, Coluaiba House Mas,
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rising, however® The only references to the exiled House in Rome
are passing references to the Old Pretender's part in the nomina¬
tion of bishops and the influanca he possessed in Rome over the
granting of dispensations. In these references Bishop Gordon, like
most of the Roman Catholic clergy in Scotland, shows his disapproval
of the Pretender*s interference in the nomination of bishops, as
this, he believed, tended to label the Reman Catholic clergy and
hierarchy as Jacobite agents. In his younger days, however, he had
bees considerably more partisan. Is 1714 he had written to the
Old Pretender urging his coming to Scotland and assuring him "you
msy be sure I and his other relations and friends would not be
(1)
backward on such an occasion*. This declaration was probably
caused by the renewed persecution and priest-hunting which broke
out after Anne's death. Bishop Gordon, however, was never arrested
after the *15 Rising, probably partly because of his powerful
connections with the Puke of Gordon and also partly because he had
never openly committed himself, as his colleague Bishop Nicholson
had done, by regular correspondence with Colonel Kooke and other
(2)
Jacobite agents.
By 1745, however, there is no evidence of any treasonable
correspondence with Jacobite agents by either of the two Catholic
Bishops, Bishop Gordon or his celloague in the Highland division,
Bishop Hugh Macdonald, Amongst the clerical correspondence after
July 1745 there are few references to the Rising by clergy in
Scotland, The chief burden of the correspondence is the problem
(1) Letter of Bishop Gordon, 28th August 1714, Columba House Mss,
(2) Nicholson was arrested in 1715 but released shortly afterwards,
see Columba House Miscell. Mss,
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oaused by the increasing infirmity and approaching death of
Bishop Cordon himself# Bishop Gordon*s colleague was Bishop
Hugh Macdonald of the Morar family. He came from a prominent
Jacobite family and might be expected to have played a more
(1)
decisively Jacobite part. According to later Catholic tradition
he is said to have visited Charles on board the "Du Teilley" and to
have tried to persuade him to return to France, and also to have
blessed his Royal banner secretly. There is, however, no written
contemporary confirmation of this and according to a source nearer
to his own time, Bishop John Geddes, who was consecrated as Coad-
(2)
Jutor of the Lowland District in 1780, Bishop Macdonald only
learnt of Charles* arrival from Macdonald of Kinlochmoidart, whom
he met accidentally, when Kinlochmoidart was on his way to inform
the Duke of Perth. As Kinlochmoidart*s message did not reach the
(3)
Duke of Perth until August 9th, and Charles had left the "Du
Teillay" on August 4th or 5th, there would seem to be little
truth in the story of the Blessing.
Bishop Macdonald took no active part whatsoever in the rising,
but was too conspicuous a figure to remain safely in Scotland
during the renewed priest hunting which followed Culloden, and he
escaped to France in August 1746. After his return to Scotland
he was arrested in 1754, solely on the grounds of infringing the
recusancy laws, and at his arrest and trial no mention was made of
any implication in the Rising nor of his supposed blessing of the
Standard. Had any evidence of such treasonable activity existed,
(1) Ms. Memoir of Bishop Hugh Macdonald, Columba House, Clapperton Mss,
(2) See Geddes Ms. History of Catholic Religion. Columba House.
(3) Oliphant. "Jacobite Lands of Gask". p.104.
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It would not have been Ignored,
It is only in the correspondence of the clergy serving in
Rome or Paris that we find any open statements of Jacobite senti¬
ments, The letters of George Innes, Principal of the Soots
College at Paris, from September 1745 onwards contain many
(1)
examples of a partisan Jacobite spirit. Such sentiments are
not found among the correspondence of the clergy in Scotland,
however. Their letters contain cryptic references to the dif¬
ficulties encountered by priests from 1746 onwards in their
missions, code names being used. News is given Of the many
priests arrested on government orders but no reference made to
Jacobite sentiment. William Harrison, for instance, Catholic
priest in North Morar since 1737, visited the Sheriff of
Argyleshire after Culloden, admitted his priesthood, but denied
any "political medling" and was given "an ample passport requiring
of everybody to allow him to go about his lawful business un-
(2)
molested". A similar pass was given, on August 2nd 1746, to
Alexander Godsman, priest at Achanacy in Huntly, "to pass south
(3)
or north where his business requires", George Gordon, priest in
Aberdeen and William Reid, priest of Mortlach, were both arrested
(4)
but later released. Robert Grant of Glenlivet, brother of the
Scots Agent in Rome, left the Scots College in Paris, where he
(1) For example, his letter of 2nd September 1745 to the Abbd
Grant, the Scots Agent at Rome, "We are all ,,, taken up with
the thoughts of our Prince's doings for which, that God
may give a blessing thereunto, we don't fall to offer our
most ardent prayers". Columba House. Miscell. Mss,
(2) Geddes Ms. "History of Catholic Religion" p.8. Columba House Mss,
(3) The pass, issued by Major William MacKenzle of Loudoun's, is
amongst the papers at Columba House,
(4) Columba House Miscell, Mss,
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had been since 1739, to return to Scotland at some time after
Charles* landing. However, the attitude of the Catholic hierarchy
to activities such as his seems to be represented by the Principal
of the Sooths College, who wrote to the Abb6 Grant in September
1746, "Robert Grant came back to us again, he had never been in
the army but had seen so much to disgust him of that employment
that I believe he will remain henceforth unshaken in his vo-
(1)
cation".
To sum up, among the letters of the Catholic hierarchy there
is no evidence of sympathy, or approval, for Jacobite activity by
the clergy. The only written expressions of symnathy with the
(2)
movement came from clergy resident on the Continent. The
Catholic hierarchy were concerned solely with the increasing
burden and difficulty of missionary work because of renewed
governement persecution, and with the scarcity of priests.
Among the lower ranks of the clergy of the Catholic Church,
however, the picture may at first appear different. There were
thirty-three priests (excluding the two bishops), two Jesuits and
(3)
four clerics in Regular orders, and three priests abroad in
1745. These forty-four included eighteen against whom some sus¬
picion of Jacobite association can be advanced, though in the
(1) Miscall. Mss. Columba House. Letter of 2nd September 1746 of
George Innes to the Abb& Grant.
(2) It must obviously be remembered here that such open reference
would be completely safe only in continental correspondence,
but even so the use of code names and the frankness of the
tone of letters written in Scotland, make suoh references
possible, and therefore makes their absence significant.
It should also be noted that the dangers of such references
did not deter Episcopalian clergy. See Chapter 6, below.
(3) 3 Benedictines and 1 Franciscan, Ms, List of Scottish Priest
1742/1800 Columba House.
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case of ei#it of them, the only evidence is the fact that they
were arrested or held in custody, for varying periods after
(1)
Culloden# Of these eight, two were released after being held
for a matter of days only and may therefore be discounted# The
remaining sixteen clergy divide into the following groups -
(a) those whose implication in the rising can be proved;
(b) those against whom the only evidence is subsequent arrest#
Group (al 1# Allan Macdonald, of the Glenaladale family who
accompanied the Clanrsnald regiment as Chaplain.
S. Aeneas McGillis, Chaplain to the Glengarry regiment.
3# James Leslie of Traquair, who was known to have
attended the wounded after Prestonpans, end who visited rebel pri¬
soners in London in 1740.
4# John Tyrie, priest at Glenlivet, who accompanied
Glenbucket*s men as chaplain.
5, John Gordon, priest in Enzie, who preached a sermon
exhorting recruitment and aocompanied Gordon recruits asfer as
Edinburgh, thereafter being in hiding for a year#
0# Robert or Patrick Leith, who accompanied the army to
England.
7# Alexander Cameron S#J., Lochiel's brother who had been
Groom to the Old Pretender in Rome and died at sea in a government
prison ship after Culloden#
8. Alexander Grant, priest in Glenlivet, who drew lots
with John ?yrie to decide which of them should accompany Glenousket *s
force,
9# Bishop Hugh Macdonald of the Morar family, said to have
blessed privately Charles* standard#
(1) Alexander Godsman, held for a few days at Huntly, and George
Gordon of Aberdeen. Passes issued to them a/hong Columba House
Miscall. Mss.
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10. Colin Campbell, killed in action at Culloden.
Croup (b), 1. Alexander Forester, priest on Uist who was banished.
2. James Grant, priest on Barra, held a prisoner until
1747,
3. John Farouharson, priest in Strathglass who surrenders-
after Culloden and was banished.
4. Charles Farquharson, Jesuit and brother of the above,
who surrendered with his brother after Cullodem and was banished,
5. Alexander Gordon, Jesuit, preaching in Glengalra,
arrested after Culloden, dying in prison,
6. William Reid, priest at Mortlach, Hurtly, held under
arrest in Edinburgh for some months but released on ball August 174-
A closer examination of the above clergy, however, seems to
suggest various motives, other than religious to which their
Jacohltism may be attributed. Of these sixteen, five were members
(1)
of families with long Jacobite traditions. It may also be
(2)
significant that three of these were Jesuits. More sigmifleant,
again, five of them were associated with the dissentient Catholic
(3)
group known as the Pilgrims and had been continually reprimanded
by those in authority since before 1740, Even more significant stil
all these five belonged to the first group - those most deeply
(1) Namely Allan Maodonald of the Glenaladale family, Bishop Hugh
Maodonald of the Morar family, John and Charles Farquharson
of the Farquharsons of Inverey and Alexander Cameron,
Lochiel*s brother.
(2) Alexander Cameron, Charles Farquharson and Alexander Gordon.
(3) Namely Aeneas McGillls, James Leslie, John Tyrie, Colin
Campbell and .Alexander Grant,
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involved, while a further three of that group, Alexander Cameron
S.J, Allan Mac&onald and Bishop Hugh Maedosald came from promi¬
nent Jacobite families.
The Pilgrims were a dissatisfied group of clergy, totalling
six in all. Of this number only one, William Harrison, priest
in North Morar, was not knows to be involved is Jacobite activity.
His only connection with it is that he is said, according to a
legend recorded in the Columba House manuscripts to have been the
priest to whom the man who stole part of the Jacobite money forming
(1)
the arkaig treasure confessed his theft.
The founder and most prominent member of the Pilgrims was
Colin Campbell. Ha was a brother of Sir Duncan Campbell of
Lochnell, who had fought on the government side both at
Shariffmuir and. Cullo&en, and was; related to the Duke of Argyll.
He was fifty-six at the time of his death at Cullodan, and had
(2)
been engaged in recruiting for French service since 1737.
He had been a trouble maker and critic of authority from 1733
onwards, and his hostile attitude Lad grown even more marked from
1737 onwards, when Hugh Macdonald was given the episcopal appoint¬
ment that Campbell hoped to gain. From that date he had been
insubordinate and hostile to his bishop, and had fabricated and
sent to Rom© numerous complaints against his superior. At some
point between 1735 and 1738 he and Father John Tyrie had visited
Rome to carry there, personally, their complaints against Bishop
Gordon, thereafter giving themselves and their clique the title
of Pilgrims. Colin Campbell served for an unspecified length of
(1) Columba House, Clapperton Mss. paper 398.
(2) Columba House. Clapperton Mss. No, 71.
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time with the Rebel force and died, either on the field of
Culloden, or the day after from wounds received in the battle.
Closely associated with him was John Tyrla, priest in
(1)
Glenliret, Tyrie had gone to Rome with Campbell, and Joined
hira in his continued opposition to Bishop Gordon on their
return. Along with a neighbouring priest Alexander Grant
(also a Pilgrim) who had himself been frequently reprimanded
for idleness, he became fired with an enthusiasm for Jacobite
views. He and Grant were the two priests who drew lots to
decide who should accompany the army. Grant lost, but Tyrie
appears to have returned north after reaching Carlisle, He
was, however, present at Culloden where he was wounded. He
was nevar arrested, but remained in hiding in the Glenlivet area
until 1750 or 51 when he moved, without permission from his
superior, to Garrioch near his birthplace of Dunnidaer in
(2)
Aberdeenshire, thus again earning episcopal censure.
The third Pilgrim was the Alexander Grant referred to above,
He was described in his bishop's corresoOndence as "of an idle
(3)
and grumbling disposition* and had received frequent reprimands
from Bishop Gordon,
The remaining Pilgrims were Aeneas MaoGillls and James Leslie,
(4)
MacCillis had studied at the Scots College in Rome, and had been
in Rome from 1735-8 when Colin Campbell and John Tyrie arrived
there on their self-styled pilgrimage to complain about their
Bishop, when they had accused him and other Scots clergy of
(1) Columba House. Miscell, Mss,
(2) ibid, Ms, No. 68,
(3) Columba House. Miscall. Mss. Clapperton Mss, No. 76,
(4) Columba House. Clapperton Mss, No, 94.
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Jansenist heresy, KaoGillis had fallen under the Influence of
Colin Campbell in Home. He had returned to Scotland in February
1741, and little is known of his clerical duties except that in
1759 he was serving as a priest is the Glengarry area and he is
listed as a priest in Glengarry on subsequent lists of priests.
The earlier lists of Highland priests do not give locations of
missions so h© may well have been serving in the Glengarry area
much earlier, since his part in the Rising was to accompany the
Glengarry force as chaplain, and he served with the Glengarry
force until after Culloden,
(1)
James Leslie, the last Pilgrim, had also served in the
Glengarry area, but by April, 1745., he was at Traquair. Ee had
been involved in a clerical scandal in 1740, when he had been forced
to face an episcopal enquiry and there make a full apology for
writing, and circulating, a set of verses with a Jansenist tinge.
From that date on he appears to have become an associate of the
Pilgrims, sharing in their resentment against Bishop Gordon, He
appears to have been in the field at Prestonpans, giving assistance
to the wounded. Later he appears in London, attempting to gain
access to imprisoned priests in 1745, By 1747 or 8 he had retired
to France where ironically he was again in trouble, this time
being asked to answer a charge of having acted as a spy for the
British Government,
The apparently strong personality of Colin Campbell and his
continued Jacobite and pro French activity since 1737, possibly
the result of bad relations with his superiors, appears to explain
the Jacobite activities of his four fellow Pilgrims, Tyrie, Grant,
(1) Columba House, Clapperton Mas, No. 79.
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MacOillis and Leslie.
The strong family associations with Jacobitism of Allan
Macdonald of Glenaladale, Alexander Cameron, Lochiel's brother, and
Bishop Hugh Kacdonald of lEorar would provide at least as convincing
an explanation.of their activities. Of the ten priests most deeply
implicated in Jaeobitiem, all but two, Robert Leith and John Gordon
were members of prominent Jacobite families or were associated with
the Pilgrims. Of the six priests less convincingly associated with
the Rising, two were Jesuits and one the brother of a Jesuit.
Their membership of an order with direct links with the continent
may also be of significance. In fact the theory that Roman Cath¬
olicism in itself provided any widespread motive for adherence to
the Jacobite cause i3 difficult to uphold.
Informed Catholics in 1715 knew that their religion could
hope for little material advantage even if there were a success¬
ful Stuart restoration. No Stuart monarch In 1745 would have
either the power, or the political ineptitude, to grant to
Roman Catholics the kind of concessions which had lost James II
his throne in the previous century. Any Stuart Restoration in
the mid-eighteenth century would inevitably be accompanied by
such guarantees for the Church of England and the religious status
quo as to ensure that the Catholic Church, as a corporate body,
would make no material gains whatsoever. Informed Catholic opinion
in England knew this and reacted accordingly. There were no de¬
monstrations of support from the major Catholic laymen of England
for this reason. They had little to gain and, in the event of
failure, much to loss,
(1) See Eardley Simpson, "Derbyshire and the Forty Five" (Philip
Allan London, 1933) for various instances of the reaction of
English Catholics to the Rising.
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There Is a further reason for official Catholic disapproval
of any rebel activity, at least ambng the priesthood. From 1730
onwards the enforcement of penal legislation against Roman
Catholics had been relaxed. The church was therefore deeply
concerned with the problem of grasping the opportunity for
expansion which was presented to it and was unwilling to risk
imperilling this opportunity by political meddling.
In Its lay following, the Church was stronger than it had
been at the beginning of the oentury. Bishop Gordon, in his
(1)
"Report to Propaganda of 1709", estimates the total Roman
Catholic population of the Highlands to be only somewhat over
8,000, and by the Highlands Bishop Gordon apparently means the
areas later taken to form the Highland division when the Bishop¬
ric was divided in 1731, viz. Braemar, Glengarry, Glenmoriston,
Strathglass, Lochaber, Arisaig, Morar, Moidart, Knoydart and the
Islands and excluding the Gordon area. The figure in 1745 was at
(2)
least 13,510, an Increase of over 5,000.
In the numbers of its priests, however, the Catholic Church
had made little progress. Bishop Gordon*s Report to Propaganda
of 1709 gives the number of Roman Catholic priests in Scotland in
1702 as forty, including nine Jesuits and four Benedictines. In
1745 there were forty-two priests. This lack of Increase in the
number of clergy made the Church very conscious of the needs of
the rising numbers among the laity. Bishop Gordon, in his Report
to Propaganda of 1730, states after a further Highland visit
"The Increase in the number of Catholics was very great ....
(1) Columba House Miscell, Mss.
(2) See above p.ai
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reckoning from the year 1706 where there were in one place.about
20 there were now 700, in another 150 had risen to 800 with a
resident priest."
There had been a corresponding improvement and expansion in
the organisation of the Scottish mission. In 1694, the first
Roman Catholic Bishop of Scotland had been appointed. In 1705,
the first Bishop was given a coadjutor and in 1737 the single
diocese was divided into two, a Highland and a Lowland Diocese.
In 1717, a seminary was established at Scalan in Glenlivet and in
1732 the seminary at Morar was set up. In numbers of priests,
however, the Church was exceptionally weak. The Episcopal Church
in Scotland had, by 1745, a priesthood of probably 130, but the
total number of Roman Catholic priests in Scotland in 1745 was 42.
A church so weak in priests could afford to lose no more, nor could
it afford to lose the services of its priesthood even temporarily.
The Roman Catholic priests of Scotland were desperately overworked
at this time so that any priest who meddled, even locally, in
Jacobitism was forced to neglect his duties to do so, while any
priest who joined the Jacobite army in any capacity was forced to
abandon entirely his mission. He, and his superiors, knew that
there could be no one to replace him. This knowledge must have
been the most potent of all reasons for the aloof sentiments and
lack of active support in the Catholic hierarchy towards the
Rising of 1745.
(1) See separate Chapter on the Episcopal Church and the
Rebellion, Chapter 6, below.
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CHAPTER 6.
THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH AND THE REBELLION
In spite of the ecclesiastical changes brought by the
Revolution of 1688/89, Episcopacy in 1745 was still a factor of
considerable importance. It remained a strong influence in the
Appin and Lochaber areas, where it was protected by Donald
Cameron of Lochiel. He was himself a non-juror, in spite of
the Roman Catholic connections of his family. The Stewarts of
Appin were also an Episcopalian clan, and, in the islands of
Harris and Ulst, Protestantism, until the 18th century was
(1)
generally equivalent to Episcopalianism. There was an
Episcopalian parish at Ardnamurchan whose incumbent, nominally
replaced at the Revolution, in fact continued to preach to the
same congregation until his death. He was the Rev. Alexander
Macdonald, both of whose sons served with the Clanranald regi¬
ment in 1745, and one of whose grandsons was Alexander Macdonald
(2)
the banker.
Episcopacy and Roman Catholicism in Ardnamurchan, as in
the Cameron country, were closely mingled. One of this cleric*s
sons became a Roman Catholic, from whom the Catholic Kinlochmoidart
family are descended, while In Lochaber, the Episcopalian Lochiel
had a Jesuit brother.
There was a strong Episcopalian element in the more remote
areas of Rannoch, where some parts were twenty miles from the
nearest Presbyterian Church, The factor of Strowan*s report to
(1) W.C, Mackenzie. "History of the Outer Hebrides". Paisley,
Alexander Gardner 1903. p.523.
(2) "Moidart - among the Clanranalds" p.138 and p.151,
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(1)
the Commissioners of Forfeited Estates {December 1755) refers,
for instance, to a non-juring cleric, who was baptising in that
area, and staying in the house of Stewart of Kynachan.
There was, and had been since covenanting days, a strong
Episcopalian tradition in Aberdeenshire. The Synod of Aberdeen
sent an address in favour of Episcopacy to the Scottish Parliament
in 1661, while a petition from Aberdeen in 16©1 called for a
meeting of a "Free General Assembly" in which Episcopalian dele-
(2)
gates would have a majority. The chapel of King*s College,
Aberdeen was closed in 1714, because of continued use of the
Book of Common Prayer, and there had been much Jacobite activity
in 1715 among the Episcopalian clergy of Aberdeen. From the
same area there were large-scale transportations to the Barbadoes
(3)
of both Episcopalian clergy and laity in 1746.
The counties of Aberdeen, Banff, Perth, Angus, Ross, Cromartie,
Caithness and the Dundee area contained Episcopalian strongholds
(4)
throughout this period. In 1711 and 1716 militia and dragoons
had to be used against Episcopalian congregations at Deer, Pltsligo,
Cruden, and St, Fergus, Stonehaven remained strongly Episcopalian
from 1689 onwards, and a writer in 1843 was able to assert that
(1) "Forfeited Estates Papers" page 215.
(2) Goldie "Short History of Episcopal Church in Scotland" p.29.
(3) Goldie, p.59.
(4) For further details of Episcopalian congregations in these
areas see J.P. Lawgm "Memoir of Affairs of Episcopal Church
in Scotland since the death of Queen Annd*, Edinburgh 1843.
G, Grubb - "Ecclesiastical History of Scotland", Edinburgh
1861. Edmonston and Douglas.
Thomas Stephen - "History of Church of Scotland?, London
1845, John Skinner. "Ecclesiastical History of Scotland",
London 1788. Goldie op.cit.
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there were "not a dozen Presbyterians in the old town at this
(1)
period".
In Perthshire, Drvunmond of Logie Almond, Lord Nairn and
Graham of Balgowan maintained Episcopalian clergy as private
chaplains, and the Robertsons of Lude maintained an Episcopalian
chapel on their property. Lord Rollo provided, after 1745,
facilities for secret Episcopalian worship, as did Lord Alrlie
in Angus. In Banffshire, in the parish of Rathven, in 1745,
there was an Episcopalian congregation continuous since 1689,
and no Presbyterian minister was appointed and no attempt made
to upset the sitting Episcopalian cleric until 1731. In the
county of Ross only two parishes (Alness and Kiltearn) contained
any substantial number of Presbyterians at the Revolution. In
(2)
Lochcarron, Gairloch, Klntail and Loch Broom it was impossible
to dislodge the Episcopal incumbents until their death. In 1725
a deputation from the Presbyterian Synod of Glenelg asked for the
help of General Wade in "strengthening our hands in the Lord's
work" and no Presbyterian minister had been able to celebrate
(3)
communion in the parish of Snaddie by 1742.
There had already been much Jacobite activity in 1715 among
the Aberdeen Episcopal clergy, thirty-six of whom were deprived
(4)
in 1716. Prom the same area there were large scale transporta-
(5)
tions, to the Barbadoes, of both clergy and laity in 1746. The
Episcopal Church as a body, however, did not make avowals of
(1) Thomas Stephen op.cit. Vol.IV, p.323.
(2) M.E.M. Donaldson, op.cit. p.300.
(3) ibid. p.301.




Jacobitism in 1745, as openly as had been done in 1715 when,
for instance, the Old Pretender had received an "Episcopal
coronation at Perth# For this reason the importance of the
part played by this Church has often been underestimated. Though
there was no open declaration of Jacobitism by the Episcopal
hierarchy, the last speech of Robert Lyon - one of the two
Episcopal clergymen who marched with the Jacobites, makes his
reasons for Joining the Rebellion quite clear# He did so be¬
cause he believed its support was In the best interest of his
church "as the best way of relieving it from its long perse-
(2)
cution". But Lyon*a Jacobite adherence shows the complexity
of motives for such action. Since Ma1 1740 there had been a
schism within the Episcopalian congregation at Perth, a rival
congregation to Robert Lyon's existing from that date. Lyon's
congregation was reported to General Hawley as "a noted nursery
(3)
of Jacobltism and rebellion", but it is possible that the
difficulties Lyon encountered in his work at Perth from 1740
affected his decision to Join the rebel army, in much the same
way as the Pilgrims - malcontents amongst the Catholic priest¬
hood in Sootland, also turned to Jacobitism#
The strength of ths Episcopal priesthood in 1745,is
difficult to assess. No detailed lists of priests have survived
among the archives of the Scottish Episcopal Church in Edinburgh.
However, three separate lists purport to give the number of
(1) For this reason government retaliatory Acts of 1746, and 1748
had to be based on their religious rather than their
political activities.
(2) J.P. Lawson, op.cit. p.517 et seq. p.288 et seq.
Forbes "Lyon in Mourning" p.10, et seq.
(3) "Episcopal History of Perth" G.T.S. Fsrquhar Perth 1894 p,173.
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Episcopal clergy preaching in Scotland in the first deoade of the
(1)
century. The first list dated April 170? gives a total of 116
Episcopal clergy still preaching, with 97 parishes vacant. The
second list, dated April 1708 gives 133 clergy with 79 vacancies,
whilst an analysis of parishes of the same date gives a total of
112 Episcopal clergy, 656 Presbyterian incumbents, and 95 vacancies.
About thirty years later three pastoral Episcopal letters give
somewhat similar figures. Bishop Freebairn, Primus of the Scots
Episcopal Church, refers to 126 clergy, exluslve of Bishops,
preaching in 1734 while Bishop Keith, Episcopal Bishop of Edinburgh,
(2)
refers to 125 clergy preaching in 1743, and Bishop Alexander
(3)
writes of 130 or so clergy.
Thus the Episcopal Church, in the number of its clergy, was in
a much stronger position than was the Roman Catholic Church in
Scotland at the same date. The total number of Catholic priests
operating here in 1742 was 42, while the Episcopal Church had at
least three times that number.
(4)
The enforcement of the Abjuration Act of 1719 had been
relaxed since there was no longer immediate danger of a Jacobite
invasion. This, coupled with the issue in 1743 of new canons
for the first time since 1636, seemed to indicate that the Episcopal
(1) "Account of Episcopal Clergy still preaching in their parishes
1708" reprinted in Appendix II. J.P.Laweon "History of Scots
Episcopal Church" Edinburgh 1843. p.515, 516.
(2) Two letters quoted p.32 George Grubb.*"An Ecclesiastical History
of Sootland". Edinburgh - Edmonston and Douglas 1861,
(3) Unaddressed letter, 14th August 1746, of Bishop Alexander, amongst
papers of Episcopal Church, Training College of the Diocese,
Edinburgh.
(4) This had required any Episcopal clergyman officiating to a
congregation of nine or more to pray for the Hanoverian family
and to take the oaths of Allegiance and Abjuration.
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Church in 1745 was about to enter a period of renewed strength.
This new stability may be compared with the more stable position
similarly reached by the Roman Catholic Church in Scotland on
the eye of the *45.
Butt this stability was to be shattered by the Episcopalian
association with Jaoobttism, which dates from the flight of
James Til or II. From that time onwards the Scottish Episcopate
had been anxious to do nothing which would interfere with the
prerogatives of the exiled icing, or of his son the Old Pretender.
While the Catholic hierarchy attempted to minimise the connection
between their church and the exiled Rouse, the Episcopal hierarchy
did just the opposite. Because of the absence of one whom they
considered the rightful king there had been no attempt until 1705
to fill vacancies in the Episcopate, caused by death. By that
year, however, with the survival of only five bishops, the
Episcopal succession faced the possibility of extinction, unless
steps were taken to fill the vacancies, In 1743 the bishops, in
f
issuing the Canons of that year, were very reluctant to abrogate
to themselves any functions which they considered rightly be¬
longed to the Old Pretender, An agent of the Old Pretender had
attended meetings of the Episcopal College in 1722 and 1724, as
the representative of the rightful Head of the Churoh, and only
(1)
five Scots Episcopal clergy were willing to qualify, in 1746,
by taking the Abjuration oaths laid down by the new Act of that
year. Though there were only two Scottish Episcopal clergy In
arms with Charles, the government belief in the association
between Scottish Episcopacy and Jaeobltlsm is shown by the
(1) See p.143 following.
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wholesale destruction by Cumberland of all Episcopalian chapels
on his march from the Tay to Speyside.
It has already been stated that the Episcopal Church as a
body did not make any avowals of Jacobitism as openly as they had
(1)
done In 1715, and that only two of their clergy accompanied the
Jacobite army as chaplains. From this it might appear that the
Jacobite associations of the Episcopal Church were less strong in
1745. Several important factors, however, suggest a very different
picture.
The first of these factors is the number of prominent Jaco¬
bites who were Episcopalians. These included Lord Eleho, Lord
Ogilvle, and his father Lord Airlle, Lord Nairn, Lord Balmerino,
Lord Pltsligo, Robertson of Strowan, Murray of Broughton, the
Ollphants of Cask, the family of the Earl Marischal, Stewart of
Invernahyle, Hay of Rannos, Stewart of Kynaehan, Drummond of
(2)
Logle - Almond and Graham of Balgowan.
Lord George Murray's children were all baptised at Tulllbar-
(3)
dine by the Episcopal cleric William Ersklne. Sir Stewart
(4)
Thriepland joined the Jacobite army on September 15th 1745, and
his parents had been secretly married by the Episcopal priest at
(5)
Perth and Sir Alexander Macdonald of Sleat, and his wife (later
instrumental in the hiding of Prince Charles Edward in Skye), were
(1) For this reason the government retaliatory Acts of 1746 and
1748 had to be based on religious, rather than political
activities of the Church.
(2) See J.P. Lawson op.clt."Jacobite Lords of Gask". Kingston
Oliphant, "Forfeited Estates Papers", M.E.M. Donaldson.
"Scotland's suppressed History".
(3) On March 26th, 1734, May 9th, 1735, and Aug. 23rd 1741, see
Register of Baptisms in parish of Muthill. Transcribed by
A.W, Hallen. Idln. 1887. Episcopal College Library.
4) Elcho, p.254.
5) G.T.S. Farquhar. "Episcopal History of Perth",1894 p.50 et seq.
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married and their son was baptised by an Episcopal cleric in
(1)
Edinburgh. Among letters written to Bishop Alexander and pre¬
served in the Theological College of the Diocese in Edinburgh,
(2) (3)
Mercer of Aldie and Murray of Taymount are referred to as
Episcopalians. Robertson of Fascally, who also served in the
(4)
Atholl Brigade, was an Episcopalian. There was too, tradition-
(5)
ally, a strong Episcopalian element among the Glencoe Macdonalds,
(6)
and probably the majority of the Appin Stewarts were Episcopalian,
(7)
as were many of Lochlel's Camerons.
The second factor to be remembered is the sudden closure of
Episcopalian correspondence from August 1745 onwards. The archives
of the Scottish Episcopl Church are preserved at the Episcopal
Theological College in Edinburgh and from August 1745 the voluminous
diocesan correspondence virtually comes to an end. For instance,
from August to December 1745, only eight letters written to Bishop
Alexander remain. Up to that date a very large number of such
letters survive. Two of these eight letters refer to Jacobitlsm.
The first is from Robert Lyon, the Perthshire Episcopal cleric,
(1) Mary Ingram, "Jacobite Stronghold of the Church". Edin. R. Grant
& Son. 1907. p.37.
(8) Letter of W, Abemethie of Logie Almond. 88.1.1745.
(3) Letter of W, Abernethle of Logie Almond. 10.4,1745.
(4) In 1728 he signed the letter offering the Episcopal charge of
Kilmavoenlg to Walter Stewart. Farquhar, op.cit. p.197.
(5) M.E.M. Donaldson. Scotland's Suppressed History, p.874, London,
John Murray, 1935. ibid. p.874.
(6) The Episcopal priest in Appin was a "non-jurant of the highest
kind" and "the people of Ardnamurchan and the Stewarts of
Appin ... Idolise the Non-juring clergy and can hardly keep
their temper when speaking of Presbyterians", James Browne,
"History of the Highlands". A. Fullarton & Co, Edin.
(7)' See Cunningham. "The Loyal Clans", p.428.
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executed for his Jacobite activities in 1746 at Carlisle, He
ends his letter to his Bishop with "now this affair has altered
all other measures, and D, Cameron (the other Episcopal cleric
(1)
with the rebel army) and I follow usy congregations". The
second letter, written in September 1745 by Bishop Keith of
Edinburgh, refers to the close political links between the
Episcopal Church and the exiled Stuart who was, to that Church,
its legitimate head, entitled to consultation before episcopal
(2)
appointments were made. Bishop Keith writes "D» entertains
scruples whether we should proceed in the election of a bishop,
now that a certain person is in the country, I had returned answer
that the delaying of consecration might be sufficient to take off
(3)
that scruple."
A further Indication of the effects of the Rising on the
daily life of the Church is seen in the very full Register of
Baptisms of the parish of Muthill, Perth, for this ceases en¬
tirely on December 23, 1745, and is not resumed until October 9,
(4)
1749. This interruption of such routine correspondence is not
characteristic of the Roman Catholic Church at the same period.
Catholic correspondence, concerned almost entirely with theological
(5)
matters continues much as usual from 1745 to 1750,
(1) Written from Dunblane, 12th Sept, 1745, among papers of Scots
Episcopal College,
(2) D, is possibly Bishop William Dunbar of Moray and Ross,
(3) Letter dated Edinburgh 17th Oct, 1745, Scots Episcopal College
Papers,
(4) Register of Baptisms in the Parish of Muthill transcribed by
A.W.C, Hallen, privately printed in Edinburgh 1887 (in the
Library at Scots Episcopal College),
(5) Numerous instances, and plentiful evidence for this is found in the
Catholic Archives. Columba House. Though no letters have been
preserved of the Roman Catholic Bishop Gordon after June 1745,
this is almost certainly due to his failing health, since he
died aged eighty-one in February, 1746,
146 •
Th© third factor to be noted is the strength of Episcopacy
in those areas where large Jacobite enlistment occurred * Two
points should be borne in mind# First, that it is easy to play
tricks with statistics, and secondly that completely accurate
figures for either Episcopal congregations or for Jacobite
enlistment are impossible to obtain# But such figures as are
available do suggest the conclusion that where Episcopacy was
strongest, Jacobite recruitment found a very strong response.
It has often been said that the *45 was in one aspect a Roman
Catholic Movement. It could be said with equal, if not greater
truth, that it was an Episcopalian Movement#
Among the records of the Episcopal Church of the mid-
eighteenth century, there are no detailed figures for either
clergy or congregations# But an anonymously compiled list of
clergy still ministering in their parishes^ and of vacant
parishes is in existence, compiled in 1708 and these are the
numbers given#
Episcopal Presbyterian
Synod. Clergy" Vacancies Clergy
Aberdeen 38 9 57
Angus & Mearns 21 14 50
Moray 19 16 26
Ross 14 8 8
Perth & Stirling 12 5 63
Caithness 5 3 13
Fife 4 5 64
Merse & Teviotdale 37 61
Lothian & Tweedale 3 9 105
Argyll 35 41
tl) Reprinted in J.P.Lawson op.clt. Appendix II. p.515, 516#
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This gives a total of 118 Episcopal clergy, somewhat less than
(1)
the figure of about 130 given by Bishop Alexander in 1746, It
should also be remembered that vacancy of a parish was often the
result of a continued refusal by the congregation to accept a
non-Episcopal cleric. These figures almost certainly underestimate
Episcopacy as all vacant parishes are treated as non-Episcopal.
Statistics of Jacobite recruitment are even more open to
dispute. The accuracy with which such figures can be established
(2)
is discussed elsewhere. Two sets of figures are used here. First
the list of named suspected persons, complied by officers of each
Excise district for government use and printed by the Scottish
History Society, with the title "List of Persons concerned in the
(3)
Reoent Rebellion. This gives a total of 2379 but omits Inverness,
and the Western Isles, and only includes those known to the
government to have been under aims.
The second set of figures are those arrived at above in the
Introduction, from examination of all available material. They
give a maximum recruited (but not necessarily all under arms at
the same time) of 12,280 and a minimum of 10,650, These were
(1) The ab$ve figures would give a percentage of Episcopal clergy
to tfie total clergy in each synod as follows;
Synod of Ross 46$
w H Aberdeen 36$
" w Moray 31$
w n Angus & Mearns 24$
" w Caithness 23$
w " Argyll 16$
" " Perth & Stirling 15£
« " Merse & Teviotdale 4$
* n Lothian & Tweedale 2$
(2) See the Introduction,
(3) Referred to here as Rosebery,
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recruited geographically as follows:-
Area. Roseberyfs figures Figures in Introduction.
Minimum. Maximum.
Ross and
Cromarty 4,1$ 3,0$ 3,0$
Moray 15$ From Moray and E. Inverness.
10$ 11$
Aberdeen 21,4$ 17$ 24$
Angus & Dundee 32,7$ 7$ 8$
Perth & Stirling 6,3$ 17$ 20$
Argyll 4,4$ Including Isles &, W.Inverness.
30$ 32$
According to Rosebery's calculations, Ross & Cromarty, Moray,
Aberdeen, Dundee, Angus and Perthshire provided 79,5$ of the
Jacobite force, the same areas on my calculations provided a
minimum of 65,5$ and a maximum of 72.8$. Of these areas, only the
Gordon corner of Inverness and Banff, a small pocket round Braemar,
could be described as Catholic,
On these figures, therefore, a proportion of the total force,
varying between 65,5$ and 79.5$ was recruited from districts with
strong, important and long standing Episcopal associations. This
should be compared with a proportion varying between 39,6$ and 40$
from the important Roman Catholic areas of Argyll, the Western
Isles and West Inverness. These figures, together with the strong
Episcopal connections of so many leaders of the rebels, and the
deference paid to the exiled House of Stuart by the Scots Episcopal
Hlerarol^r - all emphasise the clear connection between Episcopacy
and Jacobitism. There seems a far stronger link here, than the one
usually assumed between Jacobitism and the Roman Catholic faith.
The correspondence of the Episcopal Church suggests an official
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attitude of sympathy with, or approval of, the Jacobite rebellion.
There is no official censure for the clergy involved in the
Rising, nor any attempt to disassociate the hierarchy or the
Church from its connection with the exiled court. On the other
hand there is no official Roman Catholic approval for the aims
of the rebellion, but instead condemnation by the Catholic
hierarchy of priests meddling in Jacobitism and neglecting their
pvMcT'.tiy duties. The Catholic Bishop Gordon strove always to
disassociate his Church from the exiled court, and to resist inter¬
ference from the Pretender, and this is in sharp contrast to the
attitude of the Episcopal hierarchy, as clergy like Robert Lyon
were well aware.
To the Episcopal Church a successful Jacobite rebellion
offered the best hope of ending the persecution and disabilities
which that church had suffered in Scotland since the flight of
James Til and II, To the Roman Catholic Church, as has been shown
in Chapter 5, a successful Stuart restoration would not necessarily
provide relief from disabilities. In these two facts lies the




THE FINANCIAL KSSOURCSS OF THE JACOBITE ARMY*
Ths financial resources available to the Jacobite army were
both numerous and varied, although not necessarily in themselves
extensive. In order to give as full as possible a picture of
these resources, resources in kind, such as arms, food or quar¬
ters, as well as monetary sources, are her© considered,
xhese resources may be divided into six major categories.
In the first are foreign resources, which consisted largely of
money and arms provided by Franc® and Spain. The second category
consists of money grants from supporters, largely from Scottish
Jacobites. The third source consists of the money grants levied
from various large towns, especially Glasgow and Aberdeen, which
were extorted by the use, or threat, of military force. Next
come the levy and collection of public monies, such as excise,
cess or crown rents, from areas under Jacobite occupation.
Fifthly com® the various extortions in kind, the seizure of meal,
horses, bread, plaids and other necessities, again from areas
under military occupation. Lastly, there is a miscellaneous
group of minor resources, such as the attempted collection by
Tullibsrdine of Atholl rents, the plunder and loot after battle,
or the official seizure of government baggage and stores after,
for instance, Prestonpans, Probably the largest single source of
money in this category v*as the levy, in lieu of military service,
imposed on parts of Angus and Aberdeenshire, a form of scutage,
in fact, made possible only by military occupation of these areas
by Jacobite forces.
There is a dangerous tendency, however, to overestimate the
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part played by financial factors in determining the success or
failure of the Jacobite enterprise. Since most of Its sources
of money depended upon either success in the field, or the
possession of superior military force to extort contributions,
the Jacobite army was in its best financial position from early
September 1745 until February 1746. During this period the
victories of Prestonpans and Falkirk and the opportunity to over¬
awe 3&JLaburgh, Glasgov/, Dundee, Perth, Aberdeen and the surrounding
areas, with considerable military force, facilitated the extortion
of money and supplies, and ensured a certain amount of foreign
help. In both the earlier and the last stages of the campaign,
however, the position was less favourable. Without a considerable
body of men, forced levies could not be extorted, and little foreign
help expected. Moreover, the extreme west, where the rising had its
beginnings, and the Inverness area where it ended, were not natu¬
rally fertile, and had suffered a series of bad harvests. Little
in the way of meal was therefore available for the army, and there
were no large towns from which to extort contributions, nor, in
the early stages, was there the military force available to do so.
The result was that Charles arrived in Perth on September 4th, 1745
with, according to legend, only one guinea with which to defray
expenses, and regular pay of the army had not begun until August
(1)
28th, At the end of the campaign, with a military treasury again
virtually exhausted, part, at least, of the Jacobite army had
(1) See Werrand. "More Culloden Papers" Vol, IV. p.43. letter of
Duncan Grant, Aug, 28th, 1745.
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(1)
been unpaid since February 16th or even earlier. The army's
food supplies were also exhausted before Culloden, for the same
reasons.
Financial factors did not, however, effect as directly the
fortunes of the Jacobite army as might be expected. The army was
at its most successful during the period when it was best finan¬
ced, but it was well financed because it was successful rather than
successful because it was well financed. Correspondingly, its lack
of success after February 1746 was not solely or even largely the
result of lack of money. Lack of money did not necessarily mean
immediate military disaster. The successful seizure of Inverness,
Cromartie's expedition in pursuit of Loudoun, and the successful
siege of Fort Augustus all took place after the army pay had ap¬
parently come to an end, and among the factors which brought about
the Jacobite defeat at Culloden lack of money played only a small
part. This should be borne in mind, for it would be unwise to
overestimate the importance of financial factors.
Bearing in mind, therefore, that the better financial position
of the amy between September 1745 and early February 1746 was the
result and not the cause, of its military successes,the way In
Which this improved financial position was reached should now be
examined.
Aid from abroad composes the first section of Jacobite
resources. This foreign aid consisted, firstly, of those stores
(1) There was a proposal to pay some men up to March 10th or
even later, see below, but Lord George Murray in his "Marches
of the Highland Army" states that the men had received no pay
for a month before the battle of Culloden - "Marches of
Highland Army", Memoir of the Rebellion, p.110 while John
Cameron, a Presbyterian clergyman from Fort William asserts
in his Journal ("Lyon in Mourning" p.84) that no pay had been
received since the army (Lord George's column, presumably)
left Tay Bridge, which was on February 4th 1746.
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and money which Charles brought with him on board th® "Du Teillay"-
naaely 4,000 Louis d*or 1,000 guns, and 1,800 broad swords.
Einloehmo1dart was sent with this French money to get it changed
(2)
soon after landing. He had arrived to visit Charles on board
the "Du Teillay " et Lochnanaemb on July 25th or £6th and left
again to change the money and to carry letters to Murray of
(3)
Broughton, Lochlel and the Duke of Perth. The arms remained
on br.:>;*d the "Du Teilley" until July 29th, when they were unloaded
at night about a mile from Kinlochmoidart *s house for transport
(4)
through Lcchshial to Glonfinnan, The money was largely spent on
army pay, which began on August 28th, and the provision of food
for the srmy. Until August 28th payment of the troops had been in
(5)
kind, but no bread could be procured until the arrival at Blair
Atholl on August 30th when it was procured and probably paid for.
Certainly there are no references among the Atholl papers to com¬
plaints from Atholl tenants that they were not paid for supplies
provided for the Jacobite army while it was encamped at Blair,
and it was always Charles* Intention "that the country should
(6)
suffer as little as possible by the march of my troops". Among
the Atholl Estate papers the payment of money to the Jacobite army,
forced service in the army or destruction of crops by the army
occur as quite frequent excuses for later non-payment of rent by
(7)
Atholl tenants so the presumption is that any large scale extortion
1} Hcho p.238.
2) ibid, p.55 note 5 and also Murray of Broughton, "Memorials" p.159.
(3) Murray of Broughton, p.155.
(4) 0*3ullivan, p.59.
(5) Largely in the form of freshly killed beef - see below Chapt.8
P»182.
(6) Ms. Instructions signed C.P.R., from Charles for the march to
England, undated, among Miscall»Mss, Fort '''illiam. 'Vest
Highland Museum.
(7) See Box 42. p.95 and p.93. Atholl Charter Boom.
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of supplies without payment would also figure as an excuse, if it
had taken place.
The money brought by Charles from France was, however, all
but exhausted on his arrival at Perth on September 4th, 1745, The
next instalment of foreign aid did not arrive until October. In
the meantime Charles had been responsible for sending back to the
Continent deliberately glowing reports of the success of his campaign,
in order to encourage support.
On October 7th or 15th the first French supplies arrived at
Stonehaven, on board the "Crowned Herring", and were followed by a
(1) (2)
second French ship on either October 16th or 17th. Lord Elcho
refers to these French supplies as having arrived in three ships
not two, but Elcho was with the main Jacobite body in Edinburgh
when the ships arrived and is not always entirely aocurate over
events at which he was not present. These French supplies con-
(3)
slsted of six Swedish cannon, twelve smaller guns, 2,500 stands
of arms and between £2,000 and £5,000 sterling.
Further reinforcements arrived from France in February 1746.
These were the detachments of Berwick*s Regiment and of FitzJames
Horse which arrived at Peterhead and Aberdeen on February 21st and
(4)
22nd, They brought with them sufficient money for their own pay
(5)
for some months but a more significant sum from France was sent
but never reached Jacobite hands. This was the money being brought
(1) Atholl Correspondence, The letters of Oct, 15th and 17th from
Tullibsrdine give the 15th and 17th as the arrival dates of
the 2 ships, but Lord Elcho, p.294 gives Oct. 7th as the date
of the arrival of the first ship and the Chevaliar Johnstone
puts the arrival of both ships as Oct. 11th,
(2) Elcho, p.295.
(3; ibid. p.295. and also Colville*s letter of Oct. 17th to
Tullibardine referred to above.
(4) H. 3s A. Tayler. "Jacobite Letters to Lord Pitsligo". p.77 3s 78,
(5) 0*Sullivan, p.146,
155,
by the "Hazard" Sloop, a former government vessel which had
been taken in Montrose in November. This had been sent to
France to bring back money and stores. The "Hazard", however,
(1)
ran aground at Tongue and the cargo was seized by Lord Rea,
Apart from stores and 120 men, it carried 100,000 French crowns
(2)
or between £12,000 and £13,000 sterling on board. It was the
attempt to recover this money that led to Lord Cromartie^ capture
at Dunrobln Castle on April 15th,
There is a possibility that there was a further consignment
of foreign supplies between the October landings at Stonehaven and
the February ones at Peterhead and Aberdeen, Lord George Murray
(3)
in his "Marches of the Highland Army" refers to "a vast many
carriages of arms and military stores (that) had come in a
Spanish ship to Peterhead", These, he states, were on their way
to Join the Jacobite force at Falkirk before the retreat further
north and had reached Brechin by February 6th when Lord George
arrived. He then took charge of them and brought them with him
on the retreat north. These stores could not have been the
earlier supplies which had arrived in the previous October. These
had been brought from Stonehaven to Perth, and from there to
Falkirk, reaching Alloa in the charge of Lord MacLeod with the
(4)
Cromartie Regiment by January 15th, Nor could they have been
the later Peterhead supplies, which did not arrive until February
21st, fifteen days later. The arrival of a third ship with
(1) Maxwell of Kirkconnell, p.134.
(2) ibid. p.134.
(3) p.101.
(4)"The Earls of Cromartie, Their Kindred, Country and Correspon¬
dence," Sir William Fraser. Edin. 1876. Cited hereafter as
"Cromartie Correspondence."
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foreign stores is not referred to in any other contemporary
account, but is possibly borne out by Lord llcho*s reference to
(1)
three not two ships with stores arriving during October.
Almost the last money from the continent arrived in late
March at Barra, It consisted of a small sum brought in a Spanish
(2)
ship, and valued according to one source at about £380 sterling(3)
(4)
There was also, apparently, a consignment of coins on board.
Aeneas Macdonald, the banker brother of Kinlochmoidart, was sent
to Barra to fetch this money at the beginning of April, but the
disaster of Culloden and the Prince*s subsequent wanderings meant
that this money was never put to use.
The last foreign financial aid was, of course, the famous
Loch Arkaig treasure, the money brought on board the two French
frigates which arrived in Lochnanuamh on May 3rd. These frigates
would have been able to rescue Charles, had he not already left
the mainland for the Outer Isles. This money, like the Barra
money, never reaohed the hands tor which it was destined. Between
800 and 1,000 louls d*or were seized by the Younger Barrisdale, and
the remainder buried to form the lost Loch Arkaig treasure.
Historians have quite frequently pointed out the paucity of
foreign aid for the rebels, a paucity surprising when we remember
that both France and Spain had certain natural pro-Jacobite
proclivities,that with both countries the Old Pretender had
(1) See abovd Chapter 4.
(2) Donald Macleod of Gualtergill*s Account. "Lyon in Mourning"
Vol.1.p.160,
(3) Aeneas Macdonald valued it at "between 6 and 7 hundred livres
French". See 0*Sullivan p.2.
(4) O'Sullivan In his narrative refers to "Five hundred Spanish
plstalles" which Aeneas Macdonald was ordered to send after
Cullcden "to Badenoch and distribute among the gents who may
want money", ibid. p.171.
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engaged in lengthy and determined diplomatic bargaining since
(1)
1715, and that, lastly, both countries were at war with Britain
and therefore had apparently every motive to try to distract that
country and force her to withdraw her troops from the Continent.
In spite, however, of these seemingly overwhelming arguments in
favour of more active support for the rebels, France and Spain
provided between them less than £17,500 sterling, and about 5,000
(2)
louis d'or, France also provided less than 1,000 troops
approximately 2,500 stands of arms and some eighteen guns. The
reason for this apparent inconsistency is not difficult to find.
For this small expenditure, Britain's enemies had secured the
withdrawal from the Continent of almost all her continental mili¬
tary forces. Nothing any more to their advantage could be achieved,
and the military resources and money of both powers would be far
more advantageously deployed on the continent, by using the op¬
portunity afforded by the absence of British troops. In this case,
therefore, the general conclusion that military success was a
necessaiy preliminary to financial support does not quite apply.
Here, in fact, the considerable success which the Rising enjoyed
in its earlier stages meant that the objects of Britain's enemies
had in fact been achieved already, and that, therefore, no further
expenditure was necessary. Military success, in fact, Instead of
increasing the military expectations of the rebels, actually decreased
(1) See Hilton Jones, p.122 et seq.
(2) These were Lord John Drummond's French Regiment and piquets of
six Irish Regiments and of Brigadier Stapleton's (totalling
about 800 in all) which reached Montrose on Nov. 22nd 1745, and
detachments of Berwick's Regiment and FitzJames* Horse, which
arrived at Peterhead and Aberdeen on February 21st and 22nd 1746.
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thorn in this case.
A second source of financial support for the Jacobite army
cam® in the form of money grants from supporters or sympathisers.
Several attempts had been made by Murray of Broughton to raise
money before the Prince's arrival, but they had not been attended
with much success. In 1741 he had been asked by MacGregor of
Balhaldie to take over the raising of a £1,000 loan at 6# on the
Old Pretender's security, but after raising only £200 the project
was abandoned, because of the evasivness of Lowland Jacobites.
He had also experienced great difficulty in raising money for his
own visit to France in 1743 on behalf of the Jacobite Associators
and had been able to raise little more than a worthless note of
hand for £100 from Lord Lovat, TTaquair, another of the Jacobite
Associators, who had in 1741 written to ask for French help for a
Scottish rising, had tried to raise money from English Jacobites,
but according to Murray of Broughton, though he had been offered
£10,000 by Lord Barrymore, he had done nothing to follow this up.
Murray had, however, apparently secured some provisional promises
of gifts of money, and before leaving Falrntoun, the home of Lord
John Drummond, where Murray learnt the news of Charles* arrival in
Scotland, he wrote to all those who had made promises to have their
money ready. Whether any of this money was in fact produced, Murray
does not tell us.
The two ships, the "Elizabeth" and the "Doutelle" or "Du
(1)
Teillay" were provided for Charles by their owners. The"£Lizabeth"
was owned by Walter Rutledge ~ an Irish merchant of Dunkirk, and
the "Du Teillay" by Antony Walsh, a ship owner of Nantes, Before
(1) The second is the correct spelling. The first is a frequent
contemporary mis-spelling.
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his return to France, early in August 1745, Walsh seized, off
the coast of Skye, three sloops loaded with barley and oatmeal^ ^
which were sent as prizes to Charles at Kinlochmoidart's house.
Even here, however, the cargoes of meal were paid for by Charles,
presumably out of the Louis d*ors he brought from France with him.
The largest single gift or loan of money was, however, that of
Lord Elcho, who provided Charles with 1,500 guineas on Joining him
(8)
in Edinburgh, Elcho later held that this sum was a loan, not a
gift, and his failure to recover it from Charles much embittered
(3)
him later, The Duke of Perth provided between £200 and £300,
and smaller sums in cash were provided by various Perthshire
(4)
gentry and by the Dowager Duchess of Gordon, the mother of
(5J
Lord Lewis Gordon, Gifts In kind were provided by Lady Mackintosh,
the Duchess of Perth and Lady Mary Menzies who each "complimented"
the Prince with supper for himself and his household for one night
(6)
each. Similar accommodation was also provided at Callendar House
on September 14th and at Perth, where Charles stayed from September
4th to 11th, There were also, almost certainly, other and often
smaller gifts in kind as well. Barnes Glbb, in his Household
(7)
accounts, for instance, refers to gifts of table napkins, table
cloths md sheets provided by ladies in and about Edinburgh,
A further and more important, because more lucrative, source
of money was provided by levies on those large towns over which the





(5) "Intercepted Post". Edit, Donald Nicholas.London.The Bodley Head.
1956. p.33/4.
(6) At Moy Hall, Drummond Castle and Castle Weem respectively, see
Household Acoounts of James Gibb, "Lyon in Mourning" Vol.2 p.
115 et seq.
(7) ibid. Vol.2 p.115 et seq.
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only possible from September 1745, until early February 1746, for
during both the early and the late stages of the rising, the Jacobite
army was occupying those sparsely populated North and West areas
where no towns of sufficient wealth existed# Furthermore, it was
only possible to extort such levies from those towns which were
within close enough range of the rebel army to feel military pres¬
sure, while again, however, such methods were only possible when
a sufficiently large military force had first been raised. Here again,
therefore, military success did not depend upon success in raising
money, it was on the contrary a necessary preliminary to that ability
to raise money.
From early September 1745 until February 1746, however, the
necessary prerequisites existed which enabled forced levies by the
Jacobite armies from various large towns. On September 4th the
rebel army entered Perth, and for the first time were in a town
populous and wealthy enough to supply them with money, With a
(1)
military force of about 2,000 the rebels were in a position to
(2)
extort by force and £500 was demanded from Perth as a forced
levy. This money formed the first sum of any substantial size to
be received d'uring the rebellion. The magistrates agreed to pay
the money in return for a promise that nothing further should be
demanded. This money was much needed, for the Prince's funds
(3)
were entirely exhausted on his arrival In Perth, The army were
(1) KLcho puts the force which crossed the Forth 6n Sept ,13th at
2,000 (Elcho p,253). This is supported by Patullo's figure of
2,500 at Prestonpans, by which time the force of Sept,13th
had been augmented by 250 Athollmen, 150 Maclachlans and
about 100 Grants, See above. Chapter 2,
(2) Lord George Murray - Marches of the Highland Army. "Jacobite
Memoirs" p,31,
(3) According to his own account he only had one guinea in his
pocket by Sept, 4th but O'Sullivan (p,67) puts the sum at
ten guineas.
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from now on, howaver, in country whore money was available, if they
had the necessary military force to levy it, A formal demand was
sent to Glasgow on September 13th from leclcie House, on the march
to Edinburgh, It was addressed to the Provost and Magistrates
of Glasgow and asked for a "sum not exceeding 15,000 pounds
sterling and whatever arms can be found in your city". It added
that "all the privileges of your town are in my declaration and
what I have promised I will never depart from,,,,(but) if not
complied with I shall take other measures and you shall bo
(1)
answerable for the consequences", This was followed by a
second latter, again demanding £15,000, but on the 4th October
1745, by promising to jca^ immediately, the magistrates got the
sum reduced to £5,500, Lord Eleho who is not, as noted above,
entirely accurate over figures put the original demand to Glasgow
at £10,000 not £15,000, but confirms the final sum which was
(3)
actually paid.
On the arrival of the rebel army in Edinburgh various demands
could be made on that city. In the cases of both Edinburgh and
Glasgow supplies in kind as well as money were demanded, Glasgow's
levy included, according to Lord Elcho "some merchandise" and
Edinburgh was asked to provide 1,000 tents, 2,000 targets, 6,000
(4)
pairs of shoes and 6,000 canteens, Edinburgh was under Jacobite
(5)
occupation for some six weeks. During this time the size of the
(6)
occupying force increased by approximately 3,000 men, end the
rebels were encouraged by their victory at Prestonpans, Edinburgh




(5) From September 17th until Nov, 1st 1745.
(6) It consisted of about 2,500 men on Sept, 21st, and of approx,
5,500 on the departure south from Edinburgh on Nov, 1st, See
above, Introduction,
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also, was the wealthiest city they had encountered. For all
these reasons they were able to make larger demands on Edinburgh
than on any other occupied town. In addition to this forced levy
in merchandise, the rebels imposed a special tax of half a crown
(1)
in the pound-sterling, of all house rants. All public monies,
ordinarily payable to the government from Edinburgh were collected
by the rebels. These included cess, excise and rents of forfeited
(2) (3)
estates. Forced levies of both horses and corn were also made,
and there was a proposal "to get in all the pleat (plate) we can
and coin shillings, for besides the want of cash in general, there
is a great want of silver", as Lord George Murray wrote to his
(4)
brother Tullibardine on October 2nd 1745,
The longer stay in Edinburgh, of six weeks, also enabled the
sending of parties to levy money in Fife, Hitherto the longest
stay in one plaee had been the week's stay in Perth earlier in the
month, but the six weeks stay in Edinburgh afforded wider oppor¬
tunities of ijioney raising. Military parties were sent through
Fife and Angus to proclaim the Prince's father and to raise money,
(5)
John Scott, merchant of Montrose sent letters to several of the
inhabitants, and to some gentlemen of the county, demanding money
by way of loan for the Pretender's service, and quartered rebel
soldiers on such as refused while James Adsmson, farmer of Glamis
(6)
also extorted money.
In the case of Fife, the military pressure was brought to
bear by parties from Edinburgh, but in the case of Angus it was the
(1) This levy was imposed on October 7th, See Gentleman's Magazine,
Fol,XV, p,556. Historical Chronicle for October,
(2) See above Chapter 4,
(3) See above Chapter 4,




presence of the Jacobite reinforcements collected at Perth under
Lord Strathallan which enabled pressure to be exerted. An unsigned
letter among the Atholl Papers refers to "whole parties in Angus
(which) are distressed by pressing (or forcing men) or, which
they love better, a composition in money which falls heavy on the
(1)
poor tenants".
The same means were used to extort a heavy fine from Dundee,
All householders were ordered to illuminate their window, as a
token rejoioing at the landing of the French aims at Montrose,
and a fine of £20 Scots was taken from those who did not comply,
A forced levy of from £50 to £200 sterling was imposed on all
gentry, and fifteen merchants weie ordered to pay £100 sterling
(2)
each.
Meanwhile the main Jacobite body, which had marched south from
Edinburgh on November 1st, had reached Derby. Here, apart from
again demanding all Excise due locally, they also demanded £100
from the Post Office, and demanded the payment to them of the money
raised by the town of Derby to equip 600 local Hanoverian gentry
(3)
for the town,s defence. Here, however, the fact that the rebels
had passed the peak of their military success was already beginning
to show. Although they were able to secure the subscription money
of between £500 and £600, the sum demanded from the Post Office had
to be commuted to £50 before it was paid.
One further demand was made for money before the rebel army
reached Glasgow, at the end of December 1745, This was for £2,000
from Dumfries, of which again the full sum was not forthcoming,
(1) Atholl Correspondence, p,233,
(2) ibid, p.233, and 234,
(3) "A Plain General and Authentic Account of the Conduct of the
Pebels". Vol, I, p,289. Allardyce Papers,
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(1)
This time a little over half (£1,100) was paid, again a sign
of declining military fortunes. The rebel army occupied Glasgow
in its march north on December 27th, and the magistrates were
ordered to provide 12,000 shirts, and 6,000 bonnets, stockings,
shoes and waistcoats and, as in the case of Dumfries, hostages
(2)
were taken to ensure payment. Meanwhile, however, £1,000 had
been successfully extorted from Aberdeen, because of the presence
in that area of the large Jacobite military force under Lord Lewis
(3)
Gordon and Lord John Drummond. A sum of £1,000 was demanded on
December £6th by William Moir of Lonmay, and in spite of successive
bargaining, the original sum was paid on January 2nd, 1746. Again
the demand was backed up by the threat of military execution, this
(4)
time the burning and pillaging of effects, and again the sum was
only payable because the rebels had in the area sufficient troops
(somewhere in the region of two thousand men) to enforce their
(5).
threat. The size of their military force in Aberdeenshire also
enabled the rebels to collect the cess and excise and similar
public monies from the area. The Aberdeen levy was, however, the
last sums of money the rebels were able tc extort by these methods.
In spite of the rebels* victory at Falkirk, in January 1746, no
attempts seem to have been made to impose a levy on either Falkirk
or Stirling. This may have been partly because of the decline in
morale caused by the frosh desertions from Stirling and perhaps
(1) Gentleman's Magazine, Jan, 1746. Vol,XVI p,20,
(2) Elcho, p.355,
(3) See above, Chapter 3.
(4) Allardyce Papers, New Spalding Club, p.201 et seq.
(5) See above, Chapter 3,
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because of the distraction of the siege of Stirling Castle, or
because of the comparatively sudden decision to retire North from
Stirling on February 1st, Again, no attempt was made to impose a
levy on the town of Inverness, which the rebels entered on
February 18th. Inverness was the next town of any size which the
full rebel force oocupied after the departure from Stirling. On
the retreat north from there the rebel army had divided into two
divisions. The Highland division, marching through Badenoch and
Rothiemurchus marched through a sparsely inhabited area, while
the coastal division, under Lord George Murray, marched through
towns like Dundee, Montrose, and Aberdeen which had already been
forced to contribute what could be extorted. However, when the
two divisions reunited at Inverness, no attempt, beyond searching
the captured Fort George, was made to procure money. ©♦Sullivan
states that Inverness Castle (i.e. Fort George) was found to contain
(1)
no government money when it surrendered on February 21st, but no
attempt was made to impose a levy, however small, on the town, in
spite of the fact that Maxwell of Kirkconnell estimated the Jaco¬
bite force occupying Inverness to number 8,000. Again, declining
military morale may provide part of the reason for this omission.
In the view of Murray of Broughton, there was no money to be had
(2)
in the town. Furthermore, the great scarcity of grain of any
(3)
kind in the area meant, firstly, that most of the energies of such
men as Lord George Murray and Lord Pitsligo were taken up with trying
(1) O'Sullivan, p.134.
(2) A Mackenzie, "The Camerons", p.231. Letter of Murray of Broughton
to Lochiel, of 14th March 1746, in which he urges the necessity
of a general advance to Perth to obtain money, in view of the
lack of money in Inverness,
(3) See below, Chapter 8 p. 187.
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to provide meal rather than in attending to money matters. Secondly,
the shortage of grain meant that there was little point in extorting
money to pay the men, if the necessary food on which to spend the
money was not also available. Further north, however, some attempts
were made by the Ecrl of Cromartie, commanding Jacobite troops north
of the Beauly Firth, to extort such sums. On February 23rd the
Chamberlains of Ferintosh were ordered by him to pay £1,500 sterling,
(1)
on pain of military execution.
Military occupation of large or prosperous areas, however, also
enabled the rebel army to extort the various public monies, payable
to the government. It was largely with this end in view that the
Prince was oareful to appoint officials in areas under occupation
and authorise their Lords Lieutenants to enforce such levies.
The principal public monies which could be extorted by the
rebels were the Excise, Customs Duties and Cess. The levying of
the first two was made possible by two factors, first the possession
of military force and secondly the co-operation of local officials,
whether voluntarily or involuntarily. In Brechin, for instance,
"Adam Hunter, Inspectant in Excise, surveyed the district of Brechin
(2)
for the rebels". John Hogg and James Strachan, extra-ordinary
(3)
TIdesmen of Aberdeen, acted as Tidesmen for the rebels In Aberdeen.
John Murray, former clerk to the collector of Customs at Alloa,
(4)
assisted in the collecting of Excise in Clackmannan, and William
Strachan, former Clerk to the Comptroller of Customs, acted as
(1) More Culloden Papers Vol.V. p.12. Letter of the Earl of
Cromartie to the Chamberlains of Ferintosh.
(2) Albermarle Papers - 3730, Nat. Lib, Scot. p.99.




Collector of both Customs and Excise in Aberdeen. Samuel Douglas,
a former Supervisor of Excise in Forres, collected Excise in Forres,
Thomas Moncrieffe, a former Excise Officer of Perth, did the same
at Perth, as did William Ferguson, the discharged Excise Officer
(2)
of Arbroath, at Arbroath. Excise was collected by the rebels
from Aberdeen, Perth, Keith, Drum, Arbroath, Forres, Elgin,
Dalkeith, Forfar, Edinburgh and Musselburgh, Clackmannan, Kin-
(3)
cardine and Fife and Angus, and probably from all other towns
under military occupation, inoluding Derby. Here a Proclamation was
issued demanding the payment to the rebel army of all local Excise
duty. Though only part of the money due locally was actually paid,
(4)
the rebel army gained a sum of a little over £665 Sterling.
Customs duty was also taken in Aberdeen with the assistance of
(5)
minor Customs officials such as tideamen and landwalters, and
from Edinburgh and Keith where the goods of the Custom House were
(6)
sold by rebel orders. In areas under Jacobite military occupation
the cess could also be collected. This was done in the counties of
(7)
Moray, Nairn, Aberdeen, Banff, Fife, Stirling, Angus and the Mearns.
In Edinburgh it was taken under the authority of John Goodwillie
(8) (9}
W.S. Cess was also collected at Wick and Thurso, and Cess and
Excise were collected in Perthshire by Blair of Glaselune and others
(1) ibid. p.20.
(2) ibid. p.164.
(5) See Rosebery, op.cit, p.2 ot seq. for details of the persons
concerned in the collection of Excise.
(4) See Allardyce Papers, New Spalding Club p.293.
(5) Rosebery, p.8 et seq.
(6) Elcho, p.282.
(7) Rosebery, pages 24, 60, 106, 108, 198, 263.
(8) ibid. p.248.
(9) by Lord Cromartie.
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under the general authority of Lord Strathall an and Lord
Tullibardine.
In general there seems to b© a oontrast between th© personnel
involved in extorting excise and similar duties and those employed
in taking Cess or Levy money. Those employed in the latter task
tended to be of a higher social standing and to have greater
authority than those involved in collecting either Excise or
Customs revenue. Levy money also seems often to be used loosely
as a synonym for Cess, In Banff, it was taken by Sir William
Gordon of Park, in Fochabers by Alexander Gordon, Gentleman, in
Aberdeen, under the authority of William Moir of Lonmay (the
Jacobite Governor of Aberdeen) it was collected by "David Tulloch,
farmer,of Dunbennan. In Old Meldrum it was collected by Charles
Anderson, a local merchant and in Brechin by another local merchant.
It was collected in Coupar by Robert Douglas, gentleman, and in
Crail by Peter Lindsay, also styled as gentleman in the Excise
Officers returns. In Perth it was collected by David Stuart of
Ballshallan, and in the Elgin area by Maedonald of Seotus, and
in Dundee by the Jacobite Deputy Governor cf the town, John
Goodwillie, partly responsible for levying the revenues in Edinburgh,
was also of some social standing. In Caithness and Sutherland the
(1)
"public Burdens" were levied by Lord Cromartie. Among those who
levied Excise and Customs revenues we find craftsmen, such as
Alexander Deveron and Robert Marr, both wrights of Aberdeen, or
those in the lower ranks of the Excise or Customs service, such as
(si
extraordinary tidasmen, landwaiters, and Excise Pupils.
(1) "Marches of Highland Army" p.123.
(2) Such as John Henryson, Excise Pupil of Edinburgh, Henry
Elphinston, discharged landwaiter or John Hogg - extra¬
ordinary tidesman, and others.
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Various minor public monies were also collected by the rebels.
In Haddington. Robert Angus, salt watchman, acted as salt officer
(1)
and with others levied the salt duty for the rebels while in
Brechin, Aberdeen and Edinburgh, the rents of Forfeited Estates
(2}
were collected for the rebels. Crown rents were also taken by
(3)
the rebels in Alness, during March, by Lord Cromartie, for instance.
A further source of wealth for the Jacobite army was In the
form of extortions in kind, These were chiefly of meal, horses,
and fodder, but military quarters were also requisitioned without
payment. Silver plate, plaids, shoes, cattle and bread were also
seized on occasions. A little oatmeal was secretly bought on
(4)
Charles' orders in Fort William but apart from this, and the
barley and oatmeal found on board the three sloops which Captain
Walsh forced to land near Arisaig, the Jacobite army was not able
to secure, either by force or by payment, any meal until their
(5)
arrival at Blair Atholl on August 30th and 31st, This was be¬
cause of local shortages in the areas through which they passed,
O'Sullivan says of the Arisaig area "the poor people had not a
T6)
scrap of meal for about six months before" This scarcity was
common throughout the Highlands, Maxwell of Kirkoonnell and Lord
Lovat refer frequently to the scarcity of meal and previous bad
harvests in the lactam part of Inverness, and Cope found on his
march north in August 1745 that "the country could not afford
subsistence ••• it was absolutely necessary to carry a stock of
(7)
bread along with us".
(1) Rosebery, p,32,
(£) ibid. p.86, by Thomas Arbuthnot, Merchant of Peterhead,
(3) "More Cull. Papers", Vol.V. p,25. Letter of James Fraser,




(7) "Gentleman*s Magazine, VolxV_p,518. October 1746. Letter from ano-p^cer in t.hsof sii* .Toftw r™.
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The only areas from which meal could be secured were the south
of Cromarty, Moray and the Strathspey areas and, in the early stages
of the campaign, the government garrisons at Fort Augustus and
Inverness could prevent the transit of meal, while the presence of
Cope's army on its march northwards prevented the people of the
Strathspey area from committing themselves by supplying the rebels.
The army therefore subsisted almost entirely, according to Murray
of Broughton, on beef freshly slaughtered from local cattle, and
roasted on the open heath. Cope on his march north had also
been dependent to a large extent on freshly slaughtered cattle,
(2)
from a herd which was driven to accompany his force.
From the arrival at Blair Atholl until the siege of Stirling
in January 1746 all provisions supplied to the army were apparently
paid for, however, and therfore fall outside the scope of this
section, Charles* proclamation from Edinburgh to his friends in
England referred to on page '53 above asks that "the country may
suffer as little as possible from the march of my troops". Lord
Goerge Murray's memoirs imply that the thirty-five bolls of meal
ordered in Perth, in September 1745, were paid for, as were the
(3)
bread, beer and cheese supplied by Stirling in the same month.
By January 1746, however, this admirable honesty over payment
had broken down. There are suggestions that during the siege of
Stirling in January 1746 Charles was forced to authorise the
sending out of parties to seize what corn and meal they could
(1) Murray of Broughton, p.6. At Garvemore, for instance the Prince
"ordered some cattle to be killed for the men", ibid. p.178.
(2) Gentleman's Magazine, Vol,XV p.518. October 1745. quoting a
letter from an Officer of Cope's army written Sept, 27th 1745.
(3) Lord George's "Marches of the Highland Army" p.30 et seq. for
further details of oommlssariat arrangements.
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(1)
find. By the time the array arrived north again, in the Inverness
area, in February 1746, all pretence of taking provisions only in
return for payment was abandoned. On February 24th Murray of
Broughton wrote to Lord Pitsligo, who was in charge of the col¬
lecting of grain and meal to the east of Inverness, instructing
him to give receipts for all meal collected, but not to hand over
(2)
any money in payment for it. Lord Pitsligo, In obeying these
instructions, pointed out that the want of payment for meal
seized would make even more difficult the collection of it in
(3)
the future.
Such meal as Pitsligo, using Elgin as his headquarters,
was able to commandeer, came largely from three sources. Some
was seized from local granaries, such as those belonging to
(4)
Lord Braco, Lord Hchies and the Duke of Gordon, though here
the amount of meal found was usually disappointingly small,
because of the previous bad harvest. Lord John Drummond's
A.D.C, wrote, for Instance, on February 25th, to say that the
(5)
granaries of Lord Braco contained little or no meal. Secondly,
wheat, oats and barley were accepted In lieu of payment of levy
(6)
money. Here the payment of levy, whether in cash or kind, was
Imposed by the threat of quartering troops on those who refused.
Thirdly, meal was extorted by threats of military force, from any
(7)
who were believed to possess it. Similar threats were used to
(1) See "Ascanius or the Young Adventurer" published anon, London
John Johnson 1746 p.59.
(2) "Jacobite letters to Lord Pitsligo". p.73.
(3) ibid. p.76. Letter of Pitsligo to Murray Feb,26th 1746.
(4) See above Chapter 3 p. 85 et seq.
(5) "Jacobite letters to Lord Pitsligo". p.96/7.
(6) ibid. p.102 & 103, Letter of John Goodwillle of Mar, 27th to
Capt. Ramsay.
(7) See letter of Lord John Drummond from Elgin to Lord Pitslj
March 26th 1746: ibid, p.98, 99.
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try to extort meal from Inverness on the eve of the battle of
Oulloden. Charles, on the morning of April 16th, ordered the
Colonel of each regiment to send officers Into Inverness to try
to buy meal with any money they possessed and to force the in¬
habitants, by threats of burning the town, to send meal and
provisions to the rebel army on Culloden moor. These details
are from the Journal of John Cameron, reprinted in the "Lyon
(1)
in Mourning" •
While Pitsligo had been collecting meal and corn to the East
of Inverness, Lord Cromartie, with headquarters at Dingwall, had
been doing the same in Ross and the areas to the North of Inverness,
(2)
again by the use of military parties.
While the rebel army was occupying the Inverness area from
February 1746 onwards military force, or the threat of it was also
used to extort sheep for the feeding of the army, oats and straw
for what was left of the Jacobite horse, and horses for the use of
the army. Amongst the Culloden Papers In the National Library of
Scotland are miscellaneous accounts of food and other valuables
(3)
extorted by the rebels. These lists refer to goods seized from
ten farms in the immediate neighbourhood of Culloden House, during
March and April 1746. They show that in this neighbourhood alone
the rebels seized meal to the value of £7.18.ljd., sterling, and
food to the value of £2.13.10j^d. The rebels, between March 4th
1746 and April 15th, seized fodder to the value of £6.10,Id., sheep
(1) Ibid.,Vol. 1. p.85.
(2) "Cromartie Correspondence", Vol.2 p.199. letter of Sir
Thomas Sheridan of March 3, 1746 to Cromartie.
(3) National Library of Scotland. Culloden Papers 2969.
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and lambs to the value of 14/6d,, and commandeered horses to
the value of £4#2*10d. Only In one case - a mare worth £1,10,0.,
was the horse retained by the rebels. In the other cases the
horses (19 in all) were returned after they had been used for
various purposes,
Earlier, while in Edinburgh, horses were also commandeered for
the use of the rebel army, Ysrious proclamations were issued from
Edinburgh ordering the surrender of horses to the rebel amy,
(1)
largely to be used to draw wagons. The reports to Collectors of
Excise of Persons concerned in rebel activity give frequent re-
(2)
ferences to persons active in seizing horses in or near Edinburgh^
Horses were also seized In Perthshire, and various letters among
(3)
the Atholl Papers, both published and unpublished refer to the
seizure of horses in that co^aty and request Tullibardine's inter-
(4)
cession for their return. Horses were also seized in Brechin
and also, presumably, from most other areas under Jacobite occupa¬
tion, In spite of such efforts, however, the army was always
desperately deficient in horses, both for transport of baggage and
as cavalry. The Highlander was not a horseman by nature or custom,
nor was fodder for horses ever easy to procure, and it was the lack
of horses for transport which accounted largely for Lord George
Murray's difficulties in transporting the cannon and heavy baggage
north over Shap after the retreat from Derby, It also accounted for
his difficulties in transporting heavy baggage north from Stirling
to Inverness by the coast route. In the last stages of the campaign,
(1) See Gentleman's Magazine, Yol.XY p,556 October 1746,
(2) For instance Sir David Murray of Leith and '"illlam Bain, Inn¬
keeper of Fountainbridge.
(3) In the Charter Room, Blair Castle,
(4) By David Ferier, Merchant of the town, for instance,
Rosebery, p.164,
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while Cumberland was advancing from Aberdeen, Jacobite movement
and intelligence was also hampered by the absence of horses.
Various other gifts in kind were also extorted by the rebel
army. In Edinburgh, as shown earlier, shoss, tents, targets and
canteens were extorted. Glasgow also had to provide merchandise,
and Lord George Murray wrote to his brother, Tullibardine, of a
nroposal to collect silver or plate in Edinburgh for use in
(1)
coining. The Erasers were empowered by Simon Eraser, Lovat's
son and their commanding officer, to "uplift plaids, arms and all
(2)
kinds of necessarys for your company".
Lastly, quarters were also commandeered and, in the last
stages at least, unpaid for. The accounts of money and goods
(3)
extorted by the Jacobites from the Culloden area alone refer
several times to meal to be provided "when the camp was about my
(4)
house" and twice to sums expended on the maintenance of servants
attached to the rebel army. Quartering, or the threat of It, was
also used to enforce payment of both cess and levy money, especially
In the Inverness and Aberdeen areas, during their Jacobite occupa¬
tions of February to April 1746 and November to December 1745
(5)
respectively. It was also used by Lord Cromartie in enforcing
payment of the cess in Sutherland.
Various other minor sources of money remain to be considered.
In this miscellaneous group of sources of revenue comes first the
seizure after a Jacobite military victory, of enemy stores or money.
(1) Atholl Correspondence. Letter of 2nd October 1745. p.48,
(2) Fort William Mss. West Highland Museum.
(3) See above p. 172.
{4) The Accounts of Thomas Clark, farmer in Culloden, National
Library of Scotland, Cull. Papers 2969.
(5) See above Chapter 3,
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Very early In the campaign, on August 28th 1745, one of the
motives for the attack on Kuthven barracks by Camerons under
Dr. Archibald Cameron was the hope of securing the quantity of
(1)
meal that might be stored there# After Prestonpans, General
(2)
Cope*3 military chest, to the value of about £2,500 sterling
fell into rebel hands#
After the battle of Falkirk on February 17th 1746 the rebel
army were able to occupy General Hawley*s Camp at Falkirk and
gained a considerable amount of his baggage# According to
(3)
0*Sullivan the enemy "abandoned likewise their Camp and baggage,
a great quantity of the officers equipage was found in the Town,
a great many hampers of good wines and liquors and other provisions
were found in the Town"# The rebels did not, however, have similar
good fortune when they entered Fort George. At Inverness on February
£0th, according to 0,Sullivan, "we found no money but a good quantity
of Gunes and ammunition; a great quantity for such a garrisson, of
meal, salt beef, chess, bear wine, tea, but there was a very ill
acct# given of it for the most of it was plundered, not withstanding
(4)
all the precautions yt could b© taken"#
Another, and more profitable, souoe of money was from the levy
of a kind of scutage, or money payment in lieu of service. This was
levied chiefly from tops, Perthshire, Aberdeenshire and its
neighbouring counties. In Perthshire such levies were under the
authority of Tullibardine and were taken almost entirely from Atholl
tenants, while in the Aberdeenshire areas they were taken under
(1) Murray of Broughton p.184#
(2) History of Scotland. John Hill Burton William Blackwood and
London 1897# Vol.VIII p.457.
(3)0*Sullivan p,119.
(4) ibid. p.134.
(5) See Chapter 4, 2 and 3. infra, for further details of these
levies.
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the supervision of Lord Lewis Gordon, Jacobite LordxLieutenants
of the County. In Angus under the authority of Lord Ogilvy and
David Fotheringham, rebel governor of Dundee, extortion of money
in lieu of service commonly took place, often by officers and
(1)
sergeants of the Ogilvy Regiment, An anonymous letter among
the Atholl Papers ends by stating "The whole parishes in Angus
are distressed by pressing (or forcing men) or, which they love
better, a composition in money that falls heavy on the poor
(2)
tenants". In the county of Aberdeen Lord Lewis Gordon, in
his capacity as Lord Lieutenant ordered, on December 12th, the
delivery to James Moir of Stoneywood by December 18th of one
armed man per £100 of valued rent, or the payment of £5 sterling
(3)
in lieu of each man.
Similar attempts to raise money in lieu of men were made in
Perthshire from Atholl tenants. Further details of such attempts
and of their military significance are given in Chapter 2. These
attempts were made by officers of the Atholl Brigade on the
authority of the Marquis of Tullibardine, Commander in Chief North
of the Forth, Probably, however, little money was actually gathered
in by such means in Perthshire. A letter from the officer in
command of the party trying to raise money in the Glenalmond area
reported to Tullibardine on February 1st, 1746, "They have not
been able to raise a farthing", while Blair of Glasclune was able
(1) David Fenton, farmer of Angus and a Lieutenant of Ogilvy's,
for instance, "extorted money from the county to raise men
for the rebels" Rosebery p.211. This was also done by
Patrick Grant, Thomas Ogilvy, John Ogilvy and others,
ibid, pp.214, 226, 228.
(2) "Atholl Correspondence". Appendix p.233.
(3) New Spalding Club - Allardyce Papers Vol. 1. p.207. Minutes of
Meeting of Inhabitants of the Burgh of Aberdeen,
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to raise only £4 sterling and twelve oxen at the end of January
(1)
1746. The smallness of the amount raised was due heie^ as in
the rest of the area, to lack of men to act as military parties,
as Blair pointed out. He himself had only thirty men on this
occasion.
Another expected source of revenue in the Atholl area did not
materialise at all. Tfallibardine, before going south from Blair
Atholl in late October 1745, left behind factors authorised to
collect the Athell rents on behalf of the Jacobite army. Apparently
he hoped these rents would produce between £600 and £700, but on
January 19th, 1746, Colville, Tulllbardine's Secretary, reported to
Murray of Broughton that during Tullibardine's absence with the
(2)
main Jacobite army, no rents at all had been paid.
This exhausts the channels for money raising open to the
rebel army. By these methods, end especially because he was able
to levy the public monies in the areas under Jacobite occupation,
the Prince was able to do, for much of the campaign, what no
previous leader of a Highland army had been able to do. He had
been able to give his men regular pay and regular provisions. Be¬
cause the extortion of such public monies was in the hands of senior
Jacobite officers it seams to have been done with a certain degree
of fairness.
Three facts,however, should be borne In mind. The extortion
was in general accompanied by the threat of military execution,
forced quartering of troops or burning of effects. It also often
followed, or was followed by, legitimate government extortion of
(1) "Atholl Correspondence" p.181. Letter of Thomas Blair of
Glasclune from Perth, February 1st to Tullibardine,
(2) ibid. p.146-7,
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the same levy, so that in many oases individuals must have been
faced with the possibility of being foroed to pey the same sum
twice, to different sides. This was, for instance, the case with
Atholl rents. The Duke of Atholl, on his return to the estates in
.1746 attempted the collection of rents not paid since September
(1)
1745.
Lastly, this comparatively efficient and fair levying of
public money had degenerated considerably by the last stages of
the campaign. Military strength was essential in order to raise
money, When, from February 1746 onwards, the rebel army was in
fact on the defensive, this military Strength was not available,
and the disastrous collapse, illustrated above, of both financial
and supply organisation followed.
1, See above Chapter 2.
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CHAPTER 8.
THE EXPENDITURE OF THE JACOBITE ARMY
There are few sources which provide much detailed information
on the expenditure of the rebel army. Both Lord George Murray and
John 0*Sullivan, the Adjutant and Quarter Master General of the
rebel army, make fairly frequent but undetailed references to
expenditure, especially on food and forage of various kinds. The
Correspondence of Lord Croaartie and Lord Pitsligo also contain
many such references, while the memoirs of Maxwell of Kirkconnell
and of Lord llcho provide more fleeting references. In none of
these Instances, however, is the information given in any detail,
nor is expenditure itemised.
(1)
The Household accounts of James Glbb, the Master of the
Prince's Household do provide, in general, such detailed and
itemised information, but his accounts, which only begin in regu¬
lar form on October 30th, 1745, deal only with the expenses of
the seventy or so members of the Prince's household, and not with
the general expenditure of the army as a whole. His accounts form,
in fact, only a very small fragment of the general picture,
More useful are the accounts kept by Laurence Oliphant of
Gask of the expenditure of that part of the Jacobite army which
remained at Perth, under the command of Lord Strathallan and
Lord John Drumraond, while the main Jacobite army was advancing into
(2)
England. Here again, however, the accounts do not begin until
(3)
October, and they refer only to the expenditure of a portion of
(1) "Lyon in Mourning". Vol. II p.115 - 152.
{2} "Jacobite Lairds or C-esk". p.129 et sea.
(3) In this case the 11th of the month.
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the rebel army. They do provide, however, an indication of the
general level of pay within the rebel force and of the ma^or
sources of expenditure.
For further details of expenditure we are forced to rely on
miscellaneous itemised accounts, such as the rough regimental
accounts of Cluny Macpherson, for instance, which are among the
miscellaneous manuscripts in the West Highland Museum at Fort
William. Such sources help to fill in what is, at best, however,
an incomplete picture.
The Jacobite officials chiefly concerned with expenditure were
the Quarter Master General, Colonel O'Sullivan, his deputy, Robert
(1)
Anderson (younger of Whitburgh), the Ccamaissary General, Lachlan
Maclachlan of Castle Lachlan, the Paymaster, Charles Stewart of
Maryburgh, the Prince"s Secretary, John Murray of Broughton, his
Treasurer, John Hay of Restalrig, and the Vice Chamberlain of the
Prince's Household, William Murray of Taymount. The Household
accounts were kept by James Gibb and he was accountable for these
accounts to Colonel Francis Strickland, and after news of Strickland's
death in January 1746 to Jaxuas Hay of Restalrig, who was also Murray
of Broughton'a successor as Secretary, Also concerned with expendi¬
ture was John Goodwillle of "Edinburgh who was Secretary to Murray of
Broughton. After the defeat at Culloden, and the subsequent dis¬
persal of the army, Ewen Macpherson of Cluny remained in charge of
what little money remained and of its expenditure. The expenditure
by the Jacobite force at Perth from October 1745 until January 1746
was controlled by Laurence Oliphant of Gask.
(1) apparently appointed with other deputies at Edinburgh on
Lord George Murray's insistence, so as to counterbalance the
influence of O'Sullivan, of whom Lord George strongly dis¬
approved. See O'Sullivan, p.88/9 note 1.
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Cask was deputy commander, under Lord Strathallan, at Perth,
until the force collected at Perth joined the main body at Stirling
on or about January 6th 1746. From then on Gask was apparently
responsible still for the expenses connected with the transport
of the artillery from Perth, and for the pay of those troops of
the Cromartie regiment engaged in this work. He apparently re¬
mained at Perth until the general retreat north at the beginning
of February, and at Perth was responsible for the pay of Raasay*s
men and the Perthshire recruits enlisted as a result of the
acivities of Lord Tullibardine at Blair.
The chief item of expenditure amongst all these accounts was,
(1)
of course, the soldiers1 pay. Of a total sum of over £5,500 Sterling
handled by Gask, over £3,800 was expended on army pay. The provision
of shoes and weapons accounted for further expenditure, and in the
Gask accounts these items accounted for £186.6.0. and £190.11.ljd.
respectively. The first item would undoubtedly have been larger
but for the compulsory provision of shoes and clothing by Edinburgh
and Glasgow in September and December 1745,
Payments to those who brought out their men also accounted for
expenditure. Oliphant of Gask paid out £89.14.6. for this purpose,
while the provision of fodder and food only accounted for £77.15.4.
£27.0.3^. was spent on the sending of expresses and £28,11,9. on pay
or compensation to the killed or wounded of the rebsl army.
The remaining items of expenditure were all in themselves small.
They included expenses in connection with raising the cess or other
publio monies, the housing of servants, the giving of drink money,
expenses connected with the housing of enemy prisoners, or the
celebrations of the victories of Prestonpans or Falkirk. In the
11) The actual figure is £5,553.16.10. of which £3880.7,11, was
spent on pay. See "Jacobite Lairds of Gask". n.129 at
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case of the Gask accounts these miscellaneous expenses led to a
total expenditure of £39.16.11,
The last ijiajor expenditure which the rebel army had to faoe
would consist of payments for the quartering of troops. These
quarters, both on the march to and retreat from Derby were care-
(1)
fully ordered and the provisions provided seem to have been
(2)
paid for, Later, on the retreat from Stirling, quarters for the
force which took the coastal route North were carefully ordered by
Lord George Murray. No reference to the cost of quarters occurs
however in the Gask accounts, and this suggests that the expenses
of quarters, like the provision of their men*s food, were matters
to be met either by the men themselves or by the individual
regimental commanders who served at Perth under Gask and Strathallan.
The rate of pay given to the men seems to have varied during
the campaign. The regular pay of the army did not begin until
August 28th. Until this date the men were paid only in kind, by
the distribution of food, usually in the form of sheep and cattle
slaughtered in the open. From then on a fairly regular scale of pay
seems to have been adhered to, until February 1746. The accounts of
Oliphant of Gask show a fixed rate of 6d. per dey for each private
throughout the period from November 1st until the beginning of
February, when Gask rejoined his own regiment , the Perthshire
Horse. During the previous month, however, from October 11th
onwards, the payment per man does not seem to have been standard¬
ised. On October 28th Gask paid out twelve shillings to "12 men
(3)
of Nairne", while on the following day he paid out fourteen
shillings as two days pay to 14 Nairn men, and on October 31st only
(1) See 0*Sullivan, p.91 et seq.
(2) See above, Chapter 7, p.153 et seq.
(3) Gask accounts."Jacobite Lairds of Gask". p.129.
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(1)
five shillings to "8 Nairne men and Mr. Cochran".
From November 1st omvards the Nairn men and all further
recruits were paid 6d. per day and sergeants pay was also fixed
at 9d. daily. Among the office^ Ensigns received l/6d, per
day, Lieutenants 2/-, Captains 2/6d,, Lieutenant Colonels 4/-
and Colonels 6/-. These figures were also fairly constant
throughout the campaign. Gregor or Grigor Murray, who brought
in 17 Atholl men on October 31st 1745, was paid 2/6d. per day
from then onwards, and Colonel Cameron (of Torcastle) was paid
at the rate of 6/- daily from November 20th onwards, as were all
other officers of similar rank. By the end of January, however,
the payments, like those for the early days up to November 1st,
become less uniform. On January 27th the payment to McLeod of
Raasay, who held the rank of Colonel, for himself and one man
for seven days was £2,6.1. not £2.5,6. as might be expected, while
on February 3rd their pay for the following seven days was £2.10.0.
From early February onwards standards of pay seem to have
declined rapidly. Among the miscellaneous papers of Ewen Macpherson
(2)
of Cluny is a rough account in Cluny*s handwriting of his ex¬
penditure between February 6th and March 24th, 1746. It begins
"32 days pay is £34.8.0," and then after a series of miscellaneous
ft
sums end with "16 days pay £19.8,0. At this period the Macpherson
regiment numbered three hundred and on March 15 Cluny left Ruthven
with the full regiment for the siege of Blair Castle. The number
of men for whom pay had to be provided should therefore be 300,
but pay at the earlier rate of 6d. a day for 32 days for 300 men
(1) ibid. p.129. This is possibly a mistaken entry. The same days
account also shows payment of 3/6d. to "3 Nairne men and Mr,
Cochran" bringing a total of 8/6d. to twelve men.
(2)West Highland Museum, Fort William,
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would total £240.0.0. without allowing for officers pay at all.
The sum allowed, £34.8.0., only provides for a daily expenditure
of £1.1.6. or pay for forty-three men, while the last entry of
£19.8.0, provides for a daily expenditure of £1.4.6. for a
further 16 days, in other words pay for 49 men. As the acoounts
seem to be regimental and not company acoounts this may suggest a
considerable decline in the rate of pay too. In this case a decline
to a rate of about Id, per day per man. Furthermore, pay was already
in arrears. Cluny's accounts were made up on March 25th but he is
calculating the account due to his men since February 15th.
This fall in the rate of pay is confirmed franother sources.
Maxwell of Kirkconnell writes that by March 1746 "the common men
were reduced to a weekly allowance of oatmeal instead of their
(1)
pay, which had formerly been very punctual", Lord George
(2)
Murray affirms that the army had had no pay for a month before
Culloden, and, as has been pointed out earlier, no money had
been found in or received from Inverness itself.
Apart from army pay, the second and only other major Item of
expenditure seems to have been the provisioning and quartering of
the army. Here it is not easy to discover how the expenditure on
provisions was controlled. Lord Strathallan, the commander In
ohief at Perth, seems to have controlled the quartermaster
General's department there himself, for in Gask's acoounts there
are only incidental and minor references to expenditure cn food or
forage and these only account for a total expenditure of
£77.15.4. during the entire period from October 11, 1745 to
April 15th 1746. These few references are to such items as
(1) Maxwell, p.131 and 132.
(2) Marches of the Highland Army. "Jacobite Memoirs" p.110.
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(1)
"bill for dinner to Lord Lewis Drummond and his officers",
suppers to celebrate the battle of Falkirk and similar items
and obviously have no bearing on the provisioning of the army
as a whole. Only six items suggest any suoh general provisioning.
They are as follows;
£. s, d,
1746, Jan, 8th To fifteen men for baking bread for
the army 25. 10, 0.
Jan.22nd To a mair sent through the Cars
(Cars© to order in wheat on D,Perth*s
letter, 4, 6.
Jan,23rd ^ chalder of coals 1, 7. 6.
Feb. 8th For forage to 32 horses of Perthshyre
Squadron for 2 days at 6d. per day
by rect. of John McNaughten,
Quartermaster, 1, 12. 0,
Ditto for the 8th & 9th at O.Aberdeen 1, 6. 2.
Feb,28th To corn for 5 horses different times 1. 6.
Feb.(or March?)18th. To a boll oats at Fochabers
for the horses of the squadron. 9. 4.
Of the first three entries only the first seems to belong
properly to the province of the Quartermaster, while the last
entries refer to the time after the retreat north on February 1st.
On February 6th Cask rejoined his own regiment, the Perthshire
horse, and as Lieutenant Colonel in command of one of the two
troops of the Horse Cask was now apparently responsible for the
provision and fodder of his own troop.
These entries suggest therefore that the providing of food and
fodder was the responsibility of the respective commanding officers
and that at Perth such expenditure was the province of a separate
department under Strathallan, whose aocounts did not pass through
Cask's hands. The cost of such provisions may explain the
(1) On January 11th 1746.
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transference of comparatively large sums of money at intervals,
to Strathallan. These transfers were of £15,0.0. on November
30th 1745, £31,10.0. on December 9th and £61.3.4. on February
4th.
The suggestion that individual commanders were responsible
for buying forage is also borne out by Cluny's accounts. His
full account is as follows:-
Feb. 6th from that to ye 25 March included
32 days pay is £34. 8. 0
at Gaskmhor 17. 12. 6
at Mllwhlnage 17. 0
To Angus 17. 0
To Flnlayson 17. 0
at Ruthven 6. 13, 0
To Sandie Macewan 6. 0. 0
To Garva at Ruthven 18. 5. 0
53. 2. 0
32 days pay 34. 8. 0
Remainder 18. 14. 0
10 days pay 19. 8. 0
The second, third, sixth and eighth items may suggest expenditure
on food at these places, while Cluny*s regiment were in Badenoch,
holding the passes in the Ruthven area until they joined Lord
George Murray for the siege of Blair Castle. Again, the responsi¬
bility of commanding officers for the provisioning of their men is
suggested by the Journal of John Cameron of Fort William, After
the night attack of 15th April 1746 "the provisions being all
spent, the Prince ordered each Colonel to send some of their
(1)
officers to Inverness with money to buy such as could be got".
By the last stages of the campaign, however, there was an
(1) "Lyon in Mourning". Vol. I. p.85.
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Inevitable overlapping of spheres, caused by the fact that the
men were now being paid not In cash but In kind. Both Lord
George Murray and Maxwell of Klrkconnel refer to this develop¬
ment, which had taken place by the 18th March 1746, if not
earlier. The Duke of Perth, writing from Tain on that date to
Lord Cromartie, states that "Lochgarry had been here on his way
to Inverness to seek his pay. I stoped him from going there and
told him that I was to order him meal in the meantime, telling
(1)
him Sullivan should come".
Those responsible for the distribution of meal were faced,
however, with an almost impossible task. Under Lord Pitsligo
and Lord Cromartie meal was to be collected from, and stored in,
granaries such as those of Lord Braco, or at Foulis House or in
(2)
Elgin itself, but this area and indeed the whole of the North
was in the midst of a great famine and scarcity, caused by
successive bad harvests. This scarcity was felt by government
(3)
commanders as well. The letters of Major General Campbell are
full of references to the scarcity of meal and cattle in Argyll.
On January 28th he says, for instance "this country and the whole
west of Scotland is faced with famine and with great scarcity of
(4)
money". The correspondence of Sir Everard Fawkener from
Aberdeen, from February 1746 onwards, also testifies to the
scarcity of meal which he encountered in supplying the Scottish
garrisons in government hands.
(1) "Cromartie Correspondence" Vol.2 p.210,
(2) See Chapter 3, and also Lord Pitsligo's and Lord Cromartie^
correspondence during March and April 1746.
(3) See Fergusson, "Argyll in the Forty Five" p.64 at seq,
(4) Fergusson - p.88. op.cit.
188.
The effect of such natural scarcity was intensified, for the
rebel axmy, by the lack of money from February 1746 onwards with
which to buy what food was available. The result was that the
army, by April 16th, the day of the battle of Culloden, was
nearing starvation point. Lochiel*s regiment, on April 14th, were
(1)
given a "few sacks of meal, of which some baked bread". By the
following day, according to Maxwell of Kirkconnellj ."few of the
(2)
common men had had anything to eat for a day or so". In order
to halt the dispersal of men in search of food each man was given
one biscuit, but those without servants to bring them in food
"were In a downright starving condition. The small pittance given
the men only made them want more and desertion continued in spite
(3)
of all efforts to stop it". It was equally impossible to stop
the dispersal in search of food when the army returned to Culloden
Moor at six a.m. the following day, exhausted after the fiasco of
the night maroh to Cumberland^ camp. These men had had no further
distribution of food since the one biscuit each of the previous
morning.
Maxwell of Kirkconnell blames the shortage of food on de¬
ficiencies in the organisation of supply, and argued that there was
at that time enough meal in Inverness to last the whole army a fort-
(4)
night, but for mismanagement. Sven Maxwell, however, is forced
to admit that "There was at that time a greater scarcity than
usual in the Highlands, which of themselves offer nothing in that





season# It would have been impossible for a considerable body
(1)
of men to subsist together.
With regard to the problem of quartering the army, there is
some evidence as to how these quarters were obtained, but none
as to whether they were paid for. In the absence of any refer¬
ences to money paid out for quarters the presumption is that they
were not paid for however. The provision of quarters seems to
have been the responsibility of operational commanders. A letter
of Cluny Maepherson, dated March 23, 1746, in the West Highland
Museum orders the provision of quarters in Huthven for the 1,500
men under his command in that area. In general the supervision of
(2)
quarters was in the hands of Lord George Murray. His "Marches
of the Highland Army" refers to his general plan of keeping the men
under his command in two sections, one marching a day behind the
other, so that the second detachment could occupy the quarters of
the first. This was done on the maroh south into England, on the
retreat north from Derby and on the retreat north from Stirling.
When the whole army was encamped at any one place for any period
of time it had to be dispersed for quarters In the surrounding
villages. This happened at Carlisle during its blockade in
November 1745, and before the battle of Falkirk, when the men
"were in so many cantonments for several miles around that it
was always mid day before they could be assembled where as the
enemy had only to strike tents for which they had carriages and
(3)
could march at daybreak",
(1J ibid, p.158.
(2) Though on the maroh south from Edinburgh Lord Kilmarnock was
sent ahead to secure quarters in the Kelso district. See
Sullivan, p.91.
(3) "Marches of Highland Army", p.80, "Jacobite Memoirs".
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The rebel army, having neither the horse nor the carriages
for the transport of tents, nor the money to provide them, were
always faced with this disadvantage in assembling their men
quickly.
The remaining expenses incurred by the army were not large.
The two chief items remaining to be catalogued were, first, the
cost of repairing and transporting weapons and providing ammunition,
and secondly of hiring horses for use by expresses and guides.
The expenditure on the first item was not in fact large. In
Gask*s lists it only accounts for £190.11,l|,, less than a twenty-
fifth of the total expenditure. The reason for the^ smallness of
this item lies in the fact that the rebel army possessed little
artillery and few stands of arms. What artillery they possessed
(1)
in the early stages of the campaign had to be left behind at
Shap on the retreat north from Derby. From now on the rebel
artillery consisted largely of the guns landed in October from France,
and brought via Alloa to the main Jacobite army after its return to
(2)
Scotland In January 1746. The transporting of this cannon
accounts for a large proportion of Gask*s expenditure on arms.
Apart from the small arms brought by Charles from France on the
(3)
"Du Teillay", and those landed later at Montrose and Peterhead,
a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition fell into the rebel
(4)
hands from the government garrison at Inverness, and the repair
of an ammunition for these arms accounted for the rest of this
expenditure. On March 2nd, for instance, 0'Sullivan, from
(1) It consisted of that gained from Cope after Prestonpans,
(2) See Chapter 7 p.154.
3) See Chapter 7. p.154.
4) 0,Sullivan, p.134.
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Inverness, wrote to Lord Cromartle H I would have sent as your
Lordship desired the 100 stand of armes by the troops that
parted this morning but do assure you there are not two in order
or condition to be made use of. We'll get gunsmith's to work
(1)
tomorrow to get as many as possibly we can in order".
The last item, the provision of horses for expresses and such
purposes, was a frequent item of expenditure. The rebel army was
always deficient in cavalry, and by the last stages of the campaign
the horse had dwindled to two troops only, with the remnants of
Pitsligo's and Strathallan's horse in reserve. Most of the
original Jaoobite horse, such as Kilmarnock's troop, now became
Foot Guards and those of their horses which remained were given
to complete the horse of FitzJames' troop. Accordingly, horses
for the carrying of expresses had to be hired or, later, comman¬
deered. Gask's accounts show that £27,0.3^ was spent on hiring
for this purpose, and 90 separate items of expenditure on
expresses are listed. Later, when the army reached Inverness
in February, 1746, and the financial situation had further
deteriorated, local horses were frequently commandeered, without
(2)
payment, as is shown in the area accounts of local farmers
from the Culloden area.
Almost every aspect of expenditure, however, shows the same
deterioration by the last two months of the campaign. The Gask
accounts show that Gask was forced to transfer large sums of
money to other commanders from last January 1746 onwards. On
January 22nd he handed over £515,0.0. to Murray of Broughton.
On January 23rd Gask wrote to Lord Nairne from Perth in reply,
apparently, to a letter asking for money to pay the ^tholl men,
(1) "Cromartie CorresDondence". Vol-2 n.197-
(2) See above, Chapter 7.
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(1)
and told him that £15.0.0, was all that could be spared. This
money, Gask's accounts show, was handed over on January 29th. On
February 4th, £61.3,4. was handed over to Lord Strathallan, and
on 31st March a further sum was transferred. Finally on 12th
April £126.0.0. was handed over to Prince Charles, Altogether,
between October and the end of December 1745, Gask transferred
(2)
£176.10.0, to individual commanders, while between 22nd January
and 12th April 1746 a sum of £857,3.4, was transferred.
Furthermore, the system of making payments, probably in lieu
of expenses, to those bringing out men, collapsed by the beginning
of 1746. Such payments seem to have been made from very early in
the Campaign. 0,Sullivan writes that at Lochnamuamh a hundred or
fifty guineas each was paid out to Lochiel, Keppoch and others,
"some more or lesse according to the following they had, so they
(3)
all set about raising their men"; and Gask*s accounts show that
a total of £89,14,6, was spent on similar payments. However,
apart from two payments of ten shillings and £2.10.0. to Macleod
of Haasay on January 10th and February 3rd, such payments end on
December 27th 1745, with the payment of £1,0,0. to Macleod of
(4)
Bernera for "charges endeavouring to raise 100 men in ye Hylands".
The accounting system as a whole seems very rough and
(1) "Atholl Correspondence" p.153,
(2) Made up as follows:
3rd Nov, to Col, Robertson of Drumachine £15.0,0.
9th " " Lovat*s Secretary 100,0,0.
30th " " Lord Strathallan 15.0.0.
3rd Dec. " Col. Robertson of Drumachine 15.0,0,
9th " " Lord Strethallar 31.0,0.
(3) O'Sulllvan, p.57.
(4) Gask Accounts. "Jacobite Lairds of Gask" p.151.
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unsystematic. The accounts kept by Gask, Cluny Macpherson and
James Glbb apparently consist of items hastily jotted down as
they occur. There is no attempt to summarise or classify ex¬
penditure, and, though large payments to individuals are made,
no details are given of what items are included in the sum. In
James Gibb's Household accounts there are frequent large gaps,
where only the place and name of a supplier of food is inserted,
but no details of amounts paid. The blank would be filled by
the "discharged account" provided by the supplier, presumably,
Cluny's accounts again provide no details of expenditure,
such large items as £17.12,6. figure only under the heading
"At Gaskmhor" although here this may be explained by the fact
that the account is possibly only part of a rough calculation,
rather than a regular detailed statement. It Is written on the
back of a letter dated March 23rd about the provision of quarters
for the men under his command.
The acoounts kept by Gask and James Gibb are, however, in¬
tended as permanent accounts and they are neither detailed nor
systematic. No system seems to have been employed, moreover, in
the distribution of pay to the men. The pay was handed over by
Gask to the Colonels concerned, but usually with no details of
the number of ranks of the men Involved. In 118 entries dealing
with pay, only 23 make any attempt at details of the number of
men involved. Even here the details are often only of numbers of
companies involved and none give any details of the ranks and rate
of pay. Also, pay was not given at regular or systematic inter¬
vals. Some regiments received their pay at seven day intervals
for most of the time for which Gask was reponsible, but the rest
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received it at varying intervals of between one and twenty-one days
throughout the period.
Men belonging to ten regiments were at times paid at seven
day intervals. They were the recruits gathering at Perth for
Macleod of Raasay, the Earl of Cromartie, Cluny Macpherson,
Lochiel, the Frasers, MacGregor of Glengyle, Macleod of Bernera,
the Maclachlans, and one company under a Captain Anderson. Even
in these cases, however, the men were not always paid at such
intervals* Until December 21st 1745 for instance the Cameron
recruits had been paid at varying intervals of 2, 3, 4, and 5
days, and Macpherson recruits had been paid in the early part
of November at both 4 and 8 day intervals. A separate company
of Frasers were paid at varying Intervals of 8, 14, 16 and 21
days throughout Gask*s stay at Perth,
The men belonging to the other regiments at Perth, were
paid irregularly throughout the campaign. The Atholl recruits
were paid at varying intervals of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8 days,
Glengarry recruits at intervals of 2, 3, 4, and 6 days, but
usually at intervals of 2 days, Appin Stuarts at intervals of
either 5 or 10 days, Barrisdale's at Intervals of 4, 5, 6, or
9 days and Glenooe men at intervals of either 6, 8, or 10 days.
Furthermore, though in general the men were paid in advance,
some companies were paid sometimes in advance and sometimes in
arrears. This is true of the Mackintosh companies during November,
and of Eraser companies at times during November and December and
January.
Again, although those who were paid at seven day intervals
normally got their pay in advance, and were paid seven days in
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advance, quite frequently their pay was given midway through a
seven day period, to cover three or four aays In arrears and
three or four days In advance.
To sum up, the systems of accounting and of payment employed
by the rebel army seems considerably more rudimentary than the
means employed to raise the money spent. There are frequent com¬
plaints by, for instance, Maxwell of Kirkconnell, of the way in
whidrfood and fodder was bought in and distributed, and much
duplication of officers responsible for the buying of fooa, and
also, as shown, of officers responsible for the commandeering of
it.
As a whole, therefore, an army well served by those reponsible
t+tlL
for providing money and provisions was less4served by those res¬
ponsible for expenditure and accounting.
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CONCLUSION.
The Jacobite Movement is not one which lends itself to easy
generalisations. The commonly held view that it was a predomi¬
nantly Highland movement much influenced by Roman Catholic
sentiment, has been demonstrated above to be in need of consider¬
able modification. Similarly modifications must be made in any
theory which ignores the importance of economic pressure, and
Of the forcing out of recruits. To imply, for instance, that
Jacobite enlistment was largely the product of a sentimental,
blind loyalty to the House of Stuart, is to be guilty of
considerable over-simplication. Similar criticisms must be
made of any consideration of the motives for Jacobite activity,
which neglects the importance of Episcopalian sentiment, while
over estimating the significance of Roman Catholicism in the
rebellion.
There were far closer links between the Episcopal Church
and the Jacobite movement, than between that movement and Roman
Catholicism. The whole administrative organisation of the
Episcopal Church depended on the headship of that church by the
Stuarts, The Roman Catholic hierarchy in both England and Scotland
found, by 1745, that association with the exiled House was a great
disadvantage. They were, therefore, anxious to minimise this
association wherever possible. But many Scottish Episcopalians,
on the other hand, believed that active support of Jacobitism was
their best hope of ending the persecution and disabilities which
(1) See above, Chapter 6, and see also M.A. Thesis, "The Working
of the Recusant Laws against Roman Catholics" by J.M. Price,
University of Wales 1924, p.71. et seq. for the attitude of
English Catholics to Jaoobitism.
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they suffered, Roman Catholics, both in England and Scotland,
had little hope that a successful Stuart Restoration would in
any material way improve their lot. They knew that the predomi¬
nant Anglicanism of any Parliament would effectively obstruct
any legislation designed to remove their disabilities. But
Scottish Episcopalians and English Non Jurors could hope for
much improvement in their legal position if a Jacobite rebellion
was successful,
A further important characteristic of Scottish Jacobitism
was the close-knit society to which its most important adherent
belonged. There were links, not only by marriage, but also
through blood kinship in both Perthshire and West Highland
Jacobite circles. Even in the Lowlands, Jacobitism in 1745 was
nearly always the product of a family history of loyalty to the
Stuarts very often strengthened by Episcopal adherence. Few
of rank whose families had no associations with either Jacobitism
or Episcopacy came out in 1745, Jaoobitism gained few new converts
in 1745, although the army which the movement put in the field
then was, in general, larger than in previous risings. This
increase was due, not to an expanding movement, but to greater
success in tapping all available sources of support, and in
mobilising the recruits.
This ability to tap all possible sources was the reason that
so much success was achieved. Three factors account for the long
duration and wide range of Jacobite military activity in 1745/6,
First the highly organised system of hiring out and forcing out
men, practised largely in Perthshire, Angus and the North East
Counties, Next - the fact that through their temporary possession
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of the wealth of the Lowlands the rebel army was able to levy
cess, land-tax, excise and other monies, and to seize goods in
(1)
kind for military use. The last factor was the administrative
ability of such men as Lord George Murray, Lord Pitsligo, and in
some measure, John Murray of Broughton, These men, with the
help of Oliphant of Gask, and of town governors like David
Fotheringham, and collectors of revenue like Sir John
(2)
Wedderburn, were largely responsible for the finance, supply
and movement of men and baggage, for the entire rebel army.
The administrative paper work which all this Involved, was in
the hands of officials like Hay of Restalrig, John Goodwillie,
and John Colville, These were men drawn mostly from the ranks
of the Lowland professions and commerce, and the Lowlands thus
made a very important contribution to the suocess of rebel
(3)
military administration.
As, however, the rebel army lost its control over the fertile
and wealthy Lowlands, and was forced to retire Northwards, so its
administration deteriorated. There were few publio revenues to
oolleot from February 1746 onwards, and supply difficulties became
increasingly desperate, the inevitable consequenoe of the military
decision to retire North from Stirling, The declining military
strength implied by this retreat was the cause of the difficulties
over finance and supply which followed. The collapse of the
(1) The bulk of the income handled by Strathallan as Governor of
Perth, for example, came from the revenues of the Land-Tax,
Excise and cess of Fife, Kinross and Perth. Jacobite
Lairds of Gask, p,14 et seq,
(2) See Gask Accounts, "Jacobite Lairds of Gask". p,118 et seq.
(3) See above Chapter 4.
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hitherto commendably capable Jacobite administration was the
result, not the cause, of military disintegration, but in the
vicious circle of cause and effect, that collapse was Itself
the cause of future military decline, as well as ths product
of earlier military failure.
The rigours of climate in a Northern winter campaign
increased the need for an efficient administration. With no
available facilities for barraoking troops, with no money for
tents, the Jacobite army had to depend on billeting for the
quartering of its troops. The army was, however, operating
chiefly in areas where there were no villages large enough to
accommodate the whole army. Those responsible for quartering
were forced therefore, to scatter their forces over a wide
area so as to secure food and quarters. This was the case
both before the skirmish at Inverurie and before the battles
of Falkirk and Culloden. This presented, of course an obvious
military advantage to the enemy.
Furthermore, although the Jacobite High Command showed
considerable skill in exploiting all financial resources avail¬
able, these resources were never sufficient to provide enough
horses for efficient army movement, This lack of horseBwas
responsible for continual difficulties in transporting artillery
(1)
and heavy baggage. It also made difficult both scouting and
rapid movement.
Finally, desertion as a cause of the Jacobite military
collapse after December 1745, although of some importance, was
(1) As at Alloa in January, 1746, or over Shap in November and
Daoember 1745, See above Chapters 4 and 8.
£00 ,
(1)
exaggerated by contemporary opinion. As has been suggested
above, desertion, although extensive among the Atholl brigade, was
not so large elsewhere. The apparent decline in numbers among the
men was very probably the result of optimistic over-exaggeration
of the numbers recruited in the first plaoe, combined with a
failure to anticipate the practical difficulties involved. In
the West Highlands, an area whose recruits have been most often
oharged with desertion, recruitment itself was comparatively
(2)
easy, and desertion relatively slight.
(1) Chapters 2 and 3 especially,
(2) See above, Chapter 1,
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APPENDIX.




Du Telllay arrives off Briskay
Du Telllay reaches Loch Namllemph
July 26 - Aug,19 Charles Joined by Macdonald of Kinlooh-
moidart, Young Clanranald, Glenaladale,
Scotus, Keppoch, Lochiel and others.
Skirmish In which Captain Swetenham Is
seized by Lochgarrys,
Skirmish at Hlghbridge,
Raising of the standard at Glenfinnan,
Army leaves Glenfinnan for head of Loch
Ell and (eventually) Edinburgh.
Cope turns aside at Corryarrick.
Cope arrives at Inverness.
Jacobite army reaohes Blair Atholl.
September 4-11 Jacobite army occupies Perth.
Cope enters Aberdeen.
Jacobite army enters Edinburgh.
Cope arrives at Dunbar.
Battle of Prestonpans,
French arms etc. reach Montrose and are
















Main Jacobite force marches South from
Edinburgh•
Main force reaches Carlisle.
Surrender of Carlisle.
(1) For further details of all these movements, see Chapters
















Main body reaches Lancaster,
The Hazard seized at Montrose.
Main body reaches Preston, thence
via Manchester, Macclesfield.
Leek to Derby.
Main body retires from Derby to Ashbourne,
thence via Macclesfield, Preston,
Manchester, Kendal, Penrith to
Carlisle
Main body occupies Annan and Ecclefeohan
Lord Lewis Gordon recruiting in Banff and
Aberdeen, routs Macleods at Inverurie.
Main body occupies Glasgow,
Main body leaves Glasgow for Cumbernauld
and Kilsyth.
Charles at Bannockburn House, main body
occupy surrounding villages. The
Cromartie and Cameron Regiments occupied
in escorting French artillery from Perth
across the Forth at Alloa.
Main Body joined by reinforcements
gathered during November and December at
Perth under Strathallan.
Stirling town surrenders.
Siege of Stirling Castle begins.
Last of Hawley*s troops reach Edinburgh
(total now 12 Regiments of foot and 2 of









Hawley*s advance guard enters Linlithgow,
Tulllbardlne sets out for Blair to
recruit men.
Battle of Falkirk, after which Falkirk
occupied by Jacobite force. Highland
Regiments encamped at Falkirk, rest at
Stirling.
Cumberland reaches Edinburgh,
Cumberland marches to Linlithgow,
Jacobite retreat north begins • army spends
night at Dunblane, Doune and neighbouring
villages, thence retreats north in two bodies,





II Lord George and Atholl 3rigade, Lowland








Sir Andrew Agnew with government force of













Charles* contingent enters Inverness.
Lord George's contingent enters Inverness.
Loudoun and government troops at Inverness
retreat across the Firth.
Jacobite army in detachments between
Aberdeen and Inverness.
Cumberland begins advance from Perth to
Aberdeen, via Dundee and Montrose.
Arrival of detachments of Berwick*s French
Regiment at Peterhead,
Jacobite force evaouat.es Aberdeen,
Cumberland's van reaches Aberdeen,
Cromartie sent in pursuit of Loudoun.
Jacobite siege of Fort Augustus begins
under Brigadier Stapleton.
Surrender of Fort Augustus. Stapleton
begins the siege of Fort William,
Lord George leaves Inverness for attack
on Blair Castle, joining Cluny Macpherson
in Badenoch.
Cumberland orders Bland to advance to
Strathbogie.
Main Jacobite army under Lord John Drummond
withdrew from Strathbogie in view of
Bland's advance, Jacobite detachments
placed at Elgin, Gordon Castle, Fochabers,
Cullen, etc.
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Duke of Perth with Lord Cromartie dis¬
perses Loudoun's force near Dornoch.
Skirmish at Keith with Kingston's Korse.
Hazard sloop runs ashore and is seized
by Lord Reay at Tongue*
Six battalions and two cavalry regiments
of Cumberland's occupy Strathbogie,
Lord George Murray abandons siege of
Blair Castle on orders to return to
Inverness.
Jacobite force returnsto Inverness-from
siege of Blair Castle, Macphersons remaining
in Badenoch to hold the passes.
Siege of Fort William abandoned,
Cumberland with rest of his force leaves
Aberdeen,
Cumberland occupies Cull en
Duke of Perth retires across Spey,
Duke of Perth and Lord John Drummond
retire to Nairn. Cumberland encamped
between Elgin and Forres,
Cumberland advances to Nairn, Duke of Perth
retires to Culloden, orders sent out to
recall outlying troops from Badenoch, eto,
Lochiel and Camerons return from siege of
Fort William.
Night attack on Cumberland fails. Lord
Cromartie and others siezed at Dunrobin
Cast1e,
Battle of Culloden,
